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This thesis focuses on the attempt by the post-war British Labour and 
Conservative administrations to use the British Army of the Rhine (BAOR) as a 
tool to improve relations with the German civilian population during the early 
stages of the Cold War. The original contribution to knowledge lies in the 
evaluation of the efforts made by both the British and the German 
administrations to transform the BAOR from an occupation army to a protecting 
force and utilise its presence to strengthen German integration into the Western 
defence against communism. Although historians have evaluated the BAOR’s 
role in Germany from a strategic and military perspective, the political and social 
contexts resulting from the presence of nearly 80,000 British troops and their 
families during the early period of post-war German sovereignty have so far 
been largely neglected. This study considers not only the official contacts 
between the Services and the Germans, but also the more individual levels of 
contact, including living conditions of troops, social interaction and points of 
friction between soldiers and civilians.  
The thesis argues that the success of the transformation of the BAOR 
from a force of occupation to a tool of integration depended on two factors: the 
receptiveness of the German population to the new role of the BAOR and the 
attitudes of the British Services in conducting their new relationships with 
German civilians. It examines the German perceptions of the British Services by 
analysing hostile incidents between troops and civilians as well as comparing 
the popularity of the British Services with that of the other occupying powers in 
the young Federal Republic. Furthermore, it seeks to establish to what extent 
the widespread unwillingness of the Services to engage with Germans, which 
was evident in 1948, was transformed by the mid-1950s. This entails the 
analysis of the representation of Germany in British media and popular culture 
as an influence on troops in the BAOR as well as initiatives taken by the 
Services themselves to improve relations. 
ii 
 
The main findings of the thesis are that, although significant changes 
were implemented by the British administration to improve relations, the BAOR 
was not an effective tool to strengthen the Anglo-German partnership. This was 
partly due to the organisational structure of the Services but also due to a 
widespread reluctance by British troops to engage with the German population. 
Despite some local successes, the main achievement of the British and German 
administrations throughout the period in question was not an improvement but 
rather the prevention of a deterioration of relations between British Servicemen 
and German civilians in a crucial period of German integration into the Western 
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Chapter One: Introduction 
 
 
If we are to give the Germans a sense of community with the West 
something more must be done by the Services than through purely 
professional contacts and cooperation. A real sense of community must 
be fostered not only at work but in normal human relationships as well.1 
 
 
Context: The British Army of the Rhine after the Second World War 
 
The British Army of the Rhine (BAOR), just like its predecessor in 1919, was 
stationed in Germany in 1945 as an army of occupation following the defeat of 
Germany. However, with the advent of the Cold War and the establishment of 
the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) in 1949, the Rhine Army turned 
into a very different force. For the first time in the history of the British Army, the 
BAOR evolved into a major military presence, permanently stationed in 
Germany as the British contribution to the defence of Western Europe against 
communism. This contribution led not only to the stationing of British soldiers in 
Germany, but also included Servicemen’s wives and children. At its peak in the 
1950s, the BAOR employed nearly 80,000 troops in the British zone of 
Germany.2 This troop contribution not only included the British Army but also the 
British Air Forces of Occupation (BAFO). 
                                                             
1 N[ational] A[rchives], F[oreign] O[ffice 953/1662, PC 1181/16, Letter J.M. 
Fisher, British Information Services, Bonn to R.A.A. Chaput de Saintonge, 
German Information Department, Foreign Office, London, 16 March 1956.   
2 Graham E. Watson, Richard A. Rinaldi, The British Army in Germany: An 
Organizational History, 1947-2004, Milton Keynes, 2005, p. 22. 
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The country these troops were stationed in transformed rapidly, from the 
Nazi enemy of 1945 to a Cold War ally of the 1950s. At the Paris Peace 
Conference in May 1952, West German sovereignty was officially restored and 
the Allied Occupation of the Federal Republic formally came to an end. Good 
and constructive relations between the BAOR and the Germans were henceforth 
of great importance. This was due to the fact that the Services were now 
stationed in Germany by agreement with a sovereign government and not by 
virtue of their victory in the Second World War.3 In the eyes of the British 
Foreign Secretary Ernest Bevin, the role of Western Germany had very quickly 
changed, from that of Britain’s biggest enemy in 1945 to that of a necessary ally 
against the much bigger threat of the Soviet Union.4 There was, however, 
considerable reluctance among sizeable parts of the British public, as well as 
many members of both the Labour and Conservative administrations, to put any 
trust in a possibly rearmed Germany so soon after the Second World War. 
Nonetheless, despite a suspicious public and a very often German-phobic press, 
both Labour and Conservative governments aimed at improving relations with 
Germany, above all for the sake of the Washington-led defence of Europe 
against communism.  One means for the improvement of relations was to be the 
British Rhine Army. 
As Anne Deighton, a Professor of European International Politics, with a 
particular interest in Anglo-German international relations after the war, has 
pointed out, by 1945 Britain had survived five years of ‘Total War’ against 
Germany, and this war had occurred only twenty years after the Great War of 
                                                             
3 NA, FO, 371/109787. 
4 Bevin Memorandum, 3 May 1946, cited in: Anne Deighton, The Impossible 
Peace: Britain, The Division of Germany and the origins of the Cold War, 
Oxford, 1993, p. 231. 
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1914-18.5 It is therefore hardly surprising that Germany was to remain unpopular 
with the majority of the British public and with many elites in political life, and in 
Whitehall, for many decades to come. This was still strikingly evident as late as 
1989, when the question of German unification arose.6 Popular representations 
of Germany even to this day are powerfully conveyed in Britain through the 
showing and reshowing of old Second World War films. The popular press 
generally needs very little prompting before indulging in outbursts of chauvinistic 
attacks on Germany.7 The unpopularity of Germany in Britain was particularly 
understandable in the decade or so after the Second World War. Many public 
and political figures had personal memories of war, and thousands had lost 
friends and family members. Many others had seen their homes, streets and 
town and city centres damaged or destroyed by the Blitz.8 It would therefore not 
be surprising if resentment towards the Germans was also felt by many of the 
members of the British Army of the Rhine stationed in Germany after the war.  
Yet despite all this, by 1956, little more than a decade after the end of 
hostilities, the British Government had invested millions of pounds and millions 
of man-hours into the economic and political rehabilitation of the western part of 
Germany. The British helped to secure Marshall Aid for the three western 
                                                             
5 Anne Deighton, ‘Minds, not Hearts: British Policy and West German 
Rearmament’ in: Haase, Christian (ed.), Debating Foreign Affairs. The Public 
and British Foreign Policy since 1867, Berlin, 2003, p. 78. 
6 Evgenios Michail, ‘After the War and after the Wall: British Perceptions of 
Germany following 1945 and 1989’, in: University of Sussex Journal of 
Contemporary History, Issue 3, September 2001. 
7 Anne Deighton, ‘Minds, not Hearts’, p. 78. 
8 For example, some 50,000 houses in inner London were destroyed or 
damaged beyond repair, with a further 66,000 in outer London. Some 288,000 
more houses London-wide were seriously damaged and another two million 
slightly damaged. See for example: Jerry White, London in the Twentieth 
Century, A City and Its People, London, 2008, p. 39. 
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German zones of Occupation, and gave military support for West Berlin in the 
face of an alarming Soviet land blockade of the city. Britain also played a key 
role in creating a West German state with a military capacity, pledging itself to 
two formal alliances which included the new German state, NATO and Western 
European Union. Also, for the first time in history, Britain stationed its troops – 
the BAOR – on German soil indefinitely as part of a combined Western 
European defence effort. There was therefore a remarkable inconsistency 
between government policy and at least parts of British public opinion.9 The 
British press frequently reacted with incomprehension to government policy.10 
The BAOR, arguably caught between the two extremes, would have to side with 
government policy rather than public opinion if it was to play its role in the 
process of transforming the relations between Britain and Germany from victor 
and vanquished to alliance partners. British concerns over political stability in the 
newly established Federal Republic and the financial burden the British Services 
placed on the German population did not make the task of the BAOR easier. 
The British Services in Germany were in a unique and challenging position. 
There was a marked contrast in reactions to the Services by the German 
population. On the one hand there were complaints from many quarters about 
the impact of the continuing occupation by foreign troops on housing shortages, 
manoeuvre damage and crimes committed by soldiers. On the other hand there 
was widespread fear of the consequences a reduction of the same forces was to 





                                                             
9 Anne Deighton, ‘Minds, not Hearts’, p. 78. 
10 Matthias Schönwald, ‘New Friends – Difficult Friendships: Germany and its 
Western Neighbours in the Postwar Era’, Contemporary European History, Vol. 





This thesis intends to evaluate the political and social impact of the British 
attempt to transform the BAOR from an occupation force of the defeated Nazi 
Germany to an alliance partner of the Federal Republic of Germany, which 
joined NATO as a full member in 1955. The time period covered is from 1948, 
when it became increasingly evident that the western zones of Germany would 
merge into a semi-sovereign state, to 1957, when the generally good political, 
economic and cultural understanding that had been developed between Britain 
and Germany through hard work, began to take a turn for the worse. Within little 
more than half a decade it deteriorated to the worst level since the end of the 
war.11 This deterioration was partly due to the general weakening of British 
relations with Europe over the question of British entry into the European 
Economic Community (EEC) and the European Free Trade Association (EFTA), 
but also due to the fact that from 1956 onwards the question of BAOR troop cost 
and German unwillingness to cover these increasingly soured Anglo-German 
relations.12  
This thesis thus aims to establish the extent to which the BAOR, nearly 
80,000 strong by 1954 and geographically spread over the former British zone of 
Occupation, provided an effective tool for the improvement of Anglo-German 
relations. This entails the analysis of the difficulties encountered by both the 
British and the German administrations during the attempts to come to a better 
understanding between the BAOR and the German public, as well as the degree 
of success achieved in the political, economic and individual contexts. This 
                                                             
11 Sabine Lee, Victory in Europe? Britain and Germany since 1945, Harlow, 
2001 p. 72. 
12 For the debate on troop costs see for example: Hubert Zimmermann, ‘The 
Sour Fruits of Victory: Sterling and Security in Anglo-German Relations during 




thesis will shed new light on an important angle of Anglo-German diplomatic, 
military and social relations after 1945, and evaluate its impact on the wider 
context of European integration after the Second World War.  
Attempts by the British Control Commission for Germany (CCG) to 
achieve better relations between Occupation troops and German civilians began 
soon after the war. Early initiatives ranged from the instructions given by the 
British Military Governor in Germany, Sir Brian Robertson, to British officials in 
Germany in 1947 to accept the Germans as a ‘Christian and civilized people’, to 
an encouragement of contacts between German and British children. They also 
included joint participation in sports and games.13 However, the Military 
Governor had no influence on the running of the BAOR. As a result the Army, at 
least initially, had very different ideas regarding fraternization with Germans and, 
three years after the cessation of hostilities, there was ‘no great desire evinced 
to associate much with Germans’.14 One of the main aims of this research is to 
examine to what extent this reluctance was overcome between 1948 and 1957 
among the various ranks of the BAOR and which attempts were made to 
transform the initial unwillingness of British personnel to engage with Germans. 
It is important in this context to consider the difference in attitudes between 
officers and ranks, regular soldiers and National Servicemen as well as the 
Army and the Royal Air Force (RAF).       
 
 
Key Argument and Approach 
 
The main focus of this thesis is to examine the relationships between the 
military, political and social contexts in which the BAOR operated. Its main 
hypothesis is that the BAOR was in fact a missed opportunity for the British to 
develop a close relationship with the newly established Federal Republic. One of 
                                                             
13 NA, FO 1032/1465. 
14 NA, FO 1014/26. 
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the main premises of the thesis is that a successful demonstration of a new 
attitude towards the German population by the British Forces arguably served as 
a useful contribution to a number of short and long-term British security 
interests, both in regards to Germany itself as well as to the defence of Europe. 
This issue concerned both the military as well as the social contexts of relations 
between the BAOR and the Germans, as British military objectives in Germany 
were closely connected to the behavior and actions of British troops on the 
ground. This thesis will evaluate the role of the BAOR’s presence in the context 
of a number of key issues, including the rearmament of Germany. This was 
considered a necessity by Chiefs of Staff even before the outbreak of the Cold 
War, but opposed by sizeable portions of both the British and German public. 
The BAOR also posed an easy target for anti-Western propaganda from both 
the left and right of the political spectrum in Germany. 
 Furthermore, the questions of British and German contributions to the 
European defence system (initially within the proposed European Defence 
Community (EDC), later within NATO, when the BAOR formed the main element 
of NATO’s Northern Army Group (NORTHAG)), as well as continued German 
payments for the upkeep of the large number of BAOR bases were issues which 
had an impact on the BAOR’s position vis-à-vis the German population. On the 
one hand, a German contribution to European defence took some of the burden 
off British shoulders by spreading the task of European defence among a larger 
number of countries. On the other hand, German rearmament, especially 
coupled with German sovereignty, threatened to cut off all or part of the German 
contribution to the maintenance of the BAOR, whilst not contributing to the task 
of ‘controlling’ Germany.15 Good relations between troops and Germans were 
furthermore important once West Germany had entered NATO and Britain had 
agreed to the first ever peace-time commitment for a permanent involvement of 
British forces on the continent. This had been a crucial step to convince the 
                                                             
15 Sabine Lee, Victory in Europe, p. 59. 
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French to accept German rearmament.16 A hostile German population was 
arguably a potential threat to continued German payment for the upkeep of the 
BAOR, as well as the stationing of the troops themselves as part of the 
European defence system. Hence the social context of public opinion was a 
uniquely important arena that intersected with military intentions. 
The political context of this thesis examines the use of the BAOR to 
improve the relations between the British and German governments. Arguably 
the BAOR also constituted an important political asset for Britain. As previously 
noted the political relationship between Britain and Germany during the period in 
question changed from one of victor and vanquished to one of two sovereign 
states. By the early 1950s London attempted to use the BAOR to support the 
pro-Western government of the Federal Republic. British Deutschlandpolitik at 
governmental levels was arguably more aimed at British European interests, the 
containment of the Soviet threat and the ‘Special Relationship’ with the US in 
general rather than the improvement of Anglo-German relations in particular.17 
However, in order to achieve these British interests, namely the twin problems of 
controlling Germany and containing the Soviet Union, the BAOR was an 
important tool, and therefore friendly Anglo-German political relations were 
crucial. A negative image of British troops among the German population 
potentially played into the hands of those political forces in Germany, which 
were against a close alliance with the West, particularly after the release of 
Stalin’s notes on German unification in March 1952. The political aspect of the 
proposed research will therefore highlight the role the BAOR played in the tense 
political climate of the early Cold War in Europe.  
On a social level, which includes the values and perspectives, the 
subjectivity, of the British soldier, this thesis aims at finding out to what extent 
anti-German sentiment among groups and individuals in the BAOR might have 
                                                             
16 NA, FO 371/124622, C.H. Johnston, Memorandum on ‘Economy in our forces 
in Germany’, 14 May 1956. 
17 Sabine Lee, Victory in Europe, p. 51. 
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hindered the process of Anglo-German reconciliation. One hypothesis of the 
thesis is that anti-German sentiment would be expected to be even stronger in 
the BAOR than among the general British public, as many British conscripts may 
have lived through the Blitz as children and many officers might have personally 
fought against the German Wehrmacht. British Servicemen were also more 
likely than the rest of the population to show an interest in cultural products 
featuring the British war effort against Germany. Particularly fictional literature 
and war films, produced in large numbers throughout the period in question and, 
as will be seen, popular among troops, would have further impacted on their 
views. Perhaps unsurprisingly, one Foreign Office paper argued as late as 1954, 
that the attitude of the Forces in general and the Army in particular towards the 
German population had so far been unsatisfactory and that more efforts should 
be made towards better relations.18  
This thesis aims to analyze the official efforts to facilitate better relations, 
taken at the different levels of the British administration in London and Germany 
due to the initial reluctance of the Army to engage with Germans. It also 
assesses the levels of success achieved in the four districts of the BAOR in 
Germany, ranging from the Hamburg district in the north to the Rhine district in 
the south. The large number of bases all over the British zone in cities like 
Hamburg, as well as in more rural areas like Bielefeld, poses an opportunity to 
examine the relations between soldiers and civilians in various different social 
and geographical settings. Furthermore the research aims to highlight how 
different military leadership in different bases might have influenced relations 
between the BAOR and the Germans. It is important in this context to consider 
the RAF contribution to the British military presence. The British Forces in 
Germany also included the 2nd Tactical Air force, which posed additional 
problems to local relations due to noise caused by low-flying aircraft and the use 
of bombing ranges in Germany. The example of the German island of 
Heligoland, which had been evacuated by the British in 1945 and used as a 
                                                             
18 NA, FO 371/109787. 
10 
 
bomb target, was the most notorious case here.19 This thesis will therefore also 
consider the efforts made by RAF units to improve Anglo-German relations and 
compare these with Army initiatives. The British Forces will also be evaluated in 
the context of the other occupying powers in Germany, particularly the 





Despite the obvious importance of Anglo-German relations in the context of the 
making of postwar Europe, the coverage of the bilateral political and cultural co-
operation between 1948 and 1957 in general is relatively sketchy and has only 
recently begun to attract wider scholarly attention. This is partly due to the fact 
that the independent significance of bilateral relations in post-war Europe in 
general was somewhat diminished by the increasingly close European-wide 
cooperation in the context of the Cold War. Arguably this was particularly true for 
Britain and Germany. Germany’s desire for rehabilitation and supranational 
collaboration within the EEC increasingly contrasted with Britain’s focus on inter-
governmental trade relationships envisaged by EFTA. As a result for neither the 
partner across the Channel was a top priority.20  
                                                             
19 Ivone Kirkpatrick, The Inner Circle, p. 236. 
20 Sabine Lee, Victory in Europe, p. 50. Gottfried Niedhart goes as far as 
claiming that specific attempts to improve the bilateral aspect of the Anglo-
German political relationship were in fact notably absent. Gottfried Niedhart, ‘Die 
Bundesrepublik Deutschland in der britischen Politik der fünfziger Jahre: 
Rearmed but once again a healthy member of the Western family’, Historische 
Mitteilungen, 3, 1990, p. 186. There are nonetheless clear efforts evident on 
both sides to improve bilateral relations. See Sabine Lee, Victory In Europe, p. 




Some wider political aspects involving Anglo-German relations have been 
covered in far more detail than others. The ‘German question’ for instance has 
been extensively covered, particularly by German historians in a European and 
Cold War context.21 There are also numerous publications on British foreign 
policy towards Europe since 1945.22 By contrast far fewer scientific works 
examine the early political development of the Federal Republic (FRG) under 
Konrad Adenauer.23 Also, when considering Allied policy towards Germany, it is 
US policy which so far has attracted far more scholarly attention than its British 
and French counterparts.24 The reason for this lies partly in the fact that the 
majority of works on the subject has been produced by German historians with a 
focus on German-American relations. The selection of secondary sources is 
comparatively small when dealing with British policy towards Germany and 
Anglo-German relations once the FRG had been established in 1949. Again the 
majority of publications have been produced by Germans25 but here (regardless 
of the lack of access to archival material) the early works by the British historian 
                                                             
21 See for example Wolf D. Gruner, Die deutsche Frage in Europa 1800 bis 
1990, München, 1993; David P. Calleo, The German Problem Reconsidered. 
Germany and the World Order, 1870 to the Present, Cambridge, 1978. 
22 See for example Anne Deighton, Britain and the First Cold War, Basingstoke, 
1990; Elisabeth Barker, Britain in a divided Europe, 1945-1970, London, 1971.  
23 See for example Hans-Peter Schwarz, Die Ära Adenauer: Gründerjahre der 
Republik 1949-1957, Stuttgart, 1981. 
24 See for example Hans-Jürgen Grabbe, Unionsparteien, Sozialdemokratie und 
Vereinigte Staaten von Amerika 1945-1966, Düsseldorf, 1983; Thomas A. 
Schwartz, America’s Germany. John McCloy and the Federal Republic of 
Germany, Cambridge 1991; Hermann-Josef Rupieper, Der besetzte 
Verbündete. Die Amerikanische Deutschlandpolitik 1949-1955, Opladen, 1991. 
25 For recent examples see: Yvonne Kipp, Eden, Adenauer und die deutsche 
Frage and Daniel Gossel, Briten, Deutsche und Europa, Stuttgart, 1999. 
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Donald C. Watt stand out. The more recent publications by Anne Deighton also 
add important insights here.26  
Compared with later years, the period between 1945 and 1949 in general 
is covered in far more detail in both British and German publications when it 
comes to British Occupation policy and the German reaction to it. This also 
applies to individual relations between Britons and Germans.27 Likewise, the 
later period between 1955 and 1961 has been dealt with recently, for example, 
by Sabine Lee and Daniel Gossel.28 Memoirs of high-ranking British and 
German diplomats of the time also provide some useful information on the 
                                                             
26 Donald C. Watt, Britain Looks to Germany, London, 1965; Donald C. Watt, 
‘Deutschland im Zwiespalt britischer Politik’, in: Walter Hofer (ed.), Europa und 
die Einheit Deutschlands. Eine Bilanz nach 100 Jahren, Köln, 1970, p. 119-158; 
Donald C. Watt, ‘Anglo-German Relations Today and Tomorrow’, in: Karl Kaiser 
and Roger Morgan (eds.), Britain and West Germany, Changing Societies and 
the Future of Foreign Policy, London, 1971, p. 203-218; Donald C. Watt, 
‘Perceptions of German History among the British Policy-Making Elite’, in: Josef 
Foschepoth and Rolf Steininger (eds.), Britische Deutschland-und 
Besatzungspolitik 1945-1949, Paderborn, 1985, p. 15-25; Anne Deighton, 
‘Minds, not Hearts’. 
27 Anne Deighton, The Impossible Peace, Oxford, 1990. Anne Deighton, ‘Cold-
War Diplomacy: British Policy Towards Germany’s Role in Europe, 1945-49’, in: 
Ian D. Turner (ed.), Reconstruction in Post-War Germany: British Occupation 
and the Western Zones, Oxford, 1989, pp. 15-36. 
Patricia Meehan, A Strange Enemy People, Germans under the British, 1945-
1950, London, 2001. 
28 Sabine Lee, An uneasy partnership: British-German Relations between 1955 
and 1961, Bochum, 1996. Daniel Gossel, Briten, Deutsche und Europa. As 
Gossel covers the relatively long period from 1945 to 1962 the years 1945 to 




topic.29 Yvonne Kipp points out that the majority of British publications on Anglo-
German relations during the post-war years tend to give a broader overview of 
the period.30 In contrast to this, German studies tend to mostly highlight more 
specific aspects.31 Kipp’s recent publication presents for the first time an 
analysis of the British Foreign Secretary and later Prime Minister Anthony 
Eden’s attitude and foreign policy towards Germany between 1951 and 1957 in 
its entirety, therefore providing a valuable addition to the wider topic addressed 
in this thesis.32  
When considering the Occupation forces of the western powers, the 
problems created by the American troop presence have been highlighted by 
John Willoughby. His work focuses on the threat to U.S. authority in Germany 
caused by the lawless behavior of American troops and the initiatives which 
prevented a deterioration of relations in the period between 1945 and 1948.33 
There has however been no publication focusing on the specific issue of the 
British Army of the Rhine and its potential role as a tool for the improvement of 
the newly found Anglo-German partnership and its relations with the Germans. It 
is this lack of historiography on the political and social aspects of the British 
military presence in the Federal Republic, which this thesis intends to address. 
                                                             
29 Here the memoirs of the British High Commissioner to Germany Ivone 
Kirkpatrick and the German Ambassador to London Hans von Herwarth stand 
out: Ivone Kirkpatrick, The Inner Circle; Hans von Herwarth, Von Adenauer zu 
Brandt. Erinnerungen, Berlin, 1990. 
30 For a particularly useful British example see Jeremy Noakes et. al. (eds.), 
Britain and Germany in Europe, 1949-1990, Oxford, 2002;  
31 For instance: Olaf Mager, Die Stationierung der britischen Rheinarmee, 
Baden-Baden, 1990. 
32 Yvonne Kipp, Eden, Adenauer und die deutsche Frage, Paderborn, 2002, p. 
28. 
33 John Willoughby, Remaking the Conquering Heroes: The Postwar American 
Occupation of Germany, Basingstoke, 2001. 
14 
 
Regardless of how vital bilateral Anglo-German political relations were 
during the period in question, from a military or security perspective there is a 
widespread consensus in secondary sources on the importance of the British 
contribution of forces to the continent. In matters of security and defence policy 
Britain aimed for a strong and united Europe to withstand Communism, albeit in 
an Atlantic, not a European framework. Germany was a crucial factor here.34 
Britain’s unprecedented contractual commitment in October 1954 to contribute a 
maximum of four divisions and a tactical air force was arguably the one really 
substantial, firm commitment in Britain’s post war defence experience.35 Anne 
Deighton’s recent article on Britain’s policy towards German rearmament 
demonstrates that, when considering Britain’s security policy, the anti-German 
strand of opinion may have been more easily recognisable but tended to be less 
powerful for decision-makers than the imperial and post-imperial strand. As a 
result Cold War priorities for strategic reasons were stronger than anti-
Germanism.36 The various potential aims of the stationing of the BAOR in 
Germany have been touched upon in a number of publications on Britain’s 
security and defence policy since 1945. Gottfried Niedhart points out that, apart 
from being an advanced defence of the British Isles37, the BAOR was 
increasingly to constitute a vital tool for achieving the long-term goal of 
Sicherheit für Deutschland instead of Sicherheit vor Deutschland.38 Beatrice 
                                                             
34 Matthias Schönwald, ‘New Friends – Difficult Friendships’, p 318. 
35 For the discussion on how effective and wholehearted this commitment was 
see: Paul Cornish, ‘The British Military View of European Security, 1945-50’, in: 
Anne Deighton (ed.), Building Postwar Europe, Basingstoke, 1995, p. 70. 
36 Anne Deighton, ‘Minds, not Hearts’, p. 79. 
37 Angelika Volle, Deutsch-Britische Beziehungen, Eine Untersuchung des 
bilateralen Verhältnisses auf der staatlichen und nichtstaatlichen Ebene seit 
dem Zweiten Weltkrieg, Bonn, 1976, p. 41. 
38 Gottfried Niedhart, ‘Die Bundesrepublik Deutschland in der britischen Politik 
der Fünfziger Jahre‘, p. 190. 
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Heuser’s work on Britain, West Germany and NATO shows that Britain went 
further than any other country bar the USA by unilaterally committing forces to 
Germany. She demonstrates that the stationing of the BAOR was part of a plan 
to incorporate West Germany into the Western Union (recast to become the 
Western European Union) and into NATO.39 Olaf Mager furthermore stresses 
the important fact that the stationing of the BAOR aimed far more at preventing 
a change of US defence strategy and a domestic destabilisation of the FRG than 
calming French fears of a resurging Germany.40 What has been neglected so far 
is the potential impact of relations between the BAOR and the Germans on 
achieving the above aims. The closely related issue of German rearmament has 
been documented in great detail, most recently by Spencer Mawby. His work 
also covers the changes in British policy towards the arming of the Federal 
Republic, from the entry into force of the Occupation statute in September 1949, 
up to the recruitment of the first volunteers at the end of 1955.41  
Secondary source material on the official relationship between the British 
Army and the Germans is very limited and so far only covers the period 
immediately following the German surrender in May 1945. Patricia Meehan 
provides very useful insight into this period and establishes that, unsurprisingly, 
                                                             
39 Beatrice Heuser, ‘Britain and the Federal Republic of Germany in NATO, 
1955-1990’, in Jeremy Noakes, Britain and Germany in Europe, p. 142. On the 
related topic of Britain, the failure of the EDC and German entry into NATO see 
Hans Heinrich Jansen, Grossbritannien, das Scheitern der EVG und der NATO-
Beitritt der Bundesrepublik Deutschland, Bochum, 1992. 
40 Olaf Mager, Die Stationierung der britischen Rheinarmee. Grossbritanniens 
EVG-Alternative, Baden-Baden, 1990, p. 2. 
41 Spencer Mawby, Containing Germany: Britain and the Arming of the Federal 
Republic, Basingstoke, 1999. See also Saki Dockrill, Britain’s Policy for West 
German Rearmament, 1950-1955, Cambridge, 1991; A.C. Azzola, Die 
Diskussion um die Aufrüstung der BRD im Unterhaus und in der Presse 
Großbritanniens, Nov.1949-Juli 1952, Meisenheim, 1971 
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things got off to a rather cool start. There were many obstacles in the way to a 
closer relationship, both between British and Germans as well as among the 
British themselves.42 Her publication demonstrates how the BAOR and the 
Civilian Control Commission for Germany (CCG), quickly nicknamed ‘Charlie 
Chaplin’s Grenadiers’ or ‘Complete Chaos Guaranteed’ by the Army, were soon 
just as far apart from each other as from the Germans.43 Furthermore Meehan 
demonstrates that in general Army personnel were rather reluctant to socialise 
with Germans and that, according to the CCG: 
 
there has to be re-education of the Army before you can start re-
education of the Germans by the Army. We all know the Army attitude at 
many conferences where we ask for concessions to the Germans. 
[…]There still exists, far too generally, the view that in all spheres we can 
instruct the poor benighted Germans – a tendency to consider them as 
uncivilised Africans.44 
 
In regards to cultural and more personal relations between the BAOR and 
the Germans, a number of secondary sources point towards factors which 
potentially influenced the view of the general British public towards Germany 
and therefore also that of individual soldiers stationed in Germany. Sabine Lee 
for example highlights the anti-German feelings expressed by the Labour left 
with regard to British public opinion and parts of the press.45 Furthermore public 
opinion, at least in the early post-war years, generally tended to be more 
sympathetic towards the Soviet Union due to the war-time alliance and the slow 
                                                             
42 Patricia Meehan, A Strange Enemy People. 
43 Patricia Meehan, A Strange Enemy People, p. 53. 
44 FO 1014/26, cited in Patricia Meehan, A Strange Enemy People, p. 156. 
45 Sabine Lee, An Uneasy Partnership, p. 14. For relevant press views on 
Germany see also Karin Herrmann et. al. (eds.), Coping with the Relations: 
Anglo-German Cartoons from the Fifties to the Nineties, Osnabrück, 1988. 
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acceptance by the public of Cold War realities.46 Apart from useful works on 
general British public opinion on Germany47 there are a relatively large number 
of accounts of particular non-governmental groups and prominent personalities 
(as opposed to general mass opinion) and their efforts towards and experiences 
with the Germans in the immediate post-war period in secondary literature. 
Some of these potentially provide the opportunity to compare the effectiveness 
of the BAOR to other means of rapprochement.48 Many of the Army conscripts 
going to Germany perhaps had a predefined opinion of Germany and their 
inhabitants. What Jill Stephenson terms the ‘peculiarities of British history’ may 
have conditioned many a Briton to regard continental Europeans, with their 
border disputes, wars and changes of political regimes as unreliable, 
unenlightened and backward:  
 
                                                             
46 Anne Deighton, ‘Minds, not Hearts’, p. 79. 
47 Evgenios Michail, ‘After the War and after the Wall’; Ruth Wittlinger, 
‘Perceptions of Germany and the Germans in Post-War Britain’, Journal of 
Multilingual and Multicultural Development, Vol. 25, No. 5&6, 2004, pp. 453-456;  
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Affair in History’, Twentieth Century British History, No. 17, Vol. 2, 2006, pp. 
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48 John Farquharson, ‘‘Emotional but Influential’: Victor Gollancz, Richard 
Stokes and the British Zone of Germany, 1945-9’, Journal of Contemporary 
History, Vol. 22, No.3, 1987, pp. 501-519; C. Haase, ‘In Search of a European 
Settlement: Chatham House and British-German Relations, 1920-1955’, 
European History Quarterly, Vol. 37, No. 3, 2007, pp. 371-397; Rolf Breitenstein, 
Total War to Total Trust. Personal Accounts of 30 Years of Anglo-German 
Relations, London, 1976; Peter Alter, ‘Building Bridges: The Framework of 
Anglo-German Cultural Relations after 1945’ in: Jeremy Noakes et. al. (eds.), 
Britain and Germany in Europe; A more dated but still useful account is provided 
in Angelika Volle, Deutsch-Britische Beziehungen.  
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The implication is that there is a gaping gulf between the British way of 
life and European traditions and practices – without much doubt left about 
which is superior.49   
 
This may certainly have applied to the period immediately after the 
Second World War. Walter Lippmann’s Public Opinion (1929) put it well:  
 
For the most part we do not first see and then define, we define first and 
then see. In the great blooming, buzzing confusion of the outer world we 
pick out what our culture has already defined for us, and we tend to 
perceive that which we have picked out in the form stereotyped for us by 
our culture.50  
 
These stereotypes were to an extent furthered by the British film industry during 
the 1950s. For instance, Richard Falcon’s article on the portrayal of Germans in 
British films points out that the industry seemed largely preoccupied with 
appealing to audiences via heroic World War Two narratives.51   
Finally, there are a limited number of accounts of officers and conscripts 
in the BAOR and their experiences in Germany available in secondary sources. 
John Ramsden provides insight into some individual experiences of British 
soldiers in Germany after 1945. He also points out that many British servicemen 
quickly changed their anti-German attitudes with that of a lighter vein of humour 
                                                             
49 Jill Stephenson, ‘Britain and Europe in the later Twentieth Century: Identity, 
Sovereignty, Peculiarity’ in: Mary Fulbrook (ed.) National Histories and 
European History, London, 1993, p. 233. 
50 Walter Lippmann, cited in: Karin Herrmann, Harald Husemann, Lachlan Moyle 
(eds.), Coping with the Relations, p. 15. 
51 Richard Falcon, ‘Images of Germany and the Germans in British Film and 
Television Fictions’ in: Harald Husemann (ed.), As Others See Us. Anglo-
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and tolerance – despite the Army leadership’s best efforts to prevent further 
fraternisation.52 Some servicemen found the Germans in at least some of the 
areas they were stationed in quite easy to get on with.53 B.S. Johnson’s 
collection of accounts furthermore comments on boredom taking over in an army 
in peacetime conditions. This in itself, at least for some soldiers, was a 
motivating factor for fraternisation.54 However, most of the recollections of 
Servicemen in Germany during the 1940s and 1950s tend to focus on Army life 
rather than on the contacts made with the local German population. It is the 





As previously noted, this thesis aims to operate at a number of different levels. 
These range from the diplomatic and intergovernmental relations between the 
two countries, over the political and military context of the British administration 
both in London and Germany, down to the much more individual investigation of 
the experience of individual officers and ranks at a grass-roots level. As a 
consequence a wide range of primary sources offers itself for consideration. In 
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online] http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/europe/3842041.stm [accessed 27 
November 2008] 
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regards to the political angle of the project, primary source material covers for 
example British and German government papers. The bulk of the British 
material, like Foreign Office, Cabinet and War Office files, is available at the 
National Archives in Kew. The German perspective of the impact the BAOR had 
on Anglo-German political relations is highlighted by documents in the Federal 
Archives in Koblenz as well as the Political Archive of the Federal Foreign Office 
in Berlin.55 The perspective of the individual German Land administrations in 
Lower Saxony and North Rhine-Westphalia is provided by the state archives in 
Hannover and Düsseldorf. These also provide local newspaper extracts on the 
subject. 1950s literature, diaries, private papers, memoirs of individual 
servicemen and interviews with former BAOR soldiers stationed in Germany are 
also vital contributions to the project.  
The German archives provide a very good insight into the German 
perception of relations at the highest levels. The Federal Archives allow for a 
comparison of relations between British soldiers and German civilians and those 
involving American and French soldiers. The archives also disclose interesting 
reports by the British press on German attempts to use the BAOR as a scape 
goat. The Political Archives of the Federal Foreign Office reveal for instance that 
an inter-allied working group on the issue of relations between soldiers and 
civilians had been created to deal with the rising incidents of rape and murder 
committed by foreign troops in Germany.  
Sources at the British Library Newspaper Archive at Colindale contributed 
to the chapter on the perception of Germany in Britain. Close study of the Daily 
Mirror, Daily Mail and the Daily Express in the period of the early 1950s revealed 
a somewhat more nuanced picture of reporting on Germany than might have 
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been expected. The sources available at the BBC Archive Centre in Reading 
provide an equally balanced account of the Federal Republic. The Imperial War 
Museum Sound Archive contains a number of eye witness recordings of former 
BAOR soldiers in Germany relevant for the exploration of relations between 
soldiers and Germans.56 These reveal for example that, particularly among 
officers, fraternisation was frequently frowned upon even in the 1950s. Official 
regimental records on relations between BAOR and Germans on a social level 
have proven very difficult to find. There are nonetheless some highly useful 
findings in Regimental Archives. Of particular value were the Royal Signals 
Museum in Blandford Forum, Dorset, the Royal Engineers Museum in 
Gillingham, Kent, the Durham Record Office and the Royal Artillery Museum in 
Woolwich.57 These records highlight the efforts made by Regiments to improve 
relations with Germany, particularly when it suited the interest of the Regiments. 
Equally revealing is the change in reporting on Germany in several regimental 
magazines. Whereas in 1948 these magazines focused exclusively on British 
and Army issues by the mid-1950s they were increasingly reporting and 
discussing social relations, from personal relations between soldiers and local 
women to the attempts by regiments to get to know the residents better. Hence 
the changing social dimension of the Army’s activities could never be separated 
from the military and political imperatives of the Army and the British 
government. There are variations between regiments but there clearly is a 
strong tendency towards a much more positive reporting on Germany from the 
early 1950s. The Regimental Histories uncovered in the British Library also 
                                                             
56 For the Imperial War Museum Sound Archive see 
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Record Office http://www.durhamrecordoffice.org.uk/Pages/home.aspx , Royal 
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contain valuable information on relations with Germans, although in most cases 
these were written about twenty years after the events. 
 
 
Chapter Outline   
 
The second chapter will outline the development of the BAOR in Germany 
during the period in question in terms of size and organisation before analyzing 
its role in British policy towards Germany. It is important to highlight the 
controversies the BAOR caused within the British administration when other 
interests clashed with the idea of using the Services to foster Anglo-German 
relations. This entails an examination of the views of both the Labour and 
Conservative administrations of the new Germany. The relationship between the 
BAOR and the CCG in Germany at the beginning of the period under 
observation here also requires further analysis. 
The third chapter will examine the portrayal of Germany and its people in 
Britain in order to shed light on the views that would have influenced young 
Britons joining the BAOR. The focus will be on media likely to have been 
encountered by young British men such as the British press, non-fictional as well 
as fictional literature and war films. The chapter will also highlight the impact of 
grass-root level initiatives on the perception of Germany. Finally, it will consider 
the impact of Germany’s economic recovery on British opinion. 
The focus of chapter four will be on the German perspective of relations 
with the BAOR. It will analyze the changing expectations of and demands by the 
German civilian population as well as Federal and Land administrations during a 
period of fundamental changes in Anglo-German relations. Attempts to use the 
BAOR in order to undermine German cooperation with the West will be 
scrutinized as well as German efforts to counter these threats. Economic, 
political and social contexts will be explored here. Furthermore relations 
between Germans and NATO soldiers of other allies will be scrutinized in order 
to provide a comparison. 
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Chapter five is an exploration of the BAOR’s own attempts to adapt to the 
changing nature of Anglo-German relations throughout the period in question. 
This involves constraints caused by the organisational structure of the Services 
in Germany, the impact of Service accommodation on levels of contacts, official 
attempts by units to improve relations in local towns as well as the experiences 
of individual officers and ranks. A comparison of RAF and Army initiatives, as 
well as attempts to minimize negative publicity caused by incidents is important 
here. 
 Chapter six is entitled ‘The British Administration in Germany and the 
BAOR’. It discusses the attempts by the administration in London as well as on 
the ground in Germany to influence the BAOR in order to use it as a tool to tie 
the Federal Republic into the Western system of defence. This includes the use 
of the BAOR to strengthen the Adenauer government, to promote British values, 
and to control Germany at a time of increasing independence of the young 
Federal Republic. To a large extent, it also involves mitigating problems caused 
by the presence of the BAOR. This chapter, which constitutes the focal point of 
the thesis, will examine the crucial period of the mid-1950s, when German 
sovereignty fundamentally changed both Anglo-German relations in general as 
well as the position of the BAOR in Germany. 
Chapter seven is the conclusion of the thesis. It will evaluate the efforts 
made by both the BAOR as well as the British administration to improve Anglo-
German relations by utilizing the presence of the Services. It will also shed light 
on whether German sovereignty did change the position of the BAOR vis-à-vis 
the German population and administration in the period immediately after 
Federal German sovereignty was established. Finally, the chapter will answer 
the question of whether or not the BAOR was able to effectively adapt to serve 








We have never doubted that many of the bad old nationalistic elements in 
the community have survived. […] However, it is not in Parliament that 
[they] do harm. It is on the street corners and in public meeting places 







It was doubts about the re-emergence of German nationalism among the British 
administration on the highest levels, as expressed in the Foreign Office brief 
above, which led to the consideration of utilising the BAOR as a force to foster 
democratic elements in Germany. Before progressing on to the Services 
themselves and the initiatives introduced by the civilian administration in 
Germany to improve relations with the Germans in the next chapters, it is 
important to consider some of the attitudes of the most high-ranking staff of the 
Foreign Office in London and the British High Commission in Germany. After all 
it was these attitudes that helped to shape as well as implement British policy 
towards the Federal Republic. Many members of the British civilian and military 
administration in Germany during the period in question had had first-hand 
experiences with Nazi Germany before and during the war and therefore 
attitudes towards the FRG were heavily influenced by these experiences. It is 
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important to consider the attitudes of some of the senior British personnel in 
Germany before moving on to mass public opinion and its impact on the 
Services in chapter three. The antipathy towards German nationalism, combined 
with the determination to pursue a pro-German policy, influenced the British 
administration’s view of the BAOR as both a factor as well as a potential 
problem for Anglo-German relations.  
It is furthermore essential to highlight the nature and development of the 
British troop commitment in Germany in order to understand how the Services 
could be utilised as a tool for improved Anglo-German relations. This chapter will 
therefore analyse the organisational structure of the British military presence in 
Germany as well as the adaption of the BAOR to political changes in the context 
of Anglo-German relations and the Cold War. This chapter will also establish the 
structure and responsibilities of the British civilian administration in Germany, 
before addressing the question of what exactly Foreign Office expectations of 
the BAOR’s role in Anglo-German relations were at the beginning of the period 
under observation here. The analysis of the British administration and its 
relations with the BAOR and the Germans in this chapter will also consider the 
significant changes in the relation between occupiers and occupied caused by 
the establishment of the Federal Republic in May 1949. In order to understand 
the value of the BAOR as a tool for better relations between Britons and 
Germans, the political functions of the BAOR during the period in question 
require analysis. This also entails an exploration of political controversies over 
the size of Britain’s troop commitment as well as friction caused between 
different government departments over policy direction in regards to the BAOR.  
 
 
The Transformation of the BAOR and its Adaption to Political Change 
 
The dramatic events of the early Cold War period in Europe and the 
accompanying deterioration of East-West relations led to significant changes in 
size and role of the BAOR in Germany. The BAOR of the post-war period 
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began, just like its 1919 predecessor, as an army of occupation in a defeated 
Germany. The British Army had traditionally been used to garrison the Empire 
and only fought in Europe during wartime as expeditionary forces.2 When war 
ended, the Army normally demobilized and returned to its former tasks in the 
Empire and at home. However, this is not what happened after 1945. Of course 
large-scale demobilisation of British soldiers in Germany did take place after 
1945, due to strong pressure from the Treasury to cut defence spending as 
quickly as possible. However, the Occupation of Germany agreed on at the 
1945 Potsdam Conference and, soon thereafter, the emergence of the Cold 
War, prevented the disbanding of the British Expeditionary Force in Germany. 
21st Army Group instead became the British Army of the Rhine in August 1945. 
Initially, the BAOR of 1945 was made up of three corps districts with several 
divisions. Each corps was made up of up to 450,000 men and each division 
numbered up to 150,000 men. However, most of the wartime units were 
demobilized during 1946 and by January 1947, the British troop presence had 
been reduced to three divisions.3 Only thereafter was the BAOR increasingly 
expanded as well as turned into a permanent military force in Germany. The 
1947 National Service Act, introducing universal conscription in peacetime for an 
indefinite period for the first time in British history, meant that from January 1949 
onwards, the ranks of the BAOR were also filled with National Servicemen. 
These young Britons made up for the shortfall in recruitment among regular 
soldiers after 1945.4 
Britain’s first post-war global policy paper of May 1947 defined the Soviet 
Union as the potential enemy of Britain. However, due to Russian technological 
backwardness and economic problems, Britain did not expect Russia to be in a 
position to resort to war in Europe before 1957. Until the spring of 1950, Britain 
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therefore continued to give the Middle East the highest strategic priority, while 
Europe was only a part of the overall defence strategy.5 This was reflected in a 
stagnation of troop numbers in Germany. In 1947 the Imperial General Staff, the 
Minister of Defence, the Secretary of State for War and the Secretary of State 
for Air as well as the Military Governor of the British zone agreed that ‘the figure 
of about 55,000 should be regarded as the absolute minimum size of the Army 
which should be maintained in Germany in the foreseeable future’.6 However, 
even in 1947 this figure had only been accepted by the Military Governor under 
great pressure as ‘the need [was] really for larger forces’.7 Britain’s containment 
policy in Europe during this period focused on the rebuilding of the political unity 
of Western Europe through the 1947 Dunkirk Treaty and the Western Union of 
1948 rather than on increasing military strength. 
 Events such as the 1948 Czech coup and the Berlin blockade 
increasingly challenged the British perception of the Soviet threat in Europe 
being a political and economic rather than a military one. The initial plan to 
counter the Soviet forces in Europe with only two divisions and a tactical air 
force of some 141 aircraft was therefore reversed and, also in response to 
pressure from Britain’s continental allies, London agreed to increase its armed 
forces in Germany.8 The number of troops in Germany was now to be 
determined by two factors:  
 
The first is to support the prestige and authority of Military Government in 
the British Zone of Germany. The second is to act as part of the covering 
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force behind which the military resources of the Western Union can be 
mobilised in the event of war with Soviet Russia.9  
  
In January 1948 British forces in Germany totalled eleven armoured 
regiments and fourteen infantry battalions (exclusive of those in Berlin).10 British 
troop strength in Germany rose steadily after 1950, when the Korean War led to 
heightened tensions in Europe. A clear shift in Britain’s defence strategy from 
the Middle East to Europe led to the increase of troops on the continent by 
nearly two divisions, bringing the total of British divisions in Europe to four by 
1952.11  Whereas in September 1950 there were 44,000 British personnel in 
Germany, this increased to 50,000 by December and 52,000 by January 1951. 
Numbers thereafter increased by an average of 5,000 per month up to April and 
65,000 by July 1951. This rise coincided with the increase of the US military 
presence in Germany from one to five divisions. The US contingent now stood at 
81,000.12 At the same time the total number of French troops in Germany was 
55,000. Allied troops therefore amounted to a combined total of 186,000, as 
against an estimated total of 320,000 Soviet troops in the Soviet zone of 
Germany.13 At its peak in 1956, the BAOR was made up of four divisions 
containing twenty-one battalions of infantry and sixteen armoured regiments, 
totalling around 77,000 personnel.14 However, by this time the British military 
believed that West German membership of NATO and German rearmament 
would facilitate a reduction in Britain’s contribution to NATO forces on the 
Central Front.  
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Due to the development of American hydrogen weapons, British strategic 
planners now concluded that the military importance of British forces was 
considerably reduced and that the threat of a limited war in Europe appeared 
increasingly unlikely, making the BAOR an exclusively political force.15 Britain’s 
worldwide defence commitments contributed to already adverse economic 
trends, including its declining trade competitiveness worldwide. These problems, 
combined with the shock of the Suez crisis and the sterling crisis of 1957, led to 
an increasing determination to significantly cut the number of troops in 
Germany.16 Bonn’s growing unwillingness to foot the bill for Allied troops in 
Germany further exacerbated British problems. The Eden government’s 
determination to secure reductions in military spending therefore ensured that 
the commitment to maintain 77,000 men on the continent was by 1956 looking 
increasingly untenable.17 In 1957 the government also announced the end of 
National Service, with no more call-ups after 1960. In line with the overall 
reduction of British forces worldwide, the BAOR was to be reduced from 77,000 
men in 1957 to 44,900 men by 1963.18 This plan was however met with a 
barrage of opposition from Britain’s European allies, which led to Britain being 
forced to reduce the planned cuts of the BAOR. The resistance to British troop 
reductions was mainly due to the difficulties encountered when Western Europe 
sought to increase the size of its armed forces after the outbreak of the Korean 
War as well as West Germany’s unexpectedly slow build-up of its new defence 
forces. There were also continental fears of a ‘nuclearization of NATO’.19 As a 
result the now all-volunteer BAOR only saw a reduction in size to approximately 
55,000 men by 1959.  
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Although never considered strong enough by the Commanders-in-Chief 
to successfully stop a Soviet attack on Western Germany, the BAOR 
significantly grew in numbers during the period in which a war scenario similar to 
that in Korea appeared the most likely. Arguably this increase in size was in part 
politically motivated as French and American troop contributions were directly 
connected to the British commitment in Germany. Above all, the BAOR was an 
expression of the political will to defend the Federal Republic, regardless of 
military realities: 
 
Germany has to be convinced of the growing strength of the West and its 
ability to defend her on the Elbe. The reinforcement of troops and 
provision of heavy equipment suitably deployed and in evidence might 
provide the answer.20 
 
Once the immediate threat of a conventional war in Europe receded, the BAOR 
was mainly utilised as a political tool in a European context but, as the following 
chapters will demonstrate, above all on an Anglo-German level. It was the 
organisational structure of the Services and their widespread physical presence 
throughout the entire British zone, which arguably turned it into a resource for 
establishing close contacts with the population of its host country. 
 
 
The Organisational Structure of the BAOR 
 
Although it was known as the British Army of the Rhine, the area of the BAOR 
Occupation extended well beyond the Rhine into northwest Germany. The 
number of principal garrison cities in Germany exceeded twenty-five, which were 
spread throughout the two Länder of North Rhine-Westphalia and Lower 
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Saxony.21 From April 1948 the BAOR headquarters were located at Bad 
Oeynhausen, North Rhine Westphalia. In October 1954 HQ BAOR moved to 
Rheindahlen near Mönchen Gladbach. The two main administrative components 
of the BAOR were Hamburg District and Hannover District. Rhine District had 
been transformed into headquarters for Rhine Army Troops in 1947.22 However, 
the organisational structure continually changed with the size of the BAOR, with 
Rhine District reappearing by 1952, along with a new Lübbecke District. 
Nonetheless, by 1957 only the Hannover and Rhine Districts were still in 
existence. The main supply headquarters were located at Düsseldorf and the 
communications headquarters was established at Emblem in Belgium. New 
reinforcements to Germany passed through Emblem to be dispersed to their 
various bases. From Rheindahlen, where the RAF also had its headquarters, 
along with the 2nd Tactical Air force and NORTHAG, BAOR’s troops were 
commanded by a four-star general.23 The three armoured divisions of the BAOR 
were spread over twenty different locations throughout North Rhine-Westphalia 
and Lower Saxony. The increase in size of the BAOR led to the creation of a 
new division (11th Armoured) in September 1950. 6th Armoured Division was 
formed in the UK in 1951 as a strategic reserve but also moved to Germany in 
1952.24 As previously noted the period from 1951 to 1956 marked the high point 
in strength for the BAOR, with four divisions and nine brigades, along with 
supporting units.25 These divisions were similar to their World War Two 
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counterparts in organisation and much of the equipment was from this period as 
well. The reduction of the size of British forces in Germany after 1956 led to the 
disbanding of 6th Armoured Division and a complete reshuffle of the remaining 
units, leading to the BAOR being made up of the 2nd Division, 4th Division and 5th 
Division by 1958.26  
As the military requirement for the BAOR throughout its existence was 
constant readiness for a Soviet attack, frequent exercises took place all 
throughout the British zone. The physical presence of the Services in the British 
zone was further highlighted by regular patrols of the border with East Germany 
from 1949 onwards. This, together with the frequent reorganisation of the forces 




The Organisational Structure and Aims of the British Administrative 
Presence in Germany prior to 1949 
 
Up until 1949 the effort to use the BAOR as a tool for German integration was 
largely led by the British Element of the Control Commission for Germany 
(CCG(BE)). As this chapter will demonstrate, this division of the British presence 
in Germany into civilian and military elements, and the resulting internal 
organisational problems between the BAOR and the CCG, promised to 
constrain the integrative ability of the BAOR, quite apart from any problems 
arising over contact with local Germans. After the cessation of hostilities the 
CCG, under the auspices of the Foreign Office, soon took over the governing of 
the British zone from the Army and, although ultimately responsible to the 
Secretary of State for War, a junior Minister was appointed to oversee the 
                                                                                                                                                                                   
division numbered up to 20,000 troops and was made up of several brigades, 
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administration of an organisation approaching some 50,000 members.27 John B. 
Hynd, Labour MP for Sheffield and Chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster, took 
this position and headed the newly established Control Office for Germany and 
Austria from October 1945 until April 1947.  
Although the CCG was not part of the British Civil Service, it shared the 
same administrative structure. However, due to the military nature of the 
Occupation at the outset, the CCG had to be integrated into a military 
framework. This meant every British civilian employed in Germany had to have 
an ‘honorary military rank’ according to which accommodation, transport and 
messing were allocated. Often this led to former privates or corporals returning 
with the equivalent rank of warrant officers and the right to claim corresponding 
privileges. The higher rates of pay, as well as for example the considerably 
higher number of passenger vehicles available to the CCG, instantly soured the 
CCG’s relationship with the BAOR, as some civilians who had spent the war at 
home ended up with higher ranks than soldiers who had fought their way 
through Germany. This resentment quickly resulted in the two British presences 
in Germany being ‘almost as far apart from each other as from the Germans’.28 
As late as 1948 the CCG complained that: 
 
all efforts made by CCG to meet the Services, and to invite their interest 
and co-operation, have all too often met with a cold and uncompromising 
reception.29 
 
Attempts by the British civilian administration to impose its will on the BAOR and 
change the Army’s relation with the Germans was therefore beset with 
difficulties from the outset. This became evident when early CCG attempts at re-
education of German civilians in Britain were hampered by the BAOR. The 
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Foreign office sent specially selected Germans on training courses to England 
and asked the Army to accommodate these people in Hannover while waiting for 
the train to the Hook of Holland. BAOR refused point-blank and would not be 
influenced – even by the Foreign Office: 
 
It is considered highly undesirable that Germans should be 
accommodated in a transit camp with Service personnel, from a 
disciplinary, security and morale point of view.30 
 
During the early period of Occupation up to 1948 the CCG was 
increasingly pushing for closer contacts between the British and Germans in 
order to promote democratic re-education, whereas the Army was consistently 
dragging its feet. Soon after 1945 the CCG drew up plans to re-educate the 
German population in order to eliminate Nazism and foster democratic thinking. 
In May 1947 the new attitude towards the Germans was officially communicated 
in an instruction stating: 
 
We should behave towards the Germans as the people of one Christian 
and civilized race towards another whose interests in many ways 
converge with our own and for whom we have no longer any ill-will.31 
 
Once again the Army had different views on this issue. An Army document 
regulating social contacts with Germans in 1947 began by defining Germans as 
‘all persons, who, during the war, lived in Germany of their own free will’ before 
banning ‘entertainment of Germans for purely social reasons by units in Messes 
or Clubs’.32 
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The pace of reconciliation was to increase once it became clear the 
western zones would emerge as a semi-sovereign state in 1949 and the end of 
Allied authority drew closer. The civilian administration now deemed it necessary 
to use all personnel including the Services in the British zone to foster Anglo-
German relations. As early as 1948 the CCG therefore examined in great detail 
all fields of potential Army-German association - social, sporting, educational 
and welfare - with a view to producing practical proposals by which the Services 
could assist in the task of re-educating the Germans. Only in early 1948 had the 
Army command finally accepted the necessity of gradually changing its 
approach towards the German population in principle:  
 
The Army Commander had decided that closer contact with the Germans 
was now desirable and that he proposed to set an example in this 
direction himself.33 
 
It was noted with relief by the CCG ‘that Rhine Army policy is now positive’.34  
Due to the initially rather distant attitude of the British Forces, the CCG 
considered it essential to now take a gradual and planned approach, especially 
in social matters. ‘It is probable that there is some resentment on the German 
side’.35 The task of turning the BAOR into an asset for Anglo-German relations 
was clearly going to be a difficult one for the Foreign Office.  
It was this formal and organisational approach dictated by the CCG which 
was to dominate early BAOR efforts. The reluctant Services claimed it was 
‘unwise too rapidly to turn on the tap of closer relations’.36 Projects and 
associations might be started which, from subsequent lack of interests or 
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means, might decline instead of grow. The CCG regarded as typical the Army 
attitude that the Germans might well become suspicious, if a sudden, wholesale 
and too wide opening of doors became apparent. Whereas a more gradual and 
planned opening of those doors over a period of time was considered to be the 
right answer by the BAOR, the British administration’s view of the matter and 
also Army attitudes differed considerably. The CCG considered that, apart from 
unsatisfactory Army attitudes, regulations and a general lack of awareness of 
the problems in Germany prevented a quickening of the pace of reconciliation. It 
is worth at this point to consider the CCG view of the Services. 
 
 
The Control Commission View of the Army prior to 1949 
 
As established above, the British civilian administration often took a somewhat 
critical view of the early Army approach towards the Germans. The attitude of 
Army officers was, according to the CCG, one of ‘uncertainty in their ‘off parade’ 
relations with Germans’.37 There was apparently no great desire by officers to 
associate much with Germans and if there was to be any informal association a 
considerable change in facilities and outlook was required.  
To a certain extent it was regulations rather than attitudes which were to 
blame for the lack of contact. In order to ensure proper conduct the only place 
where a British officer could entertain a German person was at a married 
couple’s home. If an officer met a German in the course of business he was not 
allowed to offer a drink, a meal or even a chair outside of the office. As there 
was in 1948 very little social contact particularly between officers and Germans, 
all commanders now apparently agreed that a start had to be made. However, 
the Army was rather selective in its approach. For military and security reasons 
all efforts had to be subject to:  
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initially being strictly formal, German guests being 100% screened and 
informal parties in Messes being regarded as unsuitable at present.38  
 
The importance of ensuring that only ‘good Germans’ were invited to Officers 
and Sergeant messes was considered paramount as it would be disastrous if 
‘the respectable was mixed with the black market’.39 This strong emphasis by 
the Army on ‘screening’ guests to limit association to ‘good Germans’ certainly 
caused a few raised eyebrows at the CCG.40 Nonetheless, the Army regarded 
married families as the best means of developing relations. Contacts between 
British servicemen and German families (or, the increasing number of British 
families and German civilians) were to prevent morally questionable connections 
between troops and civilians. The result of the slow change of Army attitude was 
the drawing up of very detailed plans in order to improve relations, ranging from 
sports, youth clubs, voluntary teaching of English in German schools, cycling 
and hiking to the lending of equipment to Germans.  
However, neither the plan to re-educate German civilians nor the use of 
the Services towards this aim was met with universal praise among CCG staff. 
The Deputy Regional Commissioner of CCG Hamburg pointed out his 
abhorrence at the term re-education in regards to the German population as ‘it is 
patronising, and is one of the reasons for resentment on the German side’.41 He 
furthermore emphasised what he considered his most important consideration, 
namely the need for a planned and thorough education of the Army before any 
scheme employing the Services was launched. The attempt had been made in 
Hamburg by the CCG to explain to local units the problems in Germany, ‘but I 
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am sure we have not even scratched the surface. I cannot believe the situation 
is better elsewhere’.42 The Commissioner pointed towards the necessity, if good 
was to be achieved instead of harm, to first educate the Army, which could not 
be a quick or easy task. Approaches to Germans also ought to be spontaneous 
and not forced. Contacts would therefore inevitably be patchy, slow and with 
many failures. Above all, in the Commissioner’s view there still existed, far too 
generally:  
 
the view that in all spheres we can instruct the poor benighted Germans, 
a tendency to consider them as uncivilised Africans.43  
 
It was therefore obvious to at least some FO staff that an immediate 
change of attitude of the BAOR towards the Germans would be difficult to 
achieve successfully. However, an accelerated reduction in size of the CCG had 
to be anticipated after 1949 which indicated that ‘in day to day business the 
Army will come into more direct contact with Germans’.44 The main problem for 
the CCG was that the Army had to be briefed and, more than that, convinced if it 
was to really lend a helpful hand. There was scepticism as to how deep such 
briefing would sink with people whose main objectives lay in other very different 
directions. ‘It really amounts to a re-education of the Army before you can start 
re-education of the Germans by the Army.’45  The CCG complained frequently 
about Army attitude when units were asked for concessions to Germans:  
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Those of us who talked to units also know how little even Field Officers 
know of our aims and activities and how apathetic the troops are towards 
them.46 
 
It is evident then that prior to the establishment of the Federal Republic of 
Germany the Foreign Office saw much room for improvement for Army attitudes 
towards the Germans but also that the strained relations between the CCG and 
the BAOR stood in the way of changing Army attitudes. The Army often referred 
to the CCG as ‘Charlie Chaplin’s Grenadiers’ or ‘Complete Chaos 
Guaranteed’.47 Arguably the increasing run-down of the CCG therefore provided 
a potential opportunity for improving relations between the armed forces and the 
Germans. Although the CCG arguably exercised a moderating influence on 
strategic errors by the BAOR, this was outweighed by the strained relations 
between the two organisations. The withdrawal of CCG, combined with the 
creation of the Federal Republic, fundamentally changed the Services’ 
relationship with both the British administration as well as the Germans.  
 The initial long-term aims of the first CCG-inspired efforts developed in 
1948 were somewhat modest. This was partly due to the aforementioned early 
BAOR refusal to cooperate with the CCG and partly due to perceived German 
hostility towards British Service personnel. Aims included on the social side 
formal mess parties, the acceptance of approved Germans, informally or as 
guests in British clubs, as well as the provision of facilities for mutual 
entertainment in restaurants, cinemas and operas. Print material was 
considered from an early stage:  
 
A daily newspaper, delivered on the breakfast table, might be produced 
summarizing varying daily German political speeches and news, and 
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‘united’ with forthcoming British sport and entertainment, crossword 
puzzles, etc.48  
 
A small financial reward for passing a colloquial German language test was 
even considered in order to encourage learning of German. It was deemed 
unlikely that: 
  
the right kind of social progress will ever be made except in cases where 
a nucleus of the British taking part are prepared to do battle with the 
German language.49 
  
From the outset, the new CCG initiatives ran into difficulties. For instance, 
the Army was fully employed and could not provide enough resources. 
Particularly the officers who would have to lead the move towards better 
understanding appeared unwilling or unable to make time, and therefore the 
CCG did not regard any forced measures as likely to succeed. Furthermore, in 
almost all projects the obstacle of facilities cropped up – food, accommodation, 
transport and, to a lesser extent, language. There was a reported lack of interest 
in Anglo-German discussion groups as well as the difficulty for Germans to be 
admitted to British cinemas. German classes were not well attended. Initial Army 
enthusiasm, once the decision for co-operation with the CCG was made, was 
evidently still muted. The envisaged solution to these problems was that the 
approaches to be used by the Army should be planned on a two or three year 
basis in order to allow for long-term planning. 
The CCG itself often stood in the way of promoting its own initiatives as 
too close contacts with Germans could still have significant negative 
consequences for individual personnel employed by the Foreign Office. In May 
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1948 the Regional Commissioner of Schleswig Holstein voiced his disapproval 
of the manner in which orders concerning the treatment of officials who married 
German women were implemented.50 He quoted the case of one official, who, 
when he married a German, was nominated for transfer to another Region, was 
refused by that Region, and subsequently accepted by a Division for 
employment at Headquarters. He also said that officials married to Germans 
could not be transferred to Frankfurt owing to the American attitude to the 
question. According to the Military Governor, security was the only criterion for 
the treatment of an official who married a German. Any official who did so had to 
be told quite plainly that there was no objection to his marriage but, dependent 
on the nature of his work, it might be necessary either to transfer him or to 
dispense with his services!51 
The prospects for a rapid improvement of relations between the Services 
and the Germans in 1948 due to Foreign Office initiatives therefore appeared 
somewhat bleak. A lack of resources, a lack of personnel and a lack of 
motivation on the British side were difficult enough to overcome for the civilian 
administration. What is more, instead of being able to focus on these issues and 
improve Anglo-German relations a number of more serious issues such as 
requisitioning, manoeuvre damage and incidents of misbehaviour threatened to 
cause a deterioration of relations rather than an improvement. Moreover, as will 
be discussed in chapter three, the BAOR provided plenty of ammunition for 
communist anti-western propaganda. An intensification of CCG efforts was 
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therefore inevitable if any improvements were to be achieved. Fostering an 
interest in German affairs among British soldiers was one such approach. 
 
 
The Organisational Structure of the British Administrative Presence in 
Germany after 1949 
 
Anglo-German relations entered a new phase with the establishment of the 
Federal Republic in May 1949. This had significant consequences for the 
position and role of the BAOR. Negotiations with a semi-sovereign state now 
replaced orders and the Services soon were the largest British presence in 
Germany. The British Control Commission was now wound up with increasing 
speed. In its stead, the representative of HMG at the level of the Federal 
Government established in 1949 was the British High Commissioner, replacing 
the Military Governor. He in turn was represented by Land Commissioners 
(formerly Regional Commissioners) and, in the smallest German administrative 
units (Kreise), by British Resident Officers, each of the latter covering a group of 
Kreise in most instances.52  In 1950 the staff of the High Commission totalled 
about 6,000, widely spread across the British zone in Germany. The High 
Commission consisted of the secretariat and the political, economic, financial, 
legal and manpower committees of the High Commission. Among other 
divisions most notable were the police division, the intelligence division and the 
information and education services.  
In the provinces the British held similar but smaller organisations under 
each Land Commissioner working with the four German Land governments, 
resident officers in the garrison towns and observers in the French and 
American zones.53 The British Residents had an extensive knowledge of local 
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politics, conditions, people and large amounts of accumulated experience as 
well as knowledge of the German language as most of them had been in their 
position for a number of years.54  A good illustration of the early development of 
good social relations became evident by comparing the position of the Kreis 
Detachment Commander in 1946 with the Kreis Resident Officer in the Federal 
Republic; - in very many cases the same individual. The Kreis Detachment 
Officer in 1946 was the local Military Governor with almost unlimited power, who 
was not permitted to have any official social relations with the Germans or the 
local government bodies within his district. By 1948 he lived with and among the 
Germans with little or no direct authority. He entertained and was entertained 
frequently by officials and private persons. The value of the Kreis Resident 
Officers to the development of good understanding and satisfactory social 
relations between the British and the Germans could, according to the CCG, not 
be exaggerated.55 Their role was to provide advice to the British Forces as well 
as acting as negotiator and advisor in all political and social matters arising 
between the Services and the German authorities and people at a local level.56 
British Residents were now also at pains to distance themselves from former 
Military Government attitudes. From now on, Control Commission Officers would 
no longer give orders to Germans. The question was how the Army would adjust 
to this new attitude.  
On all levels Foreign Office officials consistently dealt with the issue of 
relations between Service personnel and the Germans. The functions and 
responsibilities of these various levels of the UK High Commission covered most 
aspects of life in Germany, and exercised executive powers in the few fields still 
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reserved to the Allies after 1949. One of many important functions of the High 
Commission, which was manned by experienced staff with knowledge of people, 
customs as well as the German language, was to negotiate between the 
Services and the German authorities and people, and, at the same time, to 
‘create and maintain the correct relations between them’.57  
One effect of the introduction of the 1949 Occupation Statute was that 
many of the Services’ requirements previously obtained by orders now became 
the subject of negotiation through the Allied High Commission. On the one hand, 
the Occupation statute had reserved extensive rights to the Allies and there was 
even something resembling an Allied government. On the other hand, now 
Federal German constitutional rights and obligations existed. Despite the 
supreme Allied authority Federal German reality soon led to the transferal of 
many rights to the Germans.58 This was clearly a potential source for 
misunderstanding and serious trouble as everything the Services required or did 
in Germany had an impact on the German people or the German economy. 
Furthermore the Services now were by far the largest visible sign of the 
Occupation of Germany at the time of a change of status from ‘an occupation to 
a non-occupation regime’.59 It was, therefore, extremely important to carefully 
convey to the German people and the German authorities the actions and 
requirements of the Forces, which, as will be shown in chapter six, the British 
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The BAOR as a Factor in British Policy towards Germany 
 
Regardless of the British attempts to use the Services to improve Anglo-German 
relations, the BAOR was a constant factor in the political affairs between the two 
countries. At this point it is worth considering some of the political functions of 
the BAOR which were not necessarily aimed at the improvement of the dialogue 
between Britain and Germany but nonetheless had an impact. For instance in 
1949, the year of the establishment of the Federal Republic, the British High 
Commissioner, Sir Ivone Kirkpatrick, argued that unpopular British measures, 
combined with the handing over of responsibilities to the Germans, made the 
presence of the BAOR crucial to the successful rebirth of Germany:  
 
The possibility of serious trouble such as a general strike is a real one. 
This would stretch the Army to its limits even under present strength. The 
Germans are cynical and increasingly nationalist and hopeless in their 
utterances. Our policy of making Western Germany an eventual partner 
in Western Union is threatened by German lack of faith in this Union. The 
Germans are already alarmed by talk that the Western countries will 
‘stand on the Rhine’. They fear that Germany will be abandoned if war 
threatens and that therefore we are not sincere in our efforts to restore 
the German economy.60 
 
Even before the establishment of the Federal Republic in September 
1949, the Military Governor of the British zone in Germany, Brian Robertson, 
reacted rather unfavourably to a proposal by the Chief of the Imperial General 
Staff, Field Marshal Slim, to cut the strength of the BAOR to 50,000 men.  
According to Robertson this would undermine the Forces’ ability to perform their 
two main functions. The first function, ‘to support the prestige and authority of 
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Military Government in the British Zone’, was in Robertson’s view particularly 
important in the critical year of 1949, when the establishment of a Western 
German government would coincide with a number of ‘intensely unpopular 
measures’. These included reparations, the setting up of the International Ruhr 
Authority and the announcement of frontier rectifications. This would allow for 
communist propaganda and nationalist tendencies to find opportunities to 
inflame public opinion. The possibility of serious trouble emanating from 
communist agitation was therefore a real one and would stretch the BAOR to its 
limits.61 Secondly, a reduction of troop numbers would arouse suspicion among 
a pessimistic and hopeless Western German population expecting war with the 
Soviet Union, knowing that neither they themselves nor the Western Allies would 
be able to defend them. Robertson concluded with the rather pessimistic view 
that the Allied forces in Germany were too weak to carry out their task, namely 
to act as a part of the covering force behind which the military resources of the 
Western alliance could be mobilised in the event of war with Soviet Russia. The 
reduction of British forces on the continent would seriously prejudice any 
chances of convincing France and the Low Countries to increase their troop 
contributions.62 Although the BAOR was to act as a tool to improve Anglo-
German relations, it was also a vital instrument in policing the British zone, 
guaranteeing British interests in Germany vis-à-vis both the Germans and the 
Soviets. These tasks led to the BAOR coming under increased scrutiny from the 
Germans. 
In a report on his recent visit to Germany in January 1951, the 
Parliamentary Under-Secretary Ernest Davies commented on the widespread 
German lack of confidence in the ability of NATO to hold the line of the Elbe in 
case of a Soviet attack. There was widespread suspicion that the Allies had no 
intention to do so, but instead to immediately withdraw to the Rhine, thus leaving 
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German troops to cover their retreat. It was considered futile in such 
circumstances to throw Germany’s lot in with the West, as the only result could 
be great physical destruction with no purpose. Suspicion of the good faith of the 
West was furthermore sustained by the maintenance of the Occupation regime, 
the consequent lack of equality and the continuance of restrictions on German 
industrial production. Restrictions not significant in themselves had become 
symbolic of the contradictory nature of the policy of the occupying powers, who 
on the one hand asked for a German contribution to the defence of the West 
and on the other imposed restrictions which made this more difficult. It is 
noteworthy that there were frequent demands, for example by the German 
Social Democratic Party (SPD) leader Kurt Schumacher, to be given assurances 
and evidence that Allied troops would be stationed in Germany in sufficient 
strength to defend the country effectively while a German force was being 
established. However, the Burgomaster of Hamburg, Max Brauer, complained 
that the Occupation was ‘unduly extravagant’ and that the Occupation 
Authorities were still occupying an undue proportion of accommodation and 
other facilities.63 Ernest Davies considered it necessary to convince the 
Germans on a number of different fronts. These included the growing strength of 
the West and its ability to defend her on the Elbe; the removal of restrictions on 
industry useful for defence; a speedy end to dismantling; an end to the bombing 
of Heligoland; the transition from the Occupation Statute to a contractual 
agreement as well as the production of evidence of cuts in Occupation costs; 
and the cessation of any extravagant use of accommodation.  
This view was supported by Kirkpatrick, who demanded in a letter to the 
Foreign Office, that the Allies ‘take stock of our position’. As Kirkpatrick saw it, 
the Western Allies had announced that Germany was to join the community of 
western nations as soon as possible as a free and equal member and, at the 
Brussels conference indicated that this process was to be accelerated. 
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Kirkpatrick urged to reflect on whether this programme could be put into effect at 
all, considering the manner in which departmental interests cumulatively foiled 
the declared policy and intentions of the Foreign Ministers: 
   
For example, I do not see – quite apart from any defence contribution 
which I do not believe is round the corner – how we can bind Germany 
effectively to the west if the Air Ministry insists on bombing Heligoland; 
[…] public opinion wishes to be tough over the war criminals; […] 
industrial restrictions are maintained; supreme authority is expressly 
reserved to the Allies in Germany, etc. etc. We could get away in my view 
with one or more of the above blots on our general policy, but I do not 
believe that we could tie Germany to the West if we insist on all our 
desiderata, since the cumulative effect is to undermine confidence in the 
belief that we do intend in a measurable distance of time to accept 
Germany as a free and equal member of our community.’64 
 
Problems in relations between the British troops and the German 
population were compounded by the financial costs to Germany caused by the 
Occupation. As Ernest Bevin pointed out to the Labour Prime Minister Clement 
Attlee, these costs included labour, accommodation, communications, travel 
within Germany, stores and supplies and the Deutschmark drawings of the 
Occupation Forces. The overall Occupation costs of the British zone for the year 
1948 covered by the Germans amounted to just under £120 million (for Western 
Germany as a whole including Berlin the figures amounted to just over £290 
million). These totals represented the cost of the services provided by the 
Germans for approximately 270,000 Allied troops and 10,000 Allied Control 
Commission personnel and their dependants. The services provided by the 
Germans for the ‘admittedly inadequate Occupation Forces and the High 
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Commission absorb something like five per cent of the German national 
income’.65 This was to increase considerably in the near future due to a 
considerable augmentation of the Occupation Forces as well as the envisaged 
raising of German divisions. Troop costs were a significant factor in Anglo-
German relations and its impact on German perceptions of the BAOR will be 
discussed in chapter four. 
A Labour government had monitored the early post-war functions of the 
BAOR, but following the 1951 general election, the new Conservative 
government of Winston Churchill took up this task. The Churchill administration 
was very much aware of the delicate position of the BAOR in regards to Anglo-
German relations and at the highest level every effort was made to avoid any 
embarrassment to the Germans. This attitude was demonstrated by the 
controversy over the appointment of a new Commander-In-Chief of Northern 
Army Group in 1954. The chief of the Imperial General Staff (CIGS), Field 
Marshal Sir John Harding, had recommended General Sir Gerald Templer as his 
successor.  However, Templer had been the Head of the Military Government in 
Germany at the time of the German Chancellor Konrad Adenauer’s dismissal as 
mayor of Cologne in 1945. Exasperated by the failure of the mayor to take 
practical steps to improve the physical conditions of his city, while he 
concentrated on political matters, Templer himself ordered his dismissal. 
Adenauer apparently bore him no grudge and although, when he became 
chancellor, he would never see Templer socially, he would send him a case of 
the best hock whenever he visited London’.66 Harding wished Templer to spend 
a year as commander-in-chief of the British Army of the Rhine in order to gain 
some first-hand experience of NATO; but this appointment was blocked by the 
Foreign Secretary, Sir Anthony Eden. The official explanation for Eden’s 
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objection was his opposition to such a short tenure at a crucial period of German 
rearmament and not, as some suggested, because of Templer's brush with 
Adenauer.67 Eden nonetheless made it clear in private that ‘our relations with 
Adenauer are so important that I do not want to take any chances with them, if I 
can possibly help it’. He therefore favoured the Ambassador Hoyer-Millar ‘to 
mention the matter casually to Adenauer and see how he takes it’. Although 
apparently not because of Templer’s position in 1945, Winston Churchill 
intervened and advised that General Gale:  
 
who has only been about eighteen months in Germany, should not be 
moved from a Command which I understand he is filling with distinction. I 
think it is in the public interest that he should remain where he is for at 
least another year.68   
 
The case clearly demonstrated the transformation of the position of the BAOR in 
Germany since Adenauer’s dismissal as mayor of Cologne in 1945. It 
furthermore underlined the extent of British efforts to avoid any friction with the 
German chancellor, considered the driving force behind Germany’s pro-western 
policy and a ‘stabilising influence’ by the Foreign Office.69 
 Despite the Conservative government’s willingness to tie Western 
Germany into the European defence against Communism, Britain’s own attitude 
towards Europe during this period was somewhat ambivalent. The view of 
Britain’s position at the heart of Churchill’s ‘three circles’, i.e. the Transatlantic 
Alliance, the Empire/Commonwealth and Europe became the main source of 
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Britain’s post-war claim to world power status.70 The misguided perception of 
Britain’s role as first and foremost the principal European partner of the 
Americans led to the decision to not join the drive leading towards European 
integration and the 1957 Treaty of Rome. The Churchill government saw a 
partnership with Germany as necessary because NATO and the Atlantic 
Alliance were at the centre of British policy. Britain favoured loose forms of 
intergovernmental cooperation in Europe but rejected supranational integration. 
European integration was a subordinate and peripheral issue.71 It was this 
attitude which increased the significance of 80,000 British troops in the British 
zone of Occupation as a means to exert influence outside the realm of the EEC.  
 
 
Controversies over the BAOR within the British Administration 
 
The BAOR was not only controversial in an Anglo-German and European 
context. It also frequently caused disagreement within the various departments 
of the British government. The importance of the BAOR as a factor in British 
policy became evident whenever the option of reducing the size of the BAOR 
was considered in order to relieve the British taxpayer. When the War Office 
considered a reduction of BAOR strength from 53,000 to 46,000 in 1949 for 
financial reasons without consulting the Foreign Office, this led to protest from 
the highest political circles.  Sir Brian Robertson, who found out about the War 
Office plans ‘by chance’, complained to the Foreign Office, resulting in a letter 
from Foreign Secretary Ernest Bevin to Viscount Alexander, clearly expressing:  
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some disappointment that when an overall reduction made necessary a 
reduction in the strength of Rhine Army […], no consultation with the 
Foreign Office took place. I am sure you will agree that the strength of 
Rhine Army is a very important factor in our whole political position in 
Germany, not only vis-à-vis the Russians, but also vis-à-vis our French 
and American Allies and above all the German population.72  
  
A reduction of BAOR strength not only threatened to invite the Americans 
to act in a similar manner and thereby endanger the entire defence of Western 
Europe but might cause doubts among the Germans as to the Allied 
commitment to defend Germany against communism. The complete withdrawal 
of the British Air Forces of Occupation (BAFO) to air bases west of the Rhine for 
tactical reasons in 1950 was therefore only allowed to go ahead as at the same 
time the number of BAOR troops was significantly increased, which would 
prevent a negative reaction from the Germans. 
 An increase in BAOR strength, desirable as it may have appeared to the 
Germans for the purposes of the defence against communism, also caused 
friction within the British administration. In December 1950 Foreign Office figures 
stated that the Western Allies in Germany had a combined total of 186,000 
troops, as against an estimated total of 320,000 Soviet troops in the Soviet 
zone.73  When the decision was made to increase the strength of the BAOR 
from 44,000 in September 1950 to 65,000 by July 1951, High Commissioner Sir 
Ivone Kirkpatrick in fact warned against this, as ‘we should have to ask for a 
supplementary appropriation of Occupation costs and (…) considerable 
inconvenience would have to be inflicted on the German population in the matter 
of housing and so on.’74  However, the Chancellor of the Exchequer dismissed 
his doubts and: 
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said that any strengthening of the Occupation forces would be good news 
and that the German population would have to put up with the resulting 
expense and inconvenience.75   
 
Nonetheless, as this thesis will explore, the issues of housing, 
Occupation costs, manoeuvre damage and land requisitioning for training 
grounds did cause considerable concern. The German population expected to 
be defended by British troops, whilst simultaneously resenting their use as 
armed protection for workers carrying out dismantling work in factories 
throughout the British zone. This was partly due to the genuine unwillingness of 
many young Germans to bear arms76 and partly for economic, political and 
manpower reasons. Those individual Germans who were affected by British 
housing needs, land acquisitions and manoeuvre damage, naturally resented 
the British troops. Kirkpatrick’s advice to ‘exercise the greatest care and the 
most rigid economy’ was therefore rather pertinent.77   
 
 
Nazi Germany, the British Administration and the Federal Republic 
 
Despite the consistently pro-German policy Britain pursued in order to integrate 
Germany into the western alliance system, it is evident that many Foreign Office 
officials themselves shared ‘the grave reservations about Germans stemming 
from the experience from two world wars’ held in the elite sections of British 
society.78 The Labour Foreign Secretary Ernest Bevin ‘hated the Germans and 
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refused to visit Germany’79 whereas in 1949 Sir Ivone Kirkpatrick commented on 
the ‘truculence and arrogance which made the Germans impossible to deal 
with’.80 Anthony Eden had described the Germans as ‘brutish monsters beneath 
a veneer of civilisation’ as early as 1919.81 Ten years after the war the British 
Ambassador Sir Frederick Hoyer-Millar warned that the German national 
consciousness was beginning to re-awaken, the sense of guilt for the war was 
faint and the German character had not fundamentally changed. ‘The spirit of 
national egoism has, for a second time, survived defeat and occupation.’ 
Furthermore, the German character was ‘volatile and basically unstable’.82 
Suspicions of the German character among the highest circles in London were 
certainly widespread and lasted into the mid-1950s. 
The British High Commissioner Sir Ivone Kirkpatrick was aware of the 
difficult position of the Services in Germany. And Kirkpatrick saw himself as 
someone who was uniquely well-placed to understand the context in which the 
BAOR would operate. At this point it is worth considering Sir Ivone Kirkpatrick’s 
long-standing relationship with Germany and its people. During the First World 
War Kirkpatrick, aged only nineteen, ran a network of British agents operating in 
German-occupied territory after being wounded in action against the Turks in 
1915.83 Having been employed by the Foreign Office since 1919, Kirkpatrick had 
gained detailed knowledge of and insight into the workings of the fascist states 
of Italy and Germany during the interwar period. He served in the British 
embassy in Rome and then as head of chancery in Berlin from 1933 to 1938. 
Moreover, he accompanied the then Prime Minister Neville Chamberlain to the 
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infamous meetings with Hitler during the 1938 Munich crisis. His meetings with 
Hitler had inspired him ‘with such a physical repugnance’ that he unsuccessfully 
asked to be excused from having to attend any more sessions of the 
negotiations.84  
Whatever his attitudes towards the Federal Republic were, they were 
undoubtedly influenced by his experience with Nazi Germany, as this time 
proved the most formative period of his career. According to his memoirs, in 
1937 Kirkpatrick:  
 
was told with some truth that I must be prejudiced by dislike of Germany 
[…]. This was scarcely odd because of the spectacle of a nation 
preparing ruthlessly to impose its will must be alarming and distasteful.85  
 
During the Second World War Kirkpatrick again worked in the propaganda and 
information role he had enjoyed during the First World War. He became 
controller of the European Services of the BBC and also was chosen to 
interview Adolf Hitler’s deputy Rudolf Hess after his flight to Scotland in 1941. In 
1944 he was appointed to organize the British element of the Allied Control 
Commission for Germany. Promoted deputy under-secretary in April 1948, he 
oversaw policy administration for Western Europe and then in February 1949 
became permanent under-secretary overseeing the German section of the 
Foreign Office, the former Control Office for Germany and Austria. Between 
June 1950 and November 1953 Kirkpatrick was British High Commissioner in 
Germany, a position carrying considerable responsibility and power. 
The seat of the Allied High Commission in the Federal Republic was in 
the same hotel in which Neville Chamberlain had stayed during the Bad 
Godesberg meeting with Hitler. A constant reminder of the past was that 
Kirkpatrick’s office as High Commissioner was in the same apartment occupied 
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on that occasion by the then Prime Minister Chamberlain.86 Although his 
relationship with the German Chancellor Adenauer was very cordial, as late as 
1959 Kirkpatrick considered it: 
 
folly to suppose that in no circumstances can Nazism, even in a different 
form, ever again raise its head in modern Germany.87 
 
However, according to his memoirs, in 1953 Kirkpatrick found it ‘a wrench to 
leave Germany, where I had made many friends’ and had been intimately 
connected with every phase of the national life.88 Nevertheless, as previously 
noted, as late as 1949 he had also commented on the ‘truculence and 
arrogance which made the Germans impossible to deal with’.89 It has to be 
noted that not all leading members of the British administration in Germany were 
as reluctant as Kirkpatrick to leave the past behind when dealing with the 
Germans. Particularly Sir Brian Robertson, the military administrator responsible 
for restoring the economic, social and political life of Germany for five years, was 
instrumental in ‘guiding the social and democratic advancement of a future ally’. 
Despite his experiences of two world wars he won the admiration and friendship 
of Konrad Adenauer and worked devotedly to foster Anglo-German relations.90  
 Unsurprisingly, many members of the British administration tasked with 
fostering Anglo-German relations were themselves often doubtful whether the 
‘German character’ could be changed for the better. In many cases their 
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personal contacts with Germans both before and during the war influenced their 
views in the post-war period. Naturally this had an impact on both the perception 
of the need for a tool such as the BAOR as well as the envisaged likeliness of its 





As this chapter has demonstrated, the British military presence in Germany in 
many respects offered a unique opportunity to foster closer Anglo-German 
relations. The increasing physical presence of British troops, spread out all 
across the British zone, and frequent manoeuvre exercises arguably provided 
ample opportunity for contacts with local communities. The British troop 
commitment also demonstrated British determination to defend Western 
Germany. At the same time however, the BAOR also posed risks due to its role 
of implementing often unpopular British policies. The political position of the 
BAOR in the early Cold War climate was precarious. It was considered too weak 
to halt a Soviet attack, too expensive to maintain and too much of a strain on the 
German economy. Yet it was a vital tool to convince the Germans as well as the 
French and the Americans of the British determination to protect Western 
Germany. It was also an important means to prevent a West German policy of 
neutrality in the Cold War, the ultimate goal of British foreign policy in 
Germany.91 The strategy to use the BAOR to improve inter-cultural discourse 
played a part in achieving this goal. Despite a plain refusal to co-operate 
immediately after the war, by 1948 at least the Army’s leadership was willing to 
support the Foreign Office strategy of improving Anglo-German relations. This 
plan was nevertheless threatened by disagreements within the British 
administration itself. Financial constraints and the continued execution of 
unpopular policies agreed on at Potsdam continuously caused friction within 
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both the Labour and Conservative governments. The lack of faith in German 
democracy among the leading administrative staff in Germany, fuelled by 
experiences of two world wars, also played an important part when considering 
the perceived necessity for the BAOR to succeed in its new role.  
This chapter has demonstrated that the effectiveness of the BAOR as a 
tool for Anglo-German rapprochement not only depended on the changing 
attitudes of the Services themselves. It was closely connected to the 
acceleration of the process of accepting the Federal Republic as a free and 
equal member of the Western alliance as well as the ending of unpopular 
policies such as reparations and dismantling. These political steps would largely 
be completed by the time of the accession of the FRG into NATO in 1955 and 
therefore the political relations between London and Bonn arguably made the 
BAOR’s task easier. Nonetheless, in the prevailing opinion of the Foreign Office, 
Federal German sovereignty also made the task of incorporating Germany into 
the Western orbit of defence more urgent due to ‘a distinct trend […] towards a 
more aggressive attitude in respect of German rights and Germany’s proper 
place in the world’.92 It was this urgency which motivated much of the Foreign 
Office activity of the early 1950s, which will be analysed in chapter six. It will 
now be necessary to establish the impact of the attitudes of the British public, 
the Services and the British administration on the effectiveness of the BAOR as 
a positive force for Anglo-German rapprochement. The main aim of the following 
chapters is to go beyond the political context when considering attitudes towards 
Germany. The following sections will therefore aim to provide a more nuanced 
analysis of the British public’s view of Germany as for example expressed in 
popular culture and the press. A detailed picture of the perception of Germany is 
crucial to allow a better understanding of relations between British troops and 
Germans in the British zone of Occupation. 
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It’s puzzling. One part of me says remember Belsen, and such like. The 
other part says we’ll have to forget and build up. Then one hears of 





As established in the first chapter, a sizeable part of the British public found itself 
out of step with the policy of both the Labour and the Conservative 
administration’s policy towards Germany. The BAOR was to serve as a tool to 
implement this policy by developing cordial relations with the German 
population. However, the Servicemen stationed in Germany naturally were 
subject to the same influences shaping British opinion on Germany as the rest of 
the public. An overwhelmingly negative public opinion would undoubtedly have 
affected the willingness of BAOR troops to engage with the German population 
and therefore undermined the BAOR’s value as a means for a rapprochement 
with the former enemy. In order to establish how effectively the BAOR could be 
utilised to improve Anglo-German relations, it is therefore necessary to establish 
a nuanced picture of public opinion on Germany in Britain. This will then allow 
drawing conclusions in regards to the attitudes of British troops in Germany. 
As Patrick Major points out in his recent article on Anglo-German 
relations, most post-war historians dealing with Britain’s view of Germany have 
generally focused on high politics in response to the geopolitical pressures of 
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the Cold War.2 International political events did indeed have an influence on 
public opinion. The desperate humanitarian situation in Germany immediately 
after the war and the Berlin blockade in 1948 had an impact.3 So did the Korean 
War from 1950 to 1953 with its similarities to the situation in Europe. ‘The 
parallel between Korea divided and Germany divided was apparent to 
everyone.’4 The initial success of the North Korean attack on the South Korean 
and American defenders sparked fears that a similar scenario was about to be 
repeated much closer to home. Equally, the resulting debate about German 
rearmament had an impact on British mass public opinion, as recorded in 
various opinion polls.5 The result was a rather more complex and less clear-cut 
view of Germany than two world wars and the revelation of Nazi atrocities would 
suggest. The realities of the Cold War led to a British policy towards Germany 
which attracted considerable amounts of hostile public sentiment in Britain.6 It is 
however important to stress that there were also more positive views of the 
recent enemy.  
The first essential task of this chapter is therefore to consider both the 
popular and the political debates on Germany in Britain at the time, by 
examining both the British press as well as Foreign Office attempts to influence 
views of Germany. Hence this chapter aims to go beyond the political sphere, in 
order to establish a more nuanced picture of factors influencing those young 
Britons going to Germany with the Services in the late 1940s and 1950s. As the 
                                                             
2 Patrick Major, 'Britain and Germany: A Love-Hate Relationship?', German 
History, 26, 4, 2008, 457-468. 
3 John Farquharson, ''Emotional but Influential': Victor Gollancz, Richard Stokes 
and the British Zone of Germany, 1945-9', Journal of Contemporary History,  
Vol. 22, No. 3, 1987, 501-519. 
4 Donald C. Watt, Britain Looks to Germany, p. 104. 
5 See for example: George H. Gallup, The Gallup International Public Opinion 
Polls, Great Britain 1937-1975, New York, 1976. 
6 Anne Deighton, 'Minds, Not Hearts’, p. 79. 
61 
 
Gallup polls on attitudes towards Germany of the 1950s also revealed, the 
British public at large was increasingly less interested in foreign policy and 
therefore also in political developments on the continent in general and 
Germany in particular. Cross-section surveys in many parts of the world have 
shown that popular interest in foreign affairs nearly always takes a backseat to 
interest in domestic politics, which in turn, is of far less concern than personal 
problems.7 The Labour Party Research Department, for instance, reported in 
March 1950 that only eleven per cent of people polled had views that were at all 
influenced by foreign policy considerations.8 Furthermore, there was some 
evidence that, in terms of politics and recent German history, many ordinary 
Britons deliberately turned away from ‘the German problem’ and tended to 
simply not think about Germany:  
 
I certainly do not hate them, yet I have no particular love for them. I 
should like to know what the significance of this is, because I am very 
interested in the situation in France and Italy and even in the Balkans, but 
I cannot work up much interest in Germany.9 
 
It is therefore plausible that many young British servicemen sent to Germany did 
not loathe their former enemy but simply felt indifferent towards their new host 
country.  
This argument is further strengthened by the fact that in 1954, at the 
height of the controversy over the European Defence Community (EDC) and the 
proposal for German rearmament in the context of a European army, only one in 
three Britons polled by Gallup knew what EDC stood for, while only another one 
in three had even heard of it.10 It therefore becomes increasingly apparent that it 
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is not sufficient to pursue a strictly political angle in order to establish a 
comprehensive picture of British opinion of Germany from the late 1940s to the 
mid-1950s. As John Ramsden points out, due to the introduction of National 
Service in 1947, a significant proportion of young British males spent months of 
their lives in Germany as never before or since and in most cases this was their 
only experience ‘abroad’.11 Many of these young men would have formed a view 
of Germany before they went there, based on factors other than Cold War 
politics. These views would then have influenced their expectations of, and 
behaviour towards, the German population they encountered. In order to gain 
insights into the attitudes of BAOR personnel towards the Germans, it is 
therefore also important to consider how Germans were portrayed in Britain by 
popular culture. After an evaluation of the Foreign Office (FO) position towards 
Germany and the British press, this chapter will highlight the perception of 
Germany in the British press, and in cultural sources, notably non-fictional 
literature, novels, comics and films on the Second World War. The BBC attitude 
will also be considered. As will be seen, these sources were crucial as vehicles 
for images and views of the Germans. The chapter also includes some more 
individual perspectives that were often based upon encounters between those 
writers and the German people. Finally, the impact of the re-emergence of 




The British Press, the Foreign Office and Germany  
 
The effect of the major political events following 1945 on British opinion of 
Germany was outlined as early as 1965 by Donald Cameron Watt. The initially 
overwhelmingly negative attitude towards Germany by both the elites as well as 
mass public opinion was increasingly challenged by the humanitarian situation in 
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Germany as well as the behaviour of the people of Berlin during the 1948 
blockade. For the first time in a generation, the British were being presented with 
the sight of Germans ‘behaving en masse in a way of which they could morally 
approve’.12 As early as January 1947, a Gallup poll had revealed that nearly half 
of those polled felt ‘friendly’ towards the German people as a whole.13 Perhaps 
this somewhat surprising result was due to the reports of the devastating 
conditions in the Reich by the British press, which provided an alternative image 
to counterbalance the one that presented Germans as evil and abnormal.14 
Despite Nazi atrocities, as Weidenfeld suggests, German suffering did not find a 
similar level of sympathy anywhere else in the West as it did in some British 
circles.15 
Nonetheless, the economic and political revival of Western Germany 
soon led to a resurgence of hostility in many British circles. In particular the 
issue of German rearmament and the danger of a resurgence of Nazism in 
Germany were influencing the public perception of the Germans. Somewhat 
surprisingly, by the early 1950s opinion polls revealed a continuous and 
relatively even split into pro-and anti-German camps. Regardless of the attempts 
by parts of the press to convince Britons otherwise, a 1953 Gallup poll on the 
question of whether there was much chance of the Nazis again becoming 
powerful in Germany, established that only twenty-four per cent of those polled 
thought it likely.16 However, this picture changed soon thereafter. As D.C. Watt 
points out, a sustained anti-German campaign by the popular press helped to 
push up this number by October 1954, prompting The Observer to comment that 
the reading of papers like the Daily Herald or the Daily Mirror led one ‘to 
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suppose that Hitler was still alive and the Nazis back in power’.17 Of those 
Britons asked by Gallup, at the height of the controversy over German 
rearmament in 1954, if there was much chance that the Nazis would again 
become powerful in Germany, now forty per cent thought there was much 
chance, forty-one per cent were of the opinion there was not much chance and 
nineteen per cent were undecided.18 The idea of a rearmed Germany only ten 
years after the war clearly had an effect on public opinion that was not helpful to 
government policy. However, these figures also demonstrated that those British 
servicemen who did take an interest in politics were just as likely to be in the 
pro-German camp as in the anti-German one when considering rearmament and 
the resurgence of Nazism. 
The policies of both the Labour and the Conservative governments were 
designed to integrate Germany into the western defence against the Soviet 
Union. It is therefore not surprising that, considering this put British politics 
towards Germany at odds with parts of public opinion, the Foreign Office closely 
monitored and, to an extent, explored means to influence the portrayal of 
Germany in the press: 
 
I believe that the whole of Fleet Street is anti-German for the simple 
reason that the average reader in England is anti-German – and the 
newspapers in England pander to their readers. Unless they pander to 
their readers the street sales of a particular newspaper will fall.19 
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Although this statement by a Foreign Office official partly contradicted the 
view of Germany expressed by the aforementioned opinion polls, it certainly 
rang true in regards to the attitudes of sections of the British press. The press in 
general played a major role in shaping Germany’s image in Britain. Whereas 
most of the quality papers like the Manchester Guardian and the Daily 
Telegraph reported objectively on Germany, much of the popular press had 
proved itself both unable and unwilling to ‘free itself from the clutches of war-
time propaganda’.20 The reporting of parts of the popular press on Germany was 
in fact a constant obstacle to improved relations between the two countries. 
Foreign Office officials considered that the wider problem of anti-German 
tendencies in newspapers could arguably be narrowed down to the Beaverbrook 
press, and perhaps The Times. In addition, certain of the more left-wing weekly 
publications were not averse to printing anti-German material. The rest of the 
British press did not necessarily appear to be particular offenders in this respect 
in the view of the Foreign Office.21 Donald C. Watt supported this view and 
argued that, whereas news of crises and international friction was always 
reported, news of positive trends was often neglected. The popular press tended 
to vary between the themes ‘foreigners are funny’ and ‘foreigners are 
dangerous’. Germany almost always fell into the latter category, as Neo-Nazism 
or the revival of anti-Semitism were what the press ‘thought their readers would 
expect to hear from Germany, so this what they concentrated on providing’.22 
 The Daily Express in particular was ‘the worst offender’, but it was by no 
means alone in its tendency to ‘look for evil designs in anything the Germans 
do’.23 Coverage of Germany by the Express was indeed overwhelmingly hostile. 
Moreover, the paper openly criticised German newspapers for retaliating against 
the negative Express coverage by reporting ‘that a ‘wave of hatred’ was 
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breaking over the English people’ and that the Daily Express was among the 
leaders of the German haters. The tenor throughout the period in question was 
‘that Germany must not be trusted, and that in the Federal Republic a new war-
loving nationalism is at work’.24 The vast majority of Express articles either made 
references to British victories over the Nazis or, once Germany recovered 
economically, accused the Germans of ‘paying the British soldier to defend 
them, freeing their own men to compete against Britain in the world’s export 
markets’.25 Even The Times published ‘some pretty poisonous articles’.26 As late 
as 1957 the issue was regarded as so detrimental to Anglo-German relations by 
the British ambassador to Germany, Sir Christopher Steele, that he suggested a 
personal appeal should be made to Lord Beaverbrook, the enfant terrible on this 
subject, to modify his attitude. One suggestion was even to ask Sir Winston 
Churchill to make an appeal to Beaverbrook to stop ‘rocking the boat’ quite so 
one-sidedly. The Foreign Office also considered arranging a private meeting 
between the German Chancellor, Konrad Adenauer and Beaverbrook.27  
However, despite the negative attitude of the right-wing Daily Express 
and the Labour-leaning Daily Mirror, which had reflected the anti-German views 
of the Labour right since the Second World War, it must be pointed out that not 
everything said on Germany in these papers was negative. There were frequent 
examples of factual and neutral reporting on day-to-day Anglo-German relations, 
which arguably reflected a degree of normalisation of relations between Britain 
and Germany. For instance, even the Express could not find anything negative 
in local German authorities inviting British Service personnel to a champagne 
reception on opening the new British Army Headquarters at Mönchen Gladbach 
in 1954.28 The Daily Mirror printed a letter to the editor in 1954 from a sixteen 
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year old Londoner, who stated ‘I have nothing against the Germans’. The author 
did not want to be told about the crimes of the past war and wanted ‘there to be 
no grudge held against young German children’.29 Even in the most anti-
German newspapers there were therefore voices of reconciliation, although at 
times these came from the readers rather than the editors. The Daily Express 
found itself reporting positively about the German ambassador to Britain and 
German efforts at improving Anglo-German relations, after a reception at the 
German embassy in London in 1955.30 Stories on British troops in Germany 
were repeatedly used for entertainment rather than criticism of Germany. This 
was demonstrated by the case of a young German who, after having posed as a 
Briton and served with the BAOR for two years, had been acquitted on charges 
of fraud, despite having ‘lectured to American soldiers, telling them British tanks 
in Korea were fitted with electrical tea machines and special plugs for razors’.31 
Clearly such examples of ‘foreigners are funny’ reporting provided a contrast to 
the dominating negative view of Germans.  
Nonetheless, as late as 1957 the prevailing view in the Foreign Office 
was that: 
 
no newspaper here will ever say anything nice about Germany. They 
regard the subject as unpopular with their readers and their policy in this 
respect is firmly fixed.32  
 
The British correspondents in Germany were ‘largely anti-German by 
inclination’, so that not only the policy of the papers, but also the character of the 
reporting of their foreign correspondents needed to change. This certainly was a 
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‘Herculean task’.33 The problem was further exacerbated by the fact that most of 
the German correspondents in England ‘write pretty poor accounts of this 
country in their own papers’, so that the unsatisfactory publicity worked both 
ways. Indeed, rather than solely blaming the British tabloids for providing a poor 
representation of Germany, the Foreign Office considered the German press to 
be equally at fault: the German correspondents in London were considered to be 
of rather poor quality and, politically, inclined to the left. Their reports appeared 
‘often tendentious and unjustifiably critical, e.g., on colonial affairs, the economic 
situation, etc.’ If anything was to be done in Britain ‘to try to put our own house in 
order we ought at the same time to urge the Germans to deal with theirs’. 
However, it appeared doubtful whether the same widespread tendency to find 
something evil ‘in everything the British do exists in the German press to the 
extent that it does, in reverse, here’.34 
 
What mystifies the Germans is the hostility of the Conservative press. 
They reckon with anything that comes from the Left but they cannot 
understand the attitude of Tory newspapers when compared with the 
consistently friendly attitude of H.M.’s recent governments.35 
 
The subject of the British press caused much concern, particularly as ‘a lot of 
our Press comment ran counter to the views of Her Majesty’s Government on 
Anglo-German relations’. According to the German Foreign Office it was most 
noticeable that in France, the Benelux countries and in Denmark and Norway, 
where the population had as good if not better grounds as in Britain to mistrust 
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and dislike the Germans, the attitude of the Press was much more positive and 
constructive.36 
According to the Foreign Office the reasons for this were threefold: the 
attitude of the British press, the quality of British correspondents in Germany 
and the organisation of German information services in London. FO powers to 
address these issues were extremely limited and there was a real danger of 
doing more harm than good in attempting any improvement:  
 
It may well be due […] to the fact that, broadly speaking, the German 
alliance is accepted in England with the head rather than the heart. But, 
whatever the origins of this feeling, the fact is that it sells newspapers.37  
 
Clearly also, as in the case of the Daily Express, the anti-German attitude 
was a matter of policy dictated from the highest level. In this case, and given the 
natural susceptibilities of the press to any suggestion of official direction, the 
main burden of improving the situation had to lie ‘in the first place with the 
Germans themselves’. There was comparatively little the Foreign Office could 
contribute to this problem but there was the hope that exchanges of visits and 
the experience of working together with the Germans as partners in 
organisations of all kinds, both official and non-official, would help to eliminate 
the anti-German legacy.38 On the one hand, the BAOR was to be used as one 
means to this end. On the other hand, the negative press coverage of Germany 
threatened to undermine the BAOR’s potential as a foreign policy tool by 
promulgating a negative view of the Germans. 
                                                             
36 NA, FO 371/130857, Copy of Confidential Minute from Mr. A.L. Pope to the 
head of Chancery, Bonn, 23 September 1957. 
37 NA, FO 371/130857, Letter Pat Hancock, FO to Sir Christopher Steele, Bonn, 
23 October 1957. 
38 NA, FO 371/130857, Letter Pat Hancock. 
70 
 
Nonetheless, the powers of the Foreign Office to influence the press were 
negligible and alternative means to make Germany more popular had to be 
found. According to a 1957 FO minute, unless some kind of powerful influence 
was brought to bear on Lord Beaverbrook himself, there seemed very little hope 
of changing the tone of his papers. In regards to The Times, that newspaper’s 
correspondent in Bonn, a Mr Heron, wrote anti-German despatches; but The 
Times leaders on Germany were often hostile in tone and it appeared that 
editorial policy had set the line. The Times suffered from the additional handicap 
of having to avoid the impression of repeating its 1930s policy of keeping out of 
the paper ‘anything which might upset the Nazis’.39 Only top level pressure 
could bring about a change here.40  
 
Of course, it is no good trying to deal with the Express or the Evening 
Standard, or indeed the Daily Mirror. But the Germans would be well 
advised to work out a programme to cope with The Times, the 
Manchester Guardian, the Herald, the News Chronicle, the Telegraph, 
the Birmingham Post, the Scotsman and the Yorkshire Post.41 
  
There was also the view that a good deal could be done to popularise Germany, 
as opposed to German political thinking, to try to bring it back to the position it 
held in the early nineteenth century:  
 
Why don’t [the Germans] do exhibitions of Nymphenburg china? They 
need a skilful showman to set all this up and it must be done discreetly. I 
think these ideas are practical but I rather despair of the German 
character, because I doubt if they have anyone who is imaginative 
enough to launch such a programme effectively.42 
                                                             
39 Donald C. Watt, Britain Looks to Germany, p. 127. 
40 NA, FO 371/130857, Minute by J.H. Moore, 12 November 1957. 
41 NA, FO 371/130857, Minute by J.H. Moore, 12 November 1957. 




Despite the attempts by the Foreign Office to achieve a more positive portrayal 
of Germany in the British press, there was pessimism both about the press as 
well as the Germans:  
 
I am afraid the problem is really deeper […]. I think the British press will 
continue to tend to be anti-German for the simple reason that the 
Germans are going to become increasingly unpopular; and this is 
because they are probably going to become more and more successful 
and, as a result more and more German!43  
 
There were also doubts about the idea of making Germany more popular by 
televising Konrad Adenauer’s speech during his 1957 state visit to Britain: ‘The 
German voice is not yet sweet music to the English ear and I am afraid the Daily 
Express will have a heyday.’44 The negative press attitude and the Foreign 
Office’s inability to change this make the search for alternative means to 
improve Anglo-German relations, including the BAOR, understandable. 
However, BAOR soldiers were of course themselves confronted with this hostile 
press attitude.  
 Moreover, at times the BAOR itself was used as a tool by the British 
press to highlight anti-German views. For instance, the Sunday Pictorial targeted 
the allegedly hostile German behaviour towards British troops in 1957. In an 
article titled ‘Yellow bellies - by order’, the journalist Audrey Whiting accused 
‘small-time German politicians’ of stirring up ‘as much trouble as they can for the 
boys of the Rhine Army’, by orchestrating vicious press campaigns and 
deliberately exaggerating minor skirmishes between British soldiers and local 
youths – ‘skirmishes which are invariably started by the Germans themselves’.45 
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British readers were regaled with stories about BAOR soldiers, who were merely 
going for a quiet drink, being told ‘out with the dirty English’ by German louts. 
Not only this, but apparently British soldiers were now also under strict 
instructions ‘not to rise to this kind of baiting’, in order to avoid trouble. 
Apparently a war office spokesman blamed minor German politicians for 
exaggerating small incidents, as they wanted British soldiers out of Germany:  
 
A National Serviceman from Booth, Lancashire told me: ‘What it amounts 
to is that we are being told to behave like a lot of yellow bellies’.46   
 
For Pictorial the case was clear: ‘These whipper snapper German politicians 
must be told by their own leaders to stop their monkey business!’47 This kind of 
press coverage certainly did not aid the cause of the Foreign Office. The article 
unsettled at least one Briton sufficiently to write a letter to the German 
chancellor Konrad Adenauer, asking for the latter to make a public statement in 
order to preserve the ‘firm friendship and alliance with Britain’.48 The German 
response to this essentially dismissed the allegations, blaming the ‘irresponsible 
boulevard press’, as well as the new, and not exclusively German phenomenon 
of the rise of the so called Halbstarken, or teenage yobs. The former portrayed 
false images by constantly exaggerating and the latter were mostly looking for 
fights without having any motives, let alone political ones.49 
 It does not come as a surprise that the British working class, arguably the 
class mostly targeted by newspapers such as the Express and the Mirror, was 
made up of those Britons most hostile to Germany (apart from the old, who after 
all had experienced two world wars); those least unfavourable to Germany were 
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the professional classes and the rich.50 This potentially had a significant impact 
on the BAOR. From 1939 to 1960, the British Army’s social structure, values, 
and way of life survived with surprisingly little change. The British officer corps 
was still dominated by the ‘gentleman’ and the Army remained essentially a 
working-class Army officered by the upper classes.51 This then would not bode 
well for British efforts to use young working-class Service personnel to improve 
Anglo-German relations once stationed in the British zone. 
 The topic of Germany was not only frequently debated in the press. The 
BBC also regularly featured Germany in its programmes. BBC Radio coverage 
of Germany during the period under observation here, although frequently 
touching upon issues related to the Nazi regime and World War Two, very much 
focused on current political, social, economic and cultural issues and trends. 
Political programmes ranged from German reunification over rearmament to 
talks on German resistance against Hitler.52 Cultural pieces on Germany were 
frequent, covering issues such as contemporary German poetry or ‘the dilemma 
of the German novel’.53 The picture emerging from the political BBC coverage of 
the Federal Republic was one of concern over the future position of Germany in 
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Europe and direction of Anglo-German relations but not one of resentment of the 
former enemy.  
There were also frequent cases of a thorough analysis of and positive 
attitude towards the new Germany. In 1955 BBC Television screened ‘A Special 
Enquiry on Germany’, a programme on the ordinary German’s view of German 
sovereignty, unification and re-armament. The aim was to ‘get a bit more behind 
the personality of the ordinary German man-in-the-street’ and to portray 
Germans against the background of day-to-day life including their views.54 The 
programme addressed questions such as German trade competition, alleged 
Nazi influence on the Bonn government, the progress of democracy and 
whether or not Germany could be trusted as a re-armed ally. In regards to trade 
competition the film provided a rather more rational view of the Federal Republic 
than the popular press in Britain:  
 
Germany dominates Western European markets once more. […] 
Germany’s position in Europe makes her indispensable to Europe from 
an economic point of view. Europe cannot be prosperous unless 
Germany is.55  
 
Considering the question of ‘are we re-arming the Nazis’, the film provided a 
wide range of German views including the official government line, the views of 
the opposition and those of Germans at large. The very detailed analysis, which 
also made use of interviews with both British and German journalists, essentially 
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arrived at the conclusion that the FRG ‘means too much to Europe’s bread and 
butter to be treated as France would like to treat her’.56  
 Not only the film’s coverage of Germany was favourable but British 
audience opinion of the programme after its screening in April 1955 was also 
very positive. An estimated seventeen per cent of the British adult population 
saw the broadcast, which was equivalent to fifty one per cent of the adult TV 
public. Questionnaires completed by a sample of the audience revealed that 
most viewers welcomed the opportunity to hear opinions at first hand from a 
cross-section of Germans. ‘The subject, viewers said, is much in peoples’ minds 
at the present time and this programme presented up to date information in  a 
most interesting way.’57 Although one or two viewers confessed having not 
much interest in Germany, the majority were most favourably impressed by the 
information provided. 
 Not only did the BBC aim at a more balanced portrayal of Germany in its 
coverage but it also actively cooperated with the Foreign Office in order to 
increase the number of German listeners to its service. According to the FO a 
listening audience in Western Germany would be of importance not only in the 
event of the situation deteriorating but also ‘to ensure a bearing for the British 
case in those matters where German public opinion takes an emotional view 
and about which the German press will not give the British position a fair 
hearing’.58 In order to increase the BBC audience in Germany the Foreign Office 
decided to finance a listener competition. Around 120,000 DM was to be drawn 
from the budget for ‘special projects of political importance’ and used to pay for 
publicity and competition prizes. The main prizes included visits to Great Britain 
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as well as radio sets. The visits to London were to coincide with the 1953 
coronation ceremonies. Despite fears that other European countries might 
complain about the preferential treatment of Germans in this matter and despite 
the difficulty in obtaining the required number of seats for the ceremony, one FO 
official remarked that there really was only one potential problem:  
 
It would be awkward, of course, if one of the German prize-winners 
turned out to be Hitler.59 
 
The weekly BBC magazine The Listener featured fifteen articles on 
Germany in the period between July and December 1948 alone. Importantly, the 
attitude towards Germany rather differed from that of the Beaverbrook press. 
Once again German politics were covered but so were cultural subjects such as 
architecture, history and youth culture. The fear of a resurgence of German 
nationalism was a constant feature throughout the period in question. This was 
evident in 1949, when readers were reminded that ‘experience has taught us 
how malignant a form German nationalism can take’.60 In 1955 the historian 
Geoffrey Barraclough still warned his audience that: 
 
Germany today is master of its own fate. The question now, before it is 
too late, is to ensure that it will not also be the master of Europe’s fate, 
and of your fate and my fate.61  
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However, despite the doubts expressed by The Listener that ‘there really has 
been a change at heart’ in Germany’, the subject was dealt with far more 
objectively and also positively than in parts of the popular press. As early as 
1948, there were encouraging reports on German students62 and in 1955 the 
author and journalist Terence Prittie argued that, although the ‘German desire to 
“be friends” with other peoples was almost embarrassingly ardent and evident’, 
German youth was ‘the fairest […] promise of a sound and settled German 
future’.63 The image of a re-emerging Nazi Germany, as portrayed by the Daily 
Express, was therefore counterbalanced by a more positive, if cautious view of a 
country, which, ten years after the war, had ‘rejected racial theories and shrunk 
away from anti-Semitism, from cracker-mottoes and distorted mythology’.64 It is 




The Battle for the British Public in Non-fiction Literature 
 
Apart from day-to-day politics, non-fictional literature was an important means 
for the British press and even Whitehall to influence the public’s view of 
Germany, whilst simultaneously keeping the topic of Germany in the public 
domain over the rearmament question. Although, according to one eminent 
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British publisher, the British public had ‘their heads well in the sand’ as far as 
Germany was concerned and they simply did not want to recognize ‘that she’s 
there again, let alone read a long book about her’, Germany was a frequent and 
controversial literary subject during this period.65 One particular case of a ‘battle 
of the books’ between pro-and anti-German factions in Britain was the notorious 
case of the alleged Foreign Office attempt to suppress the publication of The 
Scourge of the Swastika by Lord Russell of Liverpool, then the Assistant 
Advocate Judge General. This case also demonstrated the struggle of the 
British administration to prevent damage caused to Anglo-German relations by 
members of its own ranks. At the end of the war, Russell had been responsible 
for all courts martial, war crime trials, and questions of military law in the British-
occupied zone of Germany. Not only had he mistrusted Germans before 1939 
but he was revolted by the atrocities which were revealed under his auspices in 
trials of German war criminals in British military courts in occupied Germany 
(1946–50). Russell believed at heart that, because of their war depravities, the 
German people existed on a different level from the rest of humanity.66 In March 
1951 he and his wife were assaulted by a mob in the German village of Vlotho, 
when Russell forced his car through a German crowd. He had ignored local 
police, frightened pedestrians and was therefore immediately recalled to 
London.67 The next three years (1951–4), during which he worked in London as 
assistant judge advocate, were the most frustrating of his career. At his wife's 
suggestion he compiled a detailed account of Nazi war criminality which Cassell 
agreed to publish as The Scourge of the Swastika. It is worth considering the 
case of the alleged suppression of The Scourge here as it not only provided a 
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further example for the Foreign Office struggle with the press but also 
highlighted the difficult position of the British administration when faced with the 
charge of suppressing freedom of expression in order to achieve its policy 
objectives towards Germany. 
Certain sections of the popular press jumped at the opportunity provided 
by the alleged government attempt to suppress Russell’s publication. In the 
summer of 1954, Lord Beaverbrook’s right-wing and anti-German Daily Express 
accused the Government of being guilty of: 
 
an intolerable interference with the rights of the citizen. It has attempted 
to prevent a book on Nazi war crimes from seeing the light of day. It has 
exerted all its available power to achieve this purpose. And it has done so 
in vain.68  
 
The paper argued that, at the very moment when the Government was planning 
to rearm the Germans, the Assistant Judge Advocate General was publishing a 
document ‘recounting the deeds perpetrated by certain Germans when Nazi 
Germany was armed!’ The article called to ‘offer to postpone German 
rearmament in return for real talks with Russia on the future of Germany’ and 
the author hoped that ‘some rich man will send free copies to all members of the 
cabinet’.69 The Labour-supporting Daily Mirror demonstrated rather more 
restraint on the Lord Russell issue than the Express. In a more balanced article 
it provided explanations by the Lord Chancellor for attempting to prevent 
publication, Lord Russell’s subsequent insistence on releasing the book as well 
as a Foreign Office statement denying any involvement in the matter. Although 
the Mirror stated that it was possible to criticise the Lord Chancellor for the 
attempted suppression, ‘his action can be defended on the ground that he is a 
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member of the government and as such must uphold government decisions’.70 
Although the Mirror was by no means particularly friendly towards Germany, in 
many of its articles the difference in portraying the Russell case is striking. The 
Express published twenty one articles about the issue between August and 
December as well as publishing extracts of the book itself. By contrast, the 
Mirror only considered the case worthy of mentioning four times over the same 
period. The Daily Express used the book controversy to add to the ‘consistent 
stream of news and cartoons designed to drive home the image of a Germany 
returning to the state of 1939’, whereas the Daily Mirror arguably downplayed 
the issue and thereby followed the Labour party line, which was slowly accepting 
the inevitability of German rearmament.71  
The details of the Scourge of the Swastika controversy clearly 
demonstrate how non-fictional literature was used as a means to influence 
public opinion. The official explanation for the Lord Chancellor’s refusal to grant 
publication of The Scourge was that, considering Russell’s position, it was 
unacceptable for him to influence controversial contemporary politics.  Lord 
Russell rejected the Lord Chancellor’s view. He resigned his post as Assistant 
Judge Advocate General and published his book, forfeiting his government 
pension in the process. The Daily Express alleged that Lord Russell had been 
refused permission to publish his work by the Foreign Office. However, the Lord 
Chancellor insisted the responsibility for the decision to be entirely his72, which 
is not entirely convincing, considering confidential FO correspondence on 
‘influencing the publication of certain books’.73 The Lord Chancellor had carefully 
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considered ‘whether anything further could be done to prevent Lord Russell from 
publishing this book but concluded that it could not.’74 Sir Ivone Kirkpatrick 
expressed his view on Russell clearly in a handwritten note, simply stating ‘he is 
not quite sane.’75  
 The publication of what Lord Russell described as ‘a solely factual and 
historical’ account of Nazi war crimes certainly caused controversy in Britain.76 
In the words of the Observer, the ‘most serious problem of our age is exploited 
with a tastelessness and sensationalism normally associated with the worst kind 
of journalism’. It was no answer to say that Lord Russell had limited himself to 
extracts from the published records, as ‘the same defence could be made by 
any hack serving up selected extracts from divorce or murder cases.’77 The 
book title, wrapper and general presentation differed sharply from hitherto 
published war crime accounts in their sensationalism.78 According to a report by 
the Lord Chancellor’s Office, much of the press comment on this affair had been 
undoubtedly favourable to Lord Russell. However:  
 
many of the more reputable papers have thought it clear that the 
publication of such a book by a person in Lord Russell’s position should 
not be countenanced.79  
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Controversial or not, the book proved hugely popular with the British 
public. Prime Minister Winston Churchill, who considered the publication 
enormously damaging, personally thought it necessary to inform the Foreign 
Office in November: 
 
that he has heard that Lord Russell of Liverpool’s book has already sold 
60,000 copies and is being reprinted as fast as possible as the demand is 
very great.80  
 
Although Russell’s intention was to ensure German atrocities were not 
forgotten, some evidence suggests that the British public was not reading it for 
that reason. Images shown in the book included shrunken heads found at 
Buchenwald concentration camp and, according to Wendy Webster, school 
children in Britain secretly passed the book around under their desks. There was 
a perception of the ‘pleasure of horror’ and in fact the alleged effort to ban the 
book most likely led to the surge of interest.81  
Literary attempts to influence the British public’s view on Germany did not 
end with The Scourge of the Swastika. In the midst of the controversy over 
Russell’s book, the High Commission in Bonn informed the FO that the widow of 
a Berlin socialist executed after the failed July plot against Hitler, had recently 
published a book on the plot, called Das Gewissen steht auf (Conscience in 
Revolt).82 Apparently this was:  
 
very well written and gives an interesting account of the part played in the 
plot by various Germans from all walks of life. Apart from paying tribute to 
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the memory of these people, the book gives a general impression of the 
better side of Germany under the surface.83  
 
The German Federal Press Office decided on publishing an English 
version of the book, ‘particularly in view of the criticisms of Germany in some 
parts of the British press’.84 As Robert Birley pointed out in his introduction to 
Conscience in Revolt: 
 
When Western Germany became a possible partner in an alliance, the 
character and traditions of the people could no longer be ignored. It is not 
surprising, therefore, that several books, widely publicised and widely 
read, should have appeared, reminding Englishmen of the atrocities of 
the Nazi regime. This book is in no sense an answer to them. But it is an 
essential part of the evidence, and one largely neglected in this country.85 
 
Moreover, in October 1954, Norman Wymer, a literary adviser to Odhams 
Press publishing company, sent a letter to Anthony Eden to enquire if the foreign 
secretary personally objected to encouraging Konrad Adenauer to write a book 
describing the position in Germany at the time and ‘telling of his efforts to stamp 
out Nazism and re-build the country into a peace-loving nation’. As so much had 
been written about Nazi atrocities: 
  
to prejudice the general public against Germany it occurs to me that it 
might be helpful to the cause of better understanding between Britain and 
Germany to produce a book giving the new German viewpoint: a book 
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designed to remove public distrust and, instead, sow the seeds of 
confidence and friendship.86  
 
This book was considered a good antidote to the Lord Russell type of 
publication, though it obviously could not appear for some time. However, the 
need would be just as great in 1955 ‘when, as we hope, a beginning will be 
made on the new German defence contingent’.87 This request clearly 
demonstrated that, although the tabloid press and parts of the publishing 
industry were mostly interested in portraying Germany as evil, this was not 
universally the case. Typically though, the Foreign Office was careful to not 
promote its pro-German policy at home too much. A draft Foreign Office reply 
stated that Eden saw no reason why Wymer should not write to Adenauer 
personally but, as ‘he regards this as a matter which does not concern him, he 
would not wish to be quoted as having expressed a view’.88 According to the 
Head of the Central Department of the Foreign Office, Patrick Hancock, the 
whole proposal in fact came close to being imprudent:  
 
What would we think if a German wrote to the Secretary of State 
suggesting that Sir Anthony Eden should publish a book and adding that 
in that case Dr. Adenauer would not mind?89 
 
The battle of the books continued throughout the entire period in 
question. Books on German resistance were ‘usually reviewed as being much 
ado about nothing’, while accounts of the Holocaust mainly ignored Hitler’s 
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Gentile victims.90 Whitehall continuously aimed at halting this trend. According to 
a Foreign Office minute, there were at least two other books connected with 
Germany, ‘the publication of which H.M.G. are at present seeking to influence’, 
i.e. prevent. One, The London Cage,91 by a retired Colonel revealed British 
methods of interrogating POWs in the Second World War, as well as revealing 
several instances of improper treatment of Germans, which ‘might cause us 
some political embarrassment in Germany’.92 The second, as yet unnamed, 
book threatened to reveal ‘much accurate information about our Intelligence 
Service, together with the names of many officers who are still serving in it.’ 
These cases were brought up ‘because there may be growing accusations in the 
press that the Foreign Office are trying to suppress all freedom of speech about 
Germany. The fact that the decision in both cases would be taken on grounds 
quite unconnected with the political situation in Germany ‘would of course be 
overlooked by the Beaverbrook press.’93 Even though opinion polls revealed a 
certain apathy in regards to the German question, there is certainly ample 
evidence that efforts were made to influence views through publications on both 
‘good and bad Germans’. 
 
 
The Representation of Germans in British Novels 
 
More so than in non-fictional literature, young British men about to go join the 
BAOR would likely have come across Germany in novels. David Lodge, drawing 
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on his own experience of national service, pointed out in his Ginger, You’re 
Barmy, that the favourite form of escape literature among soldiers of the modern 
Army was not pornography, nor westerns but war-books.94 This idea is certainly 
supported by the fact that, according to a Gallup poll, Nicholas Monsarrat’s war 
novel The Cruel Sea topped the list of best-selling books in 1952, ahead of 
Winston Churchill’s war memoirs.95 The portrayal of Germans in Monsarrat’s 
novel was rather stereotypical, if not shrill. The only Germans encountered in the 
book were sailors of a German submarine, which the main character, British 
corvette commander Ericson, had just despatched to the bottom of the sea. One 
German was portrayed as raising his right arm and roaring out ‘Heil Hitler’, while 
he was still in the water swimming towards his rescuers.96 The U-boat 
commander himself was ‘tall, dead-blond and young’, with ‘pale and slightly mad 
eyes’. In typical Nazi fashion, he was full of contempt ‘that twitched his lips and 
nostrils’, due to the ‘hatred of his capture by an inferior’.97 The German officer’s 
behaviour was described as so appalling that Ericson had to restrain himself to 
not shoot him right there and then. Later the U-boat captain started crying during 
the sea burial of British and German sailors, having been: 
 
emotionally shocked out of the arrogant mould: he admitted 
bereavement […] It was probably the swastika, Ericson reflected: the 
dead sailor from his crew would not bother him, but the ‘gesture of 
honour’ implied by the burial party and the enemy ensign would knock 
him out.98 
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The Germans in The Cruel Sea were all of the same type: ‘We can only shoot 
them, and hope for a better crop next time’.99 
The post-war popular book market was effectively dominated by war 
books and auto-biographies.100 The Cruel Sea was still at the top of Gallup’s list 
in 1955, followed by two other war books, Reach for the Sky and HMS 
Ulysses.101 However, when one compares the portrayal of Germans in the 1952 
novel The Cruel Sea with that in Reach for the Sky of 1954, striking differences 
become apparent. The Germans encountered by the book’s main character 
Douglas Bader, an RAF pilot shot down over France, were often ‘types after his 
own heart and he would have liked to have had them in his wing. What a damn 
silly war it was’.102 The Germans went to great lengths trying to fix the pilot’s 
prosthetic leg, leaving him ‘impressed and rather touched’103, and they even 
allowed him to climb into a German fighter plane when meeting a distinguished 
German fighter ace. Although a number of subsequent encounters with 
Germans in POW camps provoked much ‘goon-baiting’ from the British POWs, 
many of the German officers portrayed in Reach for the Sky were ‘tolerant and 
sympathetic’. Douglas Bader ‘had to admit that some of the Germans were 
incredibly decent and reasonable, and had a passable sense of humour.104 
Once the hostilities ended, Bader found it difficult to express his feelings towards 
some of his fellow comrades, as:  
 
                                                             
99 Nicholas Monsarrat, Cruel Sea, p. 238. 
100 John Ramsden, ‘Re-focusing ‘the People’s War’: British War Films of the 
1950s’, Journal of Contemporary History, Vol. 33, No.1, 1998, p. 36. 
101 Robert Wybrow, Britain Speaks Out, p 45. 
102 Paul Brickhill, Reach for the Sky: The Story of Douglas Bader, London, 1954, 
p. 291. 
103 Paul Brickhill, Reach for the Sky, p. 287. 
104 Paul Brickhill, Reach for the Sky, p. 336. 
88 
 
the trouble was he did  feel sorry for them [the Germans]. Now there was 
nothing to fight, some of the hate seemed to have withered, but he felt it 
unwise to try and explain it to the others because they were still living in 
the war and would not understand.105 
 
It is in fact difficult to imagine a more positive portrayal of the former enemy only 
nine years after the war’s end.  
The popularity of war novels certainly kept the issue of Germany in 
people’s minds but in some cases the portrayal of the former enemy marked a 
distinct contrast to the ‘goon baiting’ still practiced by parts of the British press at 
the time. Military campaign histories such as The Story of Dunkirk (1955) sold 
an impressive 150,000 copies in only a few months and had to be re-printed.106 
As Penny Summerfield points out, in contrast to the previous decade, when 
sensitivities towards the feelings of the bereaved may have held back 
publishers, in the 1950s Britain remembered the military campaigns of the 
Second World War in the rites and rituals of public commemoration, as well as in 
literature.107 Several commentators have argued that, in an era only gradually 
emerging from austerity, when erstwhile enemies were outstripping Britain 
economically and the British Empire was breaking up, the nation took comfort 
from the war as a period of British success and prestige.108 As for example John 
Ramsden remarks, young British readers could read dozens of books a year 
about prisoner of war camps, combat and espionage as well as boys’ comic 
books constantly reinforcing the stereotype of the German Nazi soldier.109 The 
mass market in Britain was indeed flooded with hardback and paperback 
versions of The Dam Busters, the Colditz Story or Reach for the Sky. The latter 
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not only appeared in hardback and in paperback, but also in its first three years 
in an abridged version, a special young people's edition, and a simplified English 
edition.110 What Ramsden nonetheless overlooked is the portrayal of Germans 
as:  
 
ordinary people […]. He felt no rancour towards the soldiers who had 
winkled him out and as far as he could see they felt no rancour for him.111  
 
Prisoner of war books were so successful they effectively became a separate 
market niche in their own right. It was these ‘railway bookstall titles’ which young 
Britons, about to be despatched to Germany in an Army uniform, would have 
most likely encountered. It is however important to stress that the picture of 
Germans emerging from these novels was not always that of the goose-stepping 
Nazi shown in The Cruel Sea. 
 
 
The Portrayal of Germans in Comics 
 
Comics were another medium that possibly influenced the young soldier and his 
perception of the Germans.  However it is more difficult to emphasise the nature 
and cultural impact of comics than of mainstream novels and films or the daily 
press. This is partly due to the nature of the content of the comics, and partly 
due to the target audience being young boys rather than adults. It is 
questionable if the comics published in the 1950s would have been read by 
many Servicemen. It is therefore necessary to briefly consider the portrayal of 
Germans in comics of the preceding decades. Writing during the ‘phony war’ in 
early 1940, the phase of the conflict between the declaration of war in 
September 1939 and the Battle of Britain from Spring 1940, George Orwell 
suggested that boys’ weeklies were a source of patriotism and implicit 
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conservatism, although their main aim was to amuse their adolescent and 
teenage readers. He also observed that although the characters, from 
schoolboys to authority figures, were mostly middle-class and upper class, their 
readership was predominantly working class. The staple comics such as the 
Gem and The Magnet also played to racial and national stereotypes, although it 
is relevant to consider Orwell’s list of European stereotypes. This included the 
Frenchman (‘excitable, gesticulates wildly’), the Spaniard (‘sinister, treacherous’) 
the Italian (‘excitable, grinds barrel organ’) and even the Swede and the Dane 
(‘kind hearted, stupid’) but did not include the German.112  
Comics had been a source of mirth and comfort to young boys during the 
First World War, and Orwell implied that the same would be the case during the 
Second World War. However, he noted that Nazi Germany and Hitler had only 
just begun to creep into the stories in boy’s weeklies during the late 1930s: 
 
If a Spaniard appears, he is still a ‘dago’ or ‘greaser’; no indication that 
things have been happening in Spain. Hitler and the Nazis have not yet 
appeared, or are barely making their appearance. There will be plenty 
about them in a little while, but it will be from a strictly patriotic angle 
(Britain versus Germany) with the real meaning of the struggle kept out of 
sight as much as possible.113  
 
Orwell was arguing that the patriotism of the comics was mostly assumed and 
promoted within non-political narratives that played on the essential correctness 
and decency of the British versus the ‘foreign’ enemy. 
In fact, paper shortages permanently closed down some boy’s 
publications, including the Gem and the Magnet, both of which had ceased 
publication by 1940. During the post-war 1940s, one notable comic that 
continued from the interwar period was the Hotspur, begun in 1933 as an 
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extension to the D.C. Thomson Empire. The Hotspur, published from 1933 to 
1959, was almost completely devoid of references to the Second World War.  
The content was mostly concerned with the adventures of public schoolboys and 
their headmasters, detective fiction, the Wild West, adventures in the great 
outdoors, and iconic examples of modern trains, boats and planes. In general, 
adolescent and young teenage boys during the Second World War and its early 
aftermath, those who would become the conscripts of the post-war years, had 
less exposure to comics due to the paper shortage. And what they did read was 
rarely full-blooded patriotism, but serial escapism.114 
 In 1947 The Eagle was begun, a new title for the Hulton Press, which 
also published the Picture Post until it wound up in 1957, and a number of other 
populist weekly papers. Edward Hulton was a conservative in politics but he was 
no xenophobe, having been a supporter of Labour’s reconstruction plans.115 Yet 
his weekly magazine for boys remained essentially non-political in terms of 
references to party politics or ideologies, and non-nationalistic in relation to the 
Germans. The Eagle was more captivated by the Wild West of nineteenth 
century North America than the recent war in Europe, and by science fiction, 
modern motor cars, trains, weapons and rockets.  ‘Dan Dare the pilot of the 
future’ rather than Adolf Hitler characterised the content of The Eagle. The Reds 
were from Mars, not Russia. The Eagle was a publishing phenomenon of the 
1950s with a circulation, at its height, of over a million.116  
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Despite the lack of overt references to present political developments, 
Dan Dare was nonetheless informed by the cultural and political circumstances 
affecting Britain during the 1950s. James Chapman argues The Eagle can be 
read as a narrative of British power in the early period of the Cold War. Whether 
this narrative was understood by its contemporary juvenile readers is however 
highly unlikely. Arguably the geopolitical context of the Korean War was 
projected onto the first Dan Dare adventure, in which the planet Venus was 
divided into two hemispheres. However, after defeating the enemy and reuniting 
the planet, the comic in fact goes on to endorse Britain’s policy towards her new 
German Cold War ally: 
  
'You mean you are not going to enslave us or take our land?' [asks a 
defeated enemy] 'And breed another war?' Dan replies. 'No, my friend, 
we of the Earth have learned our peace-making in a hard, bitter school. 
Now we have a one-word policy for both victor and vanquished -- 
disarmament!'117  
 
This reference clearly related to the Allied treatment of Germany at the end of 
the Second World War rather than endorsing stereotypes from the past conflict. 
Nonetheless, as David Kynaston points out in his discussion of comics in 
austerity Britain, most of them were based more on British class caricatures than 
nationalistic stereotypes, and dealt with familiar people in familiar landscapes.  
He does not mention the war, or the Germans, in his analysis of boy’s weeklies 
after 1945.118 Indeed it was not really until the later 1950s and early 1960s that 
the pictorial celebration of the Second World War took off. The War Picture 
Library, published by the Amalgamated Press/Fleetway from 1958 and the 
Commando picture-books (D.C. Thompson) were all about the blood and guts of 
warfare. And from 1962 Captain Hurricane of Valiant (I.P.C.) made his 
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appearance, to the trembling fear of his enemies, namely the Japanese (‘slant-
eyed weevils’) and the Italians (‘ice-cream wallahs’). The Germans were rarely 
called names, but were characterised as hard-faced men in uniform who said 
‘Himmel’ a lot.119 Such depictions were stronger and undoubtedly more violent 
than were to be found in boy’s weeklies during the war, and came almost a 
generation after the war had ended, and as conscription ceased. Despite their 
popularity, which considerably increased after the period under observation 
here, comics were therefore less relevant in the context of public opinion on 
Germany than for example novels and war films. 
 
 
British War Films and their Portrayal of Germans 
 
If the topic of World War Two and Germany was popular among young British 
Servicemen in literature, then the same certainly applied to films. Whereas 
novels arguably appealed more to middle-class readers, war films certainly also 
attracted large working-class audiences. The 1950s were the final period in 
which the cinema was still the principal medium of communication and attitude 
formation in Britain. In 1955, twenty-three million Britons attended the cinema at 
least once a week (down from thirty million five years earlier).120 Movies about 
the Second World War and the Allied fight against Nazi Germany were produced 
at a rather impressive rate, both in Britain and the US throughout the late 1940s 
and 1950s. British audiences were influenced by a large number of films in the 
1950s. The Wooden Horse (UK 1950 – ‘a standard, solid POW drama’121), The 
Colditz Story (UK 1955 – ‘probably the most convincing of the British accounts 
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of POW life’122) and the famous Hollywood production by Billy Wilder, Stalag 17 
(US 1953 – ‘quite different from the understated British films on the subject’123), 
were typical examples of the frequently produced POW dramas.124 Overall, the 
portrayal of Germans in British and American films between the 1930s and 
1980s was overwhelmingly negative.125 However, it must be considered whether 
this also applies for the time period under observation in this thesis.  
Between 1948 and 1958, at least forty war films involving Germans 
arrived in British cinemas, at times at a rate of nearly one every month.126 This 
points towards a much higher level of engagement with at least some, albeit not 
the most fruitful or productive, aspects of the ‘German question’ than the political 
polls of the 1950s suggest. War films were rarely mentioned in lists noting the 
best films of the year and hardly ever appeared in film festivals abroad. In fact 
many film critics were frankly hostile towards the cliché-ridden portrayals of the 
‘stiff upper lip’. Of The Ship That Died Of Shame (UK 1955, ‘a thin and rather 
obvious melodramatic fable’127), one reviewer noted in 1955 that:  
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British film stars may not be the best in the world, but they are certainly 
the most waterproof. ‘Above us the waves’ seems to be their motto.128  
 
Despite being branded ‘old-fashioned’, ‘socially conservative’ and 
irresponsible in regards to attitudes towards future warfare by film critics, war 
films proved immensely popular with audiences. A Gallup poll indicated that the 
most popular movie in 1955 was The Dam Busters.129 The film told the story of 
the 1943 Royal Air Force attack on the German Möhne, Eder and Sorpe dams 
with the so-called ‘bouncing bomb’, in the hope to cripple German industry. It 
mostly focused on the technicalities of destroying the German dams rather than 
on the enemy. Although the carnage caused by the bombing was briefly shown 
and the high number of British casualties was evident, the film was above all a 
glorification of British ingenuity in the face of adversity.130 War films were the first 
or second top-grossing British films in almost every year between 1955 and 
1960.131 The idea of war films being particularly popular among British Service 
personnel is supported by the 1952 account of one National Serviceman, 
produced shortly after his arrival in Germany. Although pointing out that The 
Sands of Iwo Jima (US 1949 – ‘celebrated star war comic, still quite hypnotic in 
its flagwaving way’132) had been the first war film he had seen in a while, it had 
reminded him of the summer exercises in which he took part that year in 
Germany. He thereafter frequently mentioned war books and films in his 
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diary.133 It is interesting that in this case the British film Rommel (US 1951 – a 
‘vivid but scrappy account of the last years of a contemporary hero’134) even 
motivated the conscript in question to learn more of the German language. He 
had read the book and wanted to see the film in a German cinema where it was 
shown in German. Despite all criticism of the genre, here was a curious case of 
war films bringing the German language closer to a young Briton.135  
Overall the portrayal of Germans in war films throughout this period 
presents a rather less one-sided and negative picture than one might anticipate. 
Firstly, a number of films did not in fact feature any Germans at all as in the case 
of The Dam Busters. Secondly, films like The Battle of the River Plate (UK 1956) 
were in fact criticised in reviews for their pro-German attitude and the fact that, 
as the Daily Herald put it, ‘the Germans get all the glory’.136  British productions 
developed throughout the period in question from The Wooden Horse (1950) 
and The Cruel Sea (1953) to The Dam Busters (1955) and The One That Got 
Away (1957 – a ‘true life biopic, […] all very well done’137). The majority of these 
films were preoccupied with the depiction of Allied soldiers rather than Germans. 
They also were centrally concerned with ‘promulgating a selective myth of 
national identity and national cohesion’ within British society. Nonetheless, the 
change in the portrayal from the inhuman, yelping and barking goons in The 
Wooden Horse, to that of Hardy Kruger in The One That Got Away only seven 
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years later, is quite remarkable.138 In fact, it was probably in large parts the at 
times even heroic portrayal of Germans in The Battle of the River Plate, which 
led to the film being the most successful imported film in Western Germany that 
year.139 However, it was also voted the third-best film of the year by people 
interviewed by Gallup in Britain.140 
According to The Times, the reason for the positive portrayal of Germans 
was partly to be found in the ‘semi documentary tradition which has gained so 
great a reputation for British films of war. It is a fine tradition, a noble tradition’, 
which properly presented Germans as soldiers going about their jobs.141  
Despite the sometimes hostile reception of the British press, by the mid-1950s, 
at least in British (as opposed to American) films, more rounded 
characterisations of Germans emerged. Increasingly the German film characters 
accepted defeat ‘like a sportsman’.  The fact that Germany by the 1950s was 
one of the most lucrative film markets in the world might partly explain the 
motives for this new-found ‘brotherly love’. This was impressively demonstrated 
by the contrast between Monsarrat’s novel The Cruel Sea and its film 
adaptation.142 The grotesque Nazis of the novel were in fact completely 
eliminated from the film and the only comment by the British corvette captain 
about German U-boat crews was that ‘they look a lot like our boys’. The opening 
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narration of the film stated that ‘the only villain is the sea – the cruel sea – that 
man has made even more cruel’.143 The effect of the changing attitude towards 
Germans in British war films of the period on the average British conscript is 
likely to have been noticeable. 
Many of the war films of the 1950s could not have been made without the 
active co-operation of the Services themselves. For the armed forces, in the 
aftermath of the 1939-45 experience, the portrayal of British efforts on film was 
evidently an important issue. The Royal Navy hosted its own annual Royal 
Naval Film Corporation dinner, at which actors and producers could be wined 
and dined. The RAF had a special trophy for 'the best interpretation of the RAF 
to the public' each year, unsurprisingly won in 1955 by The Dam Busters.144 
Support by the Services ranged widely from the training of actors to the 
provision of equipment. This culminated in the entire Mediterranean fleet staging 
a sea exercise to facilitate the filming of The Battle of the River Plate. Naturally, 
in return for their efforts, the Services were granted every opportunity to recruit 
young cinema goers into its ranks. Measures included window displays in 
cinemas, parades outside of theatres. In at least one case in 1955, when 
showing The Dam Busters, there even was a RAF recruitment centre inside a 
cinema in Rugeley in Staffordshire.145 In this particular case there was also a 
display of medals and photographs, and a gala opening with an RAF guard of 
honour, fanfare trumpeters and the local civic leaders; an RAF cake-making 
competition for local bakers was organized, with all proceeds going to the RAF 
Benevolent Fund.146 Although this sort of practice may well have increased the 
number of volunteers to the Services, it is questionable whether they aided the 
government’s policy to turn Western Germany into a staunch ally by promoting 
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understanding between British soldiers and German civilians, let alone the future 
German armed forces. Critics frequently pointed out that there existed a public 
appetite for war-glorifying films, and that those films depicting the futility of war 
due to the horrors experienced by all sides, or those showing British war crimes, 
regularly flopped at the box office.147 
 
 
The Impact of Individual Encounters with Germans on British Opinion 
 
A point worth making in regards to public perception of Germany is that, despite 
the revelations of Bergen-Belsen and other concentration camps, the scope and 
detail of the horrible crimes committed by Germans were arguably not as much 
discussed in public during the 1950s as for example during the Auschwitz trials 
of the 1960s.148 It is this background which partly explains the outrage caused 
by publications like Lord Russell of Liverpool’s The Scourge of the Swastika in 
1954. Although British perceptions of Germany had naturally been influenced by 
the revelation of Nazi war crimes in 1945, there are individual accounts by 
Britons which portray a more nuanced picture about attitudes to Germans. 
Geoffrey Gorer thought it worthy of attention that Germans, like foreigners in 
general, appeared frequently in non-marital sexual relationships of English 
people interviewed for his 1955 work on the ‘English character’: 
 
I would suggest this is a cross-cultural phenomenon, rather than a 
reflection on the sexual habits of most peoples other than the English. 
The foreigner is ‘less dangerous’, less likely to be censorious; and foreign 
techniques of courting and flirtation, with their greater apparent 
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aggressiveness and confidence may well be more successful with the 
‘exceptionally shy’ English than they would be in their own countries. 149 
 
Whereas this phenomenon would certainly have affected the experiences 
of many young British servicemen spending their time in Germany, a 
considerable number of British women came into contact with German men, too. 
Political views of Germany in the late 1940s and early 1950s therefore have to 
be considered in the example of a miner’s wife from Essex, whose one real love 
affair outside marriage had been with a married German Prisoner of War.150 Of 
course this did not always lead to a better view of Germans, as probably proven 
by a 24-year old working-class girl from Ilfracombe, who had an affair with a 
German man ‘who, realizing we were getting serious, told me he had no room 
for marriage in his plans’.151 It is likely that for some Britons the personal 
became semi-political. The lived experience of relationships between the 
English and the Germans went to the heart of popular perceptions of Germans, 
if only for a minority. The controversial issue of relationships between Britons 
and Germans so shortly after the war was taken up in films such as Frieda (UK 
1947 – ‘stuffy and dated drama about how one English family learned to love 
one particular German’152), portraying the difficulties of married life of a British 
soldier and his German wife in Britain shortly after the war. Symptomatic of 
changed attitudes, rather more Londoners interviewed by Mass Observation in 
1947 approved than disapproved of the lift of the ban on marriages between 
German prisoners of war and English girls. Nonetheless, one man said of 
English girls marrying German POW’s: 
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I think if an English girl goes so low she should be segregated. If there 
aren’t enough Englishmen, heaven help us!153 
 
Despite this view, the encounters of individual Britons with Germans after 
the war have to be taken into account when considering British views of 
Germany. Famous German individuals, such as the much-revered Manchester 
City goalkeeper Bernd Trautmann, certainly helped to improve the view of 
ordinary Germans.154 He was however only one prominent example of a 
multitude of contacts between Britons and Germans after 1945. Contacts on a 
broader scale were also established very soon after the ending of hostilities 
through a multitude of British initiatives. For instance, the twinning of German 
and British towns and cities began as early as 1947 as the example of Reading 
and Düsseldorf demonstrates. Lord Pakenham, the Minister in charge of 
Occupation Affairs and the Regional Commissioner for North Rhine-Westphalia 
warmly welcomed an initiative by the Mayor of Reading. This initiative attempted 
to ‘establish friendly associations’ with a German town and, as one local paper 
reported, ‘friendly correspondence […] would go far towards breaking down the 
suspicion and antagonism that comes from suffering and despair’.155 The project 
had apparently been given ‘warm approval’ by representative citizens of the 
town. The ‘attitudes of grassroots movers and shakers in politics, religion, 
academia, the arts, business and the unions’ often expressed themselves in 
immediate practical action, and the need to ‘inculcate the young with principles 
of European co-operation and peace’.156 It is doubtful whether town twinning 
programmes had any mass appeal during the period in question but local 
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initiatives such as this have to be added to the broader perception of Germany 
at the time.  
 
 
The Impact of Germany’s ‘Economic Miracle’ on British Opinion 
 
Finally, economic factors must be considered when discussing British views of 
Germany during the period in question. The town twinning programmes 
mentioned above were initially often a means to assist the war-torn German 
towns and cities. However, the German economics minister Professor Ludwig 
Erhard’s ‘social market economy’ was transforming the Federal Republic 
quickly. With the aid of the European Recovery Program (ERP), German 
industries were reviving and general living standards were rising so fast they 
were exciting jealous comments in Britain. As early as 1948, The Listener 
commented on the fact that British officials in Germany could no longer afford to 
eat in German restaurants. One British official summed up his feelings by saying 
that the British in Germany were in danger of becoming ‘the poor relations of the 
Germans’.157 Britons were compelled to eat dreary official rations while some of 
the Germans ‘who used to be glad to accept a tin of corned beef […] now eat 
roast goose’.158 In 1950, with a general election in the offing, the Labour 
Parliamentary Secretary for Food told British voters that Germans were to be 
pitied, not envied for the fact that food-rationing in the FRG had been abolished. 
According to her this merely allowed the wealthy to buy up available supplies.159 
However, in the same year, the leader of the West German Trade Union 
Federation told the German press, having just returned from a UK visit, that the 
British people were living ‘worse than the Germans’.  The German delegation 
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‘could hardly satisfy its hunger in Britain and he was glad ‘to get a square meal 
when I got back to Germany’.160 When Sir Brian Robertson ordered British clubs 
in Germany to be opened to German guests in 1950, one British observer was 
told by a resident of Düsseldorf that ‘we don’t want to go there anyway. The food 
is quite ghastly’.161 
In 1952 and 1953 the graphs marking Western Germany’s economic 
progress continued their vigorous upward flight and complaints in Britain against 
German export competition reached a peak.162 According to one British 
journalist the sharpness of the German export challenge in the first instance, 
coming as it did in markets where Britain had held undisputed sway since the 
end of the war, provoked apprehensions as exaggerated as they were 
uninformed.163 The German export drive was aided by a series of fortunate 
circumstances like the Korean War, the poverty of the home consumer, the lack 
of defence industry and the fact that Germany was regarded as politically 
neutral, thus a more desirable trading partner. This applied particularly in areas 
where Britain’s image had suffered, as in the Middle East.164 Comments among 
British producers grew so acrimonious by 1954 that the Foreign Office became 
concerned lest a serious deterioration in Anglo-German relations ensue.165 
Some British car makers blamed their failure to sell their products in Germany 
on the intensity of German nationalism, ‘drummed into them over the past 
seventy years, and particularly by Dr. Goebbels’.166 Others adopted a more 
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open-minded perspective, while still finding fault with the Germans. The 
journalist Fyfe Robertson wrote to the Picture Post in 1955, claiming that the 
Germans had a ‘new secret weapon’ namely ‘hard work’: 
 
The Germans are steadily taking over our markets. They’ve rebuilt their 
cities, re-equipped their industries, and achieved a remarkable degree of 
prosperity in a remarkably short time, with scarcely any rise in prices. 
 
But, as David Kynaston shows, Robertson went on to ask whether the 
difference between the two countries was that the British were not working as 
hard as the Germans, not giving ‘a fair day’s work for a fair day’s pay’.167 The 
notion of a resurgent German nationalism was increasingly accompanied by the 
fear of German economic competition, which inevitably highlighted the economic 
problems facing Britain: 
 
‘After 1945’ seems to have had the same effect on the Germans as 1940 
had on us…. I can think of a gloomy list of signs ever since the war that 
all is not well with us.168 
 
A less ambiguous hatred of the Germans and undoubted resentment of 
their economic recovery was evident at the very apex of British politics.  As 
Peter Hennessey has pointed out, Harold Macmillan ‘simply could not stand the 
Germans’ and he even shocked the Duke of Edinburgh with a rant against the 
crawling Huns.  As Chancellor of the Exchequer in 1955-56, when the German 
economic recovery was forging ahead, Macmillan became acutely aware that 
the economic balance of power was shifting away from Britain to Germany and 
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other members of the European Coal and Steel Community.169 Or, as the Daily 
Mirror put it in 1957:  
 
The old Teuton, fatter than ever, sits in the best and most lavish counting-
house outside the shores of the United States. Who really won [the 
war]?170 
 
As David Kynaston has argued, the Daily Mirror along with the Daily Express 
was the most popular daily newspaper in Britain, selling over four million copies 
by the early 1950s.171 The readership of the Mirror was overwhelmingly working 
class, while the Express was read by people across the working and middle 





The picture emerging of the influences on young British men and their views of 
Germany was not exactly positive, although it was not quite as negative as 
might be expected so shortly after the Second World War. Although public 
opinion on political issues regarding Germany appeared equally split into pro-
and anti-German camps, large parts of the British press were clearly anti-
German to an extent that caused concern in the Foreign Office. Whitehall’s 
reluctance to impede freedom of expression effectively reduced the control it 
might have exerted on anti-German publications, thereby increasing the 
necessity to establish other means of improving Anglo-German relations. 
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Whereas Foreign Office influence on the press was very limited, more 
was achieved by influencing the publication of non-fictional literature – the 
Scourge of the Swastika being a notable exception. The constant reminders of 
the Nazi past and warnings of the re-emergence of right-wing politics in 
Germany in the British press would undoubtedly have left an impression on 
young Servicemen. There is however also evidence that some young Britons 
were unwilling to accept the negative view of Germany and particularly German 
youth presented to them. It furthermore has to be stressed that, despite the 
widespread hostility in the popular press, a normalisation of relations was 
evident even in papers like the Daily Express. The BBC attitude towards 
Germany, although not always friendly, was clearly more nuanced and positive. 
Equally, despite the fact that British victory in the Second World War was 
increasingly glorified during the years of austerity and slow economic recovery, 
the countless non-fictional books, novels and war films released during the 
period in question did not always portray the Germans in a bad light. War 
movies and novels were increasingly popular and, as several observers pointed 
out, served to provide comfort by retelling stories of British glory and prestige. 
Nevertheless, it appears that, at least during the period in question (and in 
marked contrast to the stereotypical Nazis emerging in the following decades), 
the Germans portrayed in a number of films and novels were ordinary people 
not unlike the British, who happened to fight on the wrong side of the conflict 
and occasionally even ‘brought a breath of the chivalry lost from modern war’.172 
Despite stark and controversial reminders of the Nazi past such as The 
Scourge of the Swastika and widespread scepticism as to the future of the 
Federal Republic, the subject of Germany in British popular culture was rather 
more complex and less one-sided than might be expected. British Servicemen 
going to Germany would have most likely absorbed both the image of the 
goose-stepping Nazi as well as that of the ‘ordinary people’ already encountered 
by a number of Britons in the form of German POWs. Despite the predominantly 
working-class composition of the Services this arguably made the prospects of 
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using the BAOR as a tool for Anglo-German rapprochement more promising 
than the negative views of the popular press suggest. The next chapter will look 
across the Channel and consider the German perspective by analysing the view 
of the British Occupation forces held in the Federal Republic. This also entails 
an analysis of the problems caused by the presence of up to 80,000 Britons in 




Chapter Four: German perceptions and criticisms of the BAOR 
 
Introduction 
The German national newspaper Die Welt reported in October 1952 that a fight 
in a bar in the town of Hameln had led to a British Army wife beating 
unconscious the owner of the pub. A German disabled war veteran had blamed 
a group of ten British soldiers and their wives for his injury and subsequent fate, 
which led a soldier to attack the man. The wife of the disabled German then 
used his crutches to knock out the British soldier. In return the British wife 
accidentally beat the publican with a bar stool when he tried to calm the 
argument. ‘When the police arrived all they found was the publican with a head 
wound’.1  
It was the projection onto a national stage of seemingly minor and at 
times even comical incidents like this one, which regularly influenced German 
perceptions of the British occupying forces. Local incidents commonly caused 
controversy, first in the local and then in the national press, as well as leading to 
repeated political attacks by anti-Western political parties. As the German 
journalist Paul Sethe wrote in 1951, ‘in the past six years the number of 
anglophiles in Germany has dropped steadily’ and bitter feeling had grown up 
among Germans ‘against this island nation’.2 In order to establish how exactly 
the problems caused by the presence of the BAOR impacted on Anglo-German 
relations from the local to the highest levels and how both the British and 
German authorities worked on eliminating them, it is essential to understand the 
nature and causes of grievances perceived by the German civilian population. 
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 This chapter will therefore focus on the German views and experiences 
of the presence of the BAOR in the British zone. Some of the German official 
and individual attempts at improving relations will also be explored after 
establishing the main causes of discontent among the population. The 
grievances suffered by Germans at the hand of the BAOR can largely be divided 
into three major categories, namely economic, political and personal issues. 
Although there was always a degree of overlap between the economic issues, 
the political processes as well as the lived experiences of Germans and 
Servicemen, they will be largely addressed separately in this chapter. 
The first category to be analysed here concerns the economic demands 
of the British Forces to ensure the functioning and efficiency of the Services. 
These demands regularly caused outrage among the civilian population. 
According to the German Member of Parliament and leader of the Christian 
Social Union of Bavaria (CSU), Franz Josef Strauss, Germany paid the same 
amount of money towards the Occupation as France was using to pay for its 
entire army, air force, colonial troops as well as the war in Vietnam. According to 
Strauss, an Occupation soldier in 1951 cost nearly ten times as much as that of 
1918 and for every two Occupation soldiers there were nine civilians employed 
in Germany.3  
The financial impact of the Occupation was frequently criticised by 
German politicians and the press. Nonetheless, the majority of West Germans in 
1949 thought that the establishment of a German army in order to replace 
foreign troops was neither necessary nor desirable. In addition to pacifist 
sentiments so soon after the war, there were also economic arguments in 
support of this view, as a German army would attract young men from essential 
industries, which could ill afford such loss. A German army would also imply an 
increase in national expenditure and taxes. ‘They consider that the Allied policy 
during and since the war, carries with it the obligation on the part of the Allies, to 
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defend Western Germany’.4  On the one hand, therefore, a strong presence of 
British troops in the FRG was a reassuring factor for the majority of the German 
population. On the other hand, the economic damage caused by British troops in 
Germany, in addition to the regular Occupation costs, was under constant 
scrutiny. Manoeuvre damage, the requisitioning of training grounds, private 
houses, hotels and public buildings as well as noise pollution by aircraft caused 
the most frequent complaints. These complaints regularly evolved around 
material issues at a time of economic hardship for most Germans, which often 
stood in stark contrast to the standard of living of the British Services. In most 
cases the economic grievances caused by the Occupation subsequently 
generated social tensions between Britons and Germans, as will be seen in the 
case of the requisitioning of housing.   
Secondly, in the political sphere there were a large number of problems 
caused by British official communications or rather the perceived lack thereof. 
On several occasions the Foreign Office or the Services themselves caused 
offence when implementing decisions in Germany, usually made in cooperation 
with the Bonn or Land governments, without sufficiently communicating these 
arrangements to local communities. Subsequently this frequently led the press 
to not only criticise the perceived British arrogance towards local and national 
German government bodies, but also the general lack of effort by senior British 
officers, unit commanders as well as Foreign Office officials to publicise 
decisions. The increasing level of sovereignty of the Federal Republic after 1949 
in fact exacerbated this problem and led to the growth of German demands to 
be treated as equals rather than occupied enemy territory. 
The third and arguably most difficult category for the British and German 
authorities to address was made up of the actions of individual soldiers and 
negative experiences by individual civilians. These were often caused by or 
involved drunkenness, violence, theft, cultural issues, sexual jealousy or the 
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recent history of Anglo-German relations. An entirely independent problem 
which influenced all three categories was that of mishaps and errors by British 
personnel occurring on all levels. Furthermore, as seen above, a significant 
factor in turning minor complaints into threats to Anglo-German relations on a 
national level was the German press, both in the FRG as well as the German 
Democratic Republic (GDR). 
It is important to analyse how these different categories developed during 
the period in question and how they impacted on the various strands of Anglo-
German relations. Of particular importance were the frequent cases of local 
discontent spreading into the highest circles in London and Bonn. This chapter 
will use three specific examples to analyse how the discontent caused by troops 
was used by those political groups of the left and right in Germany (and Britain), 
that were against German cooperation with the Western Allies in the climate of 
the early Cold War. The most controversial examples this chapter will examine 
in order to highlight the economic, political and personal aspects involved, are 
the requisitioning of housing, manoeuvre damage and, curiously, fox hunting by 
British troops. Furthermore the increase in German official concern over damage 
caused by troops requires analysis. As the British Services were not the only 
NATO troops in the British zone of Occupation, a comparison to the behaviour of 
Canadian troops will shed further light on the popularity of British troops. Finally, 
the quality and success of attempts by German non-governmental organisations 
as well as the Federal and Land governments at countering the dissatisfaction of 
the public with British troops will be considered in detail. Although a wide variety 
of initiatives were taken, there is also some evidence demonstrating a lack of 









Economic Causes of Discontent: Requisitioning of Housing and Land 
 
For the German population the issue of requisitioning was mostly an economic 
problem during times of hardship. It nonetheless caused social tensions 
between occupiers and occupied in its wake. As a result much of the activity of 
German authorities in regards to this issue consisted of reacting to the anger 
caused by the Services. In order to function as a defence against the perceived 
Soviet threat, the British Forces required large training grounds. According to a 
British report the amount of land under requisition in North Rhine-Westphalia 
(NRW) in 1952, exclusive of the land on which requisitioned houses and 
workshops stood, amounted to 125 square miles, approximately one per cent of 
the entire Land. These figures excluded new British demands for four new 
airfields, a large training area for Dutch troops, an air-to-ground firing range of 
large dimensions, extensions to installations allowing for the accommodation of 
an additional 10,000 Belgian troops and the requirements of a Canadian brigade 
among others.5 In addition, some British officials had doubts whether at any 
point anybody kept the increasing Allied demands under co-ordinated review 
and predicted a strenuous German opposition to the loss of any more 
agricultural land. Particularly in larger cities the lack of housing, due to bomb 
damage and requisitioning of accommodation by the Army, caused severe 
resentment. Requisitioning of land also came at a high social and financial cost. 
A planned airfield in the Niederrhein area in 1951 required the eviction of 151 
farms at a cost of up to six million Deutschmark (DM).6 
Due to its scale, the requisitioning of training grounds and 
accommodation was a potential and often real point of friction between the 
German civilian population and the Services, and one which was regularly 
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observed by the Foreign Office in London. Most German cities and towns 
suffered from severe housing shortages due to Allied bombing during the war.7 
The most heavily populated areas of Germany lay in the British zone and most 
of the major and many of the smaller towns had been severely affected by the 
strategic bombing campaign unleashed in order to undermine German morale 
during the war. In 1943 alone the city of Wuppertal, in the industrial heartland of 
the Ruhr, lost 153,000 homes; the nearby Krefeld lost over forty per cent of its 
housing that year with over 90,000 people left homeless. Eighty five per cent of 
Cologne was destroyed and ninety per cent of Hannover lay in ruins.8 
Nonetheless, in the FRG in 1951 the Allied Forces had in their use thousands of 
requisitioned houses, rooms and flats, plots of land as well as hotels, 
restaurants and numerous other installations.9  
From the outset of the British Occupation one of the most publicised 
scandals, which caused much damage to relations with the local population, was 
the high number of premises requisitioned and subsequently left standing 
empty. In the early days of Occupation the Army often simply moved out of 
houses without derequisitioning them. At times the Services refused to 
relinquish empty accommodation in case units arrived from abroad. In other 
cases houses were either kept through oversight or the ‘well-known Army 
principle of never giving up property once acquired’.10 It is important to consider 
how German attitudes to requisitioning developed once the BAOR was 
transformed from an occupation to an allied force, a key element at the heart of 
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this thesis. Unsurprisingly, once the Federal Republic was established, German 
resentment of requisitioning grew. The German press carefully monitored the 
situation and reported that, despite a considerable effort by the British to reduce 
these figures, according to the German finance ministry there were still 60,000 
requisitioned buildings in 1951.11   
The lack of suitable accommodation in the British zone immediately after 
the end of the war due to bombing and the arrival of refugees is well-
documented.12 In the British-occupied Land of Schleswig-Holstein nearly three 
million refugees had to be accommodated alongside the 1.6 million residents. 
The population of Lower Saxony had grown from 4.5 million in 1939 to 6.7 
million in 1947. In the British-occupied Rhineland alone there were two hundred 
camps with nearly 100,000 refugees.13 By February 1947 906,000 refugees 
from the east had arrived in North Rhine Westphalia.14 The arrival of British 
families, beginning to join Service personnel in 1946, had naturally exacerbated 
the ‘unparalleled’ housing situation in the zone.15 Many Germans were evicted 
at short notice from their homes to make room for British families.16 
 What is less well documented is that the issue of requisitioning continued 
to threaten relations between BAOR and the Germans throughout the entire 
period under observation here. The British Düsseldorf Resident reported as late 
as September 1954 that the city’s population still grew by five hundred a day 
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Nachrichten, 18 August 1951. 
12 See for example: Patricia Meehan, A Strange Enemy People as well as 
Volker Koop, Besetzt: Britische Besatzungspolitik in Deutschland, Berlin, 2007.  
13 Volker Koop, Besetzt, p. 91. 
14 Volker Koop, Besetzt, p. 99. 
15 Commander-in-Chief and Military Governor, Air Marshal Sir Sholto Douglas, 
cited in: Patricia Meehan, A Strange Enemy People, p. 137. 
16 Volker Koop, Besetzt, p. 152. 
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and that despite signs of new dwellings, the ‘hard core of bunker inhabitants’ 
remained a constant figure.17 In contrast to this, British soldiers and their 
families often found life in the British zone extremely comfortable. For example 
the fifty families of the 15th/19th King’s Royal Hussars in the city of Lübeck on the 
Baltic coast lived in requisitioned homes and flats in what had been before the 
war the smartest area of town. It was not unusual for a senior NCO, his wife and 
one child to live in a six-bedroom house surrounded by a vast garden and to 
receive the services of a nanny and a daily help, all free of charge.18 Many of 
these benefits enjoyed by British troops in Germany were only slowly given up in 
1956. This change of heart did however not occur in order to improve Anglo-
German relations but rather because the Germans were no longer required to 
pay for the costs of the cheap German labour used for the provision of domestic 
servants for British officers. According to Harold MacMillan, the Chancellor of 
the Exchequer, ‘somebody else’ had been paying for the privileges and: 
 
People in the forces will, I am sure, realise that the situation is different 
when this heavy new burden falls on their own people in the United 
Kingdom.19 
 
In fact the secretary of state for war very much regretted abolishing the benefits 
enjoyed particularly by British officers in Germany, as these had hitherto been 
beneficial for the recruitment of new officers. The luxurious life in Germany was 
to counterbalance the hardship endured in other stations around the world.20 
                                                             
17 NA, FO 1013/2451, British Resident Düsseldorf Report, 30 September 1954. 
18 Jeremy Bastin (1981), The History of the 15th/19th the King’s Royal Hussars, 
1945-1980, Chichester, p. 52. 
19 NA, CAB 129/82, C.P. (56) 157, Memorandum by the Chancellor of the 
Exchequer on Forces Conditions in Germany, 27 June 1956. 
20 NA, CAB 129/82, C.P. (56) 155, Cabinet Memorandum by the Secretary of 
State for War on Forces’ Conditions of Service in Germany, 25 June 1956. 
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This luxury was obvious to the local population and shaped the German attitude 
towards the Forces’ accommodation situation. The generally slow speed of 
derequisitioning of homes was a frequent point of complaint by Germans.21  
The German press and many political parties constantly campaigned 
against requisitioning, thereby causing problems for the Bonn government. For 
example in 1951, the Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung reported on the Social 
Democrats’ (SPD) demand that the government ensure no more housing was to 
be requisitioned in case of any further increase of Allied troop strength in 
Germany. In addition, the restrictions prohibiting Germans sharing 
accommodation with Service personnel should be abolished.22 Furthermore in 
1951 the SPD issued an official request to parliament demanding the 
government reach an agreement with the Allied High Commissioners to not 
remove victims of Nazi oppression, refugees, those affected by the war and 
those displaced by the Occupation regime from their current premises. The 
fulfilment of this demand would arguably have left very few properties for the 
BAOR to requisition. The SPD also demanded that the necessary housing and 
installations for Allied troops should be built immediately.23 This put additional 
pressure on the Bonn government to spend more money and resources on 
housing at a time when the increase of BAOR troops itself heightened the 
Occupation costs for the FRG. There was evidently a demand by the German 
population that the transformation of the BAOR from an occupation force to an 
ally should go hand in hand with a reduction in the often lavish accommodation 
of British troops. The British attempts to accommodate these demands will be 
analysed in chapter six, following an examination of German civilian attempts to 
wrestle the control of their homes from the British. 
 German civilians displaced and dissatisfied by the Occupation regime 
(the so-called Besatzungsverdrängte) increasingly organised their protests and 
                                                             
21 NA, FO 1013/2451, British Resident Düsseldorf Report, 30 September 1954. 
22 NRW, NW 115/174, Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 3 January 1951. 
23 NRW, NW 115/174, Rheinische Post, 3 January 1951. 
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founded official organisations in North Rhine-Westphalia and Lower Saxony.24  
According to a 1951 German press report, the number of people with claims 
against the German government due to requisitioning was as high as 3.5 million:  
 
For six years these people had been waiting for the return of either their 
homes or other property like furniture requisitioned by the Allies. 25   
 
The same newspaper estimated that the number of displaced persons as a 
result of requisitioning made up as much as 6.8 per cent of the entire German 
population.26  
The Besatzungsverdrängte organisations arranged frequent 
demonstrations throughout the British zone and their demands continuously 
increased throughout the early 1950s. Postulations ranged from the return of the 
requisitioned properties and the exclusive housing of Allied troops in barracks to 
the repatriation of all Allied families to their home countries and a general end to 
the ‘colonial policies’ ostensibly represented by the BAOR.27 The 
Besatzungsverdrängte organisation of North Rhine-Westphalia threatened to 
take legal action against the state of NRW, after a man had been removed from 
his house by a force of ‘nearly fifty policemen’. This incident had occurred 
although the requisitioned property in question had stood empty for a long time. 
Apparently the return of the house had been promised repeatedly and this was 
                                                             
24 One example in North Rhine Westphalia was the Notgemeinschaft der 
Besatzungsbetroffenen (Hardship Association of those affected by Occupation), 
expanded in 1951 to Schutzverband der Besatzungsbetroffenen Düsseldorf und 
Umgebung (Association for the Protection of those affected by Occupation in 
Düsseldorf and surrounding areas), NRW, NW 115/174. 
25 NRW, NW 115/174, Rheinische Post, 11 January 1951. 
26 NRW, NW 115/174, Rheinische Post, 11 January 1951. 
27 NRW, NW 115/174, Head of Press Office (Chef der Pressestelle),  
9 February 1952. 
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only the latest in a series of cases in the area.28 At least one protest march by 
the organisation in the town of Detmold had to be dispersed by the police as it 
threatened to turn violent.29 In January 1952, desperate German families in the 
town of Herford moved back into their requisitioned homes without permission. 
The local German authorities issued severe warnings to the residents, as it 
would be impossible to protect the families should British personnel forcefully 
remove them.30 In 1953, despite the protests by displaced Germans, there were 
still British couples without children living in entire houses by themselves in 
Herford. An attempt by displaced homeowners to move into their empty but 
requisitioned houses ended with water and electricity supplies being cut off and 
German guards, employed by the BAOR, enforcing the strict isolation of the 
Germans in question.31 The pressure of the Besatzungsverdrängte groups also 
contributed to the pressure on the German authorities.32 These cases 
demonstrate how the unpopularity of British requisitioning not only affected 
German views of Allied troops, but also how the image of the Land and Federal 
Governments suffered as they enforced unpopular measures previously agreed 
on with the British. The largely economic issue of requisitioning, therefore, also 
had political implications for both Britain and Germany. 
Cases of displaced persons illegally occupying their still requisitioned 
houses were reported by the press as late as 1955. Interestingly, there were 
some similarities here with the occupation of military accommodation by 
homeless squatters in Britain in 1946. In Britain as in Germany the military 
seemed indifferent to the problems of ordinary people, despite the possession of 
many unoccupied or partly occupied premises during a period of housing 
                                                             
28 NRW, NW 115/175, Die Welt, 22 April 1953. 
29 NRW, NW 115/175, Freie Presse, 27 April 1953. 
30 NRW, NW 115/175, Chef der Pressestelle, 31 January 1952.  
31 NRW, NW 115/175, Ruhr Nachrichten, 29 May 1953.  
32 NRW, NW 115/175, Chef der Pressestelle, 26 May 1952.  
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shortage.33 The German authorities continually attempted to force the occupants 
to leave their properties by cutting off water and electricity supplies. The 
Besatzungsverdrängte organisations on the other hand keenly supported the 
individuals in question, much to the frustration of the British authorities.34 In one 
case a local German court forbade neighbours of one particular property illegally 
occupied by their owners to install an alternative gas supply to the house. The 
court also ordered the owner to leave his home, which after a lengthy court case 
he did in January 1956 as the requisitioning continued until May of the same 
year.35  
In several cases where homes had been requisitioned but subsequently 
left empty by the British, landlords and families in need of housing simply moved 
back in as a sign of protest. For example in the small Westphalian town of 
Lübbecke, where 160 houses with 1,500 rooms had been requisitioned, seven 
families moved back into their requisitioned but empty homes and raised the 
European flag as a sign of protest.36 Lübbecke had a population of 
approximately 7,000 people with an additional 3,000 refugees when it became 
one of the key British administrative centres of the British zone in 1945. And the 
housing situation continued to be severe even after barracks for British troops 
were built in 1948.37 Once more this situation led to the formation of local protest 
organisations which supported those Germans occupying their homes. The 
Lübbecker Notgemeinschaft telegraphed the minister president of North Rhine-
Westphalia as well as the Personal Security Advisor to the German chancellor, 
Dr. Blank, to advise them that the seven families had moved in, claiming their 
                                                             
33 David Kynaston, Austerity Britain, pp. 122-23. 
34 NRW, NW 115/175, Westfalenpost, 12 November 1955. 
35 NRW, NW 115/175, Abendpost, 10 January 1956. 
36 NRW, NW 115/174, Freie Presse, 27 January 1951. 
37 Stadtarchiv Bad Oeynhausen, B II 18, cited in: ‘Lübbecke und die Britische 
Kontrollkommission 1945’, Lübbecke Kompakt, available at 
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rights in accordance with the Basic Law of the FRG. The British, however, 
demanded the immediate evacuation of the flats, threatening to otherwise arrest 
the families in question, who then left without causing further incidents.38 It was 
events of this type which occurred all over the British zone, particularly in those 
more rural areas which had been spared the worst of the Allied bombing and 
therefore were inhabited by a large number of refugees from bombed-out cities 
and the east. The establishment of friendly relations between troops and 
communities which had to make way for British families as late as ten years 
after the end of hostilities was undoubtedly going to be a difficult task. 
The worst area of the British zone of Occupation in regards to 
requisitioning was without doubt the area of Bad Oeynhausen, which housed the 
headquarters of the BAOR until 1954. The town had largely escaped bomb 
damage during the war but an unwelcome surprise of a different kind affected 
the majority of inhabitants in 1945:  
 
‘Baddo’ as it was called, was a very pleasant spa, about twice the size of 
Southwell in Nottinghamshire, with twice the population. Unfortunately the 
10,000 ‘Deutschers’ had been evicted from their nice little town to make 
way for 1,000 officers and 2,000 other ranks who acted as clerks, 
batmen, drivers, runners and every kind of dogsbody to the officers.39  
 
The town was substantially requisitioned until 1954:  
 
The railway station itself is requisitioned, and Germans using it are 
segregated to some extent. I find it impossible to imagine a situation 
anywhere else parallel to that which still obtains in this town, seven years 
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after the end of hostilities and on the eve of the Federal area resuming 
sovereignty.40 
 
Barbed wire fences separating the British from the Germans in Bad Oeynhausen 
were only removed in 1951, when seventy hectares of requisitioned land, 
including the spa gardens, were handed back to the Germans. Nonetheless, 
forty per cent of all available living space in the town continued to be 
requisitioned by the BAOR.41 By the time the British headquarters at Bad 
Oeynhausen were finally closed, the physical and economic damage caused by 
the BAOR was considerable. The town had lost, ‘apart from [the damage caused 
by] the thirty-two minor and medium fires, the Protestant church, a 750,000 DM 
bathing house and four private residences’, all of which had been requisitioned 
by the British.  A local newspaper article outlined how under British ‘rule’, the 
largest thermal spring in Europe had remained closed to anyone but the BAOR 
and how the only public building in town accessible to the German public had in 
fact been a public lavatory. The entire train station with all ticket offices and 
waiting rooms was reserved for ‘the handful of British tourists’, while the last 
remaining church bells were not allowed to ring for German but only for English 
services.42  
Requisitioning caused more than economic grievances. For an increasing 
number of Germans, it stood in the way of achieving the re-establishment of 
German sovereignty. As diplomatic relations between Britain and Germany on 
the highest levels increasingly normalised, it was economic questions such as 
requisitioning, which threatened to turn the BAOR into a liability rather than an 
asset to Anglo-German relations. The ostensibly economic grievance of 
                                                             
40 NA, FO 1013/2439, Letter Deputy Land Commissioner W. J. Bate to Land 
Commissioner on ‘Military Accommodation Programme and Allied/German 
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41 NRW, NW 115/174, Rheinische Post, 2 July 1951. 
42 NRW, NW 115/175, Der Nordwestspiegel, 3 June 1954, p.3. 
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manoeuvre damage also clearly highlights how economic damage translated 
into political problems. 
 
 
The BAOR and the KPD: Manoeuvre Damage and its Political 
Consequences 
 
Besides the requisitioning of land and property, there was a further major source 
of complaint throughout the entire period in question. At least once every year 
the British Services, together with their allied NATO forces, conducted large-
scale manoeuvres across wide parts of the British zone. These inevitably 
caused damage to property and distress to local inhabitants. Roads were 
damaged by tanks and armoured vehicles, farmers lost their crops, damage to 
forests and even houses and farms frequently occurred. Furthermore there were 
a number of areas constantly affected by their proximity to training areas, which 
led to an increasing resentment of British troops as well as the fear of a rise of 
political extremism. Manoeuvre damage therefore quickly developed into an 
economic problem with serious social ramifications. On a tour of damaged areas 
near the Rheinsehlen training area in 1951, a British officer met with local 
German farmers and officials affected. The officer concluded it was important to 
note that all the locals had a full understanding that considerable damage was to 
be expected and unavoidable and that they accepted necessary damage with 
equanimity. They were however becoming increasingly resentful and bitter over 
what appeared to be unnecessary, avoidable and even wilful damage. ‘The 
Germans met had a genuine fear that extremism in political feeling is being 
engendered.’43 
British fear of providing political extremists in Germany with ammunition 
over the actions of the BAOR was not unfounded. West German communist 
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groups in particular made good use of the issue of Occupation Forces. A 1953 
British Information Services Report highlighted the ‘increasingly frequent and 
more scurrilous’ attacks on the Allied Defence Forces by the communist press in 
Germany. The campaign magnified every small incident involving an Allied 
soldier, even remotely, into an act of terrorism or drunken brutality; training 
damage was pictured as wanton destruction which was ruining the farmers; and 
protests against the requisitioning of land for airfields or training purposes, as 
well as against the preparing of roads and bridges for explosion charges, were 
published almost continuously under bold and provocative headings. In the run-
up to the 1953 German general elections, the same type of material was 
repeated ad nauseam in the communist press as electioneering propaganda in 
favour of the Communist Party of Germany (KPD). The communists specifically 
linked the Federal Government with the Allied troops and demanded ‘Out with 
Adenauer, out with the Occupation troops. Vote KPD’.44 Communist agitators 
frequently used British plans to create new training areas or enlarge existing 
ones to claim that: 
 
In the interest of war preparation they will first take your land and then 
your sons shall be driven to the slaughter for the profiteering interests of 
the war-mongers in this country and abroad. The bombed cities are still 
lying destroyed, the tears of widows and orphans have not yet been 
dried, and again the same hands – which are still smeared with the blood 
of the last war – are grasping at your land, at your houses, at your lives.45 
  
It is evident from this type of propaganda that relations between British troops 
and the German population really were a potential source of major problems for 
West German integration as well as European defence. Although Adenauer’s 
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Christian Democrats (CDU) comfortably won the 1953 election and the number 
of communist votes dropped below the five per cent mark required to enter 
parliament, prior to the election the Federal Government feared that Germans at 
large had not yet been convinced by the idea of democracy.46  
The communist press in Germany as well as in Moscow used every 
opportunity to campaign against the BAOR. In a number of cases this proved 
hugely damaging to the Services as well as Anglo-German relations. This 
damage took months of intense efforts from both Bonn and London to undo. 
Often these incidents were in fact instigated by local communists. An article in 
the weekly national paper Die Zeit traced how one such incident had turned into 
the number one news issue for a whole week throughout the entire country. It 
began with a typically brief British military press note, announcing the 
enlargement of the Teutoburg forest training area. The local communist press as 
well as the Soviet news agency TASS then jumped at this and fuelled 
speculations with rumours. A local communist newspaper article, headed 
‘Warmongering in Teutoburg forest demands first victims’, called for protest after 
the alleged eviction of 266 people from the Teutoburger Wald region to make 
room for manoeuvre areas. The article repeatedly referred to Allied war 
preparations and highlighted the danger for the water supply as well as for the 
lives of local inhabitants and called for mass protests to preserve the existence 
of communities as well as peace.47 Local German opinion apparently had been 
affected by the behaviour of a particularly insensitive British Army officer:  
 
who made it very clear he did not like Germans and the memory of British 
tanks in 1945 destroying twenty houses in the village despite there being 
no German soldiers left and white flags hanging out of the windows.48  
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The issue was then picked up by the non-communist press. According to the 
conservative newspaper Westfalenpost, the potential environmental impact of 
the decision to extend the British shooting range which had led to the 
evacuations had been brought to the attention of UNESCO. Environmental 
concerns now added to the economic problems caused by the affair. The British 
allegedly had ordered the residents of several villages to evacuate their homes 
for three days per week when BAOR planned to practise artillery and machine 
gun shooting.49 The forested area to be destroyed by British troops was valued 
at fifteen million DM and considered vital for the local tourism and logging 
industries.50  GDR propaganda now also seized the opportunity to attack the 
BAOR. Radio Leipzig reported that many inhabitants of the area had protested 
in the name of the National Front of the Democratic Germany against the 
destruction and colonization of their Heimat and for national and economic 
independence. It also referred to the rise in number of members of the National 
Front of the GDR in North Rhine Westphalia.51  
Despite British attempts to calm the mood and explanations as to the real 
aims of the extension of the training area, the German press continued to doubt 
British promises and the plight of the local population received attention even in 
the non-affiliated press.52 Only at a later date did the West German press report 
that the evacuation was merely designed as a safety measure around the actual 
practice area which had been used since 1945, that only two families, who had 
previously been informed about this, had to leave their homes for three days per 
week and that logging could continue on the days when no practice took place.53 
Arguably as a result of this negative publicity, the decision on the extension was 
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referred back to the British High Commissioner, General Robertson, and also 
became a matter for the Federal Government.54 The subject dragged on for 
weeks and ended with a British announcement to reverse the decision to 
expand the training area.55 On the same day however, the British announced 
the requisitioning of a different area in the Sauerland area, which promptly 
caused renewed uproar in the press.56 This example highlights only one of many 
cases receiving national attention due to a combination of factors: requisitioning 
and training exercises exacerbated by a perceived lack of communication by 
British authorities; alleged actions by British officers; and an at least partly 
hostile German press. The British military presence did not only threaten to 
cause resentment due to economic grievances, but also due to becoming 
subject to political agitation by the KPD.  
The threat to Anglo-German relations posed by the KPD was taken 
seriously by both the German and British administrations. The communists had 
entered the 1949 Federal Parliament with 5.7 per cent and the 1953 election still 
returned around 600,000 communist votes in the FRG. The poor performance of 
the KPD in 1953 was at least in part attributable to the brutal Soviet suppression 
of the June 1953 uprising in the GDR.57 This was certainly greeted with 
satisfaction by the British High Commissioner Sir Frederick Hoyer-Millar.58 The 
fear of the potential consequences of anti-Western propaganda nonetheless 
increased over time. Only the banning of the KPD in 1956 finally alleviated the 
perceived threat posed by the extreme left to the newly established German 
democracy.  
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As with requisitioning, manoeuvre damage not only caused problems for 
Anglo-German relations but also for the German Land and Federal 
Governments. Once the Occupation status had given way to that of equal 
partnership, the demands of the German population grew rapidly. These 
demands could then be taken up by the press. There was to be no military 
training and shooting on German public holidays. The damage to trees in 
requisitioned training areas was to be minimised and, among other demands, 
there was to be no low level flying of aircraft. Throughout the period in question, 
warnings by local German officials about the political consequences of 
manoeuvre damage steadily increased.59 According to the trade minister of 
Niedersachsen, by 1953 the anger of the population was mainly targeted at the 
Bonn government which, considering the looming elections, was a problem. 
Furthermore many of the claimants of previous years were still waiting for 
compensation for manoeuvre damage.60 The number of disgruntled German 
voters was potentially growing year by year. In addition to these problems, the 
actions of individual officers threatened to exacerbate an already tense situation 
in some parts of the British zone. 
 
 
Fox Hunting as a Cause of Inter-cultural Friction 
 
Hunting impressively demonstrated the fragile nature of Anglo-German relations 
at the local level. It also highlighted the willingness of both the Services and the 
Germans to use the issue of ‘friendship’ as a bargaining token. What was 
intended to promote inter-cultural communications was instead sometimes a 
significant hindrance. The traditional British way of fox hunting had been 
outlawed in the Federal Republic as this was considered cruel to animals. After 
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1949 this ban therefore also applied to Allied troops in Germany. In spite of the 
Bonn government banning the practice, at least in one case a local British unit 
had rather strongly demanded an exemption.61 The British desire to use dogs for 
fox hunting in the town of Wolfenbüttel even led to the British Resident Officer in 
the area, Colonel Day, responsible for liaising between troops and German 
civilians, to use his influence with local German politicians. Apparently the British 
Resident and Captain Lord Blandford of the ‘Life Guards’ put considerable 
pressure on the German official responsible for hunting in the town of 
Wolfenbüttel. A letter by Lord Blandford to the German official used drastic 
language to highlight the potential damage of the hunting issue for Anglo-
German relations in general. Apparently fox hunting was: 
 
taking place in a large number of European countries and the only reason 
it was outlawed in Germany was due to Hermann Goering’s decision in 
1937.62 
  
It is doubtful this letter would have swayed the German official’s view in favour of 
the British request. 
 The British government had informed BAOR units that, in the interest of 
Anglo-German friendship, hunting was now only allowed for troops with 
permission of the local German owners. It was these owners who, in the eyes of 
some officers, endangered this friendship by their refusal to ‘leave a few hares, 
which was really not much to ask’. After all, British officers had spent:  
 
considerable amounts of time and money to buy and train their dogs and 
would, due to this unfriendly and short-sighted action of yours, receive 
preciously little joy and amusement in return.63  
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Lord Blandford stressed that the Germans had to be aware that Anglo-German 
relations in the area would suffer considerably, unless the Germans were willing 
to compromise.64 This thinly veiled threat was however only the beginning of the 
conflict over fox hunting in Wolfenbüttel. 
The German official, Herr Lieberkuehn, subsequently complained to the 
Lower Saxony Land government. Apparently British troops had harassed him 
after he refused to grant the desired exemption for British fox hunting in the 
area. According to Herr Lieberkuehn, such decisions could only be made in 
Bonn or Wahnerheide and local Germans were very upset about the British 
practice of employing dogs for the chase. To make matters worse, the night 
following the refusal of an exemption, the house of Herr Lieberkuehn was 
attacked by ‘heavy and very heavy’ British pyrotechnic devices and it appeared 
obvious that this was a response to the refusal.65 The excuse given by the 
British for launching three ‘attacks’ during that evening was that apparently the 
soldiers launching the flares meant to deliver an ovation to their commanding 
officer to celebrate ‘Battle of Hastings Day’ and that they had accidentally picked 
the wrong house!66 The German police report concluded that the flares used 
could easily have caused the entire house to burn down and that the home of 
the commanding officer was in a completely different part of the town.67 
Naturally the incident, which caused considerable damage to the house as a 
number of small fires were started, was gratefully taken up by the communist 
press in the GDR.  
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This was a remarkable case of the problems incurred by the attempts by 
individual officers to circumvent British orders from high levels on the ground. 
The consequences in return had to be dealt with by the Minister President of the 
Land government as well as the British Land Commissioner. The issue was 
finally resolved with a British apology to Herr Lieberkuehn and the end of fox 
hunting in the area. The British hunting dogs were returned to England.68 It is 
however questionable whether, after this incident, the local BAOR unit had much 
interest in improving Anglo-German relations. Incidentally a British Information 
Services report for 1952 highlighted the emergence of ‘a violent and obviously 
organised Press campaign in Lower Saxony against hunting by Allied troops’.69  
 
 
Actions by Individual Officers as Social Causes of anti-BAOR Sentiment 
 
There is further evidence demonstrating the damage done to the British image in 
Germany by individual officers. At times apparently insignificant episodes 
caused enormous problems. It is worth considering some examples here in 
order to understand the varied nature of German grievances against the BAOR. 
In September 1952, the senior head of the Lüneburg City Council was denied 
access to the tennis court of his requisitioned estate by a British officer. Claiming 
the borders of the requisitioned area were unclear, the German official went on 
to openly attack the British officer in a public council meeting. The incident led to 
a formal protest by the city council and naturally attracted the attention of the 
press. One parliamentarian stated that the Lüneburg public was aghast, that 
seven years after the war, a single British officer could still remove the first 
representative of a large city council from his own private property using military 
police. ‘Incidents which may still be possible on the Fiji Islands should belong to 
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the past in Europe’.70 This in return caused a letter of protest from the British 
Land Commissioner of Lower Saxony and a very lengthy argument between 
German and British officials aiming to establish whether or not the tennis court 
had been requisitioned. British officers in command in 1945, when the 
requisitioning took place, had to be consulted and detailed plans of the property 
were produced in order to establish the exact boundaries of the requisitioned 
premises. Both the British and German authorities once again had to spend 
considerable amounts of time and effort to minimise the damage and 
propaganda value for both left and right wing political factions in Germany. 
There was another noteworthy case of this kind in the summer of 1952, when an 
officer drove his tank into the garden of a restaurant in Lower Saxony because 
he had been refused a drink. Having caused one thousand pounds worth of 
damage, the officer was officially severely reprimanded – unconfirmed reports 
however had it that subsequently he had been congratulated by his 
commanding officer for ‘showing initiative’.71 Similar ground for complaints were 
provided by one British Major who had to be dealt with by the Military Police in 
Hamburg after crashing his private car into a German taxi and kicking the driver 
in the stomach, whilst ‘under the influence of drink’.72 This type of incident 
provided ample ammunition for the German press to ridicule British attempts to 
use the BAOR to display the values of Western democracy. German complaints 
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Incidents caused by British Troops 
 
The relations between troops and civilians were frequently over-shadowed by 
minor as well as major incidents caused by British troops in Germany. The 
frequent reports of clashes between soldiers and Germans gave an indication 
that things did not always progress as smoothly as planned. British Resident 
Officers generally produced positive reports in regards to relations between 
British troops and German civilians, but the monthly newsletters issued by the 
Public Safety Department of the British High Commission shed a somewhat 
different light on the situation on the ground. For example the April 1954 Public 
Safety Report for the Westphalia area listed two serious late night incidents 
between soldiers and civilians. One German civilian died from his injuries and 
one British soldier was stabbed in the back and seriously wounded.73 The same 
report listed for July 1954 nine cases of malicious damage by British personnel, 
ten common and four indecent assaults and one case of rape by Servicemen, 
not to mention seven brawls involving Service personnel as well as four thefts.74  
In Hamburg one typical incident occurred in May 1954, when ‘a soldier grabbed 
a German woman by the breast and hip and offered her five DM for permission 
to have sexual relations with her’.75 Local incidents such as these caused 
frequent complaints but particularly during the mid-1950s the behaviour of 
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Incidents caused by Canadian Troops 
 
Despite the threat caused to Anglo-German relations by certain British actions it 
is noteworthy that Canadian troops were often regarded as far worse than the 
British and there were widespread complaints about drunkenness, violence, 
prostitution and black market activities recorded by the German authorities.76 
One example involved twenty five Canadian soldiers organising the raid and 
destruction of a bar in the town of Bergen and injuring the guests because the 
publican had called a Canadian officer to calm an argument between Germans 
and Canadians a week before.77 As a result three Canadian soldiers were 
sentenced to one and a half years in prison with hard labour. In an additional 
incident in December 1951, two Canadian officers were set upon by a group of 
twenty German youths armed with sticks and chains. There were further reports 
of unprovoked attacks in the town by German youths leading up to the incident 
in the pub.78  
As in Britain, relations between troops and civilians caused comments in 
the Canadian press. The fact that the Federal Archive in Koblenz holds records 
of Canadian press reports on relations between troops and Germans 
demonstrates the considerable level of concern among the German authorities. 
The Vancouver Sun reported in 1956 that Germans ‘resented the presence of 
Canadian troops in their country’ and although there was little open hostility, 
there was continual sniping at Canadian soldiers in the German press. Going 
further, the article claimed that ‘the effort at good community relations appears 
to be all one-sided – on the part of the Canadians.’ According to the Vancouver 
Sun the German attitude towards Canadian soldiers was hardly surprising 
inasmuch as many Germans, opposed to rearmament, resented their own 
                                                             
76 NI, Nds. 100, Acc. 60/55, Nr. 1142, p. 2, Letter Dora Dittmann to Canadian 
Camp Commander Hannover, 10 September 1952. 
77 NI, Nds. 100, Acc. 60/55, Nr. 1142. 
78 NI, Nds. 100, Acc. 60/55, Nr. 1142, p. 60. 
134 
 
soldiers and it was therefore likely that Canadian and German troops were likely 
to get on much better than Canadian troops and German civilians.79 One 
Canadian reporter claimed he had not found a single man who did not want to 
go home as soon as his tour of duty was completed. One frequently heard 
Canadian reaction was that ‘the Germans like our money but not us’.80 
According to the German embassy in Vancouver, the Vancouver Sun 
consistently demonstrated a hostile, subjective and tendentious attitude towards 
Germany.81 Clearly it was not only Anglo-German relations which potentially 
posed a threat to the German commitment to Western defence in the British 
zone of Occupation. However, the fact that Canadian behaviour was rated 
worse by many Germans arguably worked in favour of the British.  
 
 
German Official Concerns over British and other Allied Troops 
 
As the above examples demonstrate, the presence of British troops in particular 
and Allied troops in general was not universally welcomed by the German 
population. In 1952 a survey by the German political opinion polling company 
Emnid Institute attempted to gauge how successful the Allied attempt to 
transform Occupation troops to protective forces had been. Only fourteen per 
cent of those polled throughout the three western zones saw the troops as 
‘welcome protection’. Sixty-seven per cent regarded them as either unavoidable 
or even as an unwelcome nuisance. This view was spread equally across all 
zones.82 Despite these somewhat negative attitudes towards Allied protection, a 
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poll conducted by the American High Commission resulted in seventy-five per 
cent of respondents being against a withdrawal of Allied forces from Germany 
due to fear of a Soviet attack. Seventy-four per cent thought it unwise to engage 
with the Soviet suggestion to withdraw all Allied troops from Germany. This 
constituted an improvement as, at the end of the Berlin blockade in 1949, only 
forty-six per cent had declared support for a continuation of the Occupation.83 
These figures therefore suggest a fairly widespread and increasing German 
willingness to accept the presence of Allied soldiers for reasons of anti-
communist expediency. The statistics do not however demonstrate a particularly 
friendly attitude towards the Occupation troops.   
Despite this, the behaviour of the soldiers in Germany was rated better 
than their role as ‘welcome protectors’. Forty-one per cent of those polled by 
Emnid thought the behaviour was very good or good, thirty-four per cent 
answered average or bad. In fact the British fared the best with forty-eight per 
cent very good or good and only twenty-two per cent average or bad.84 German 
sources suggest that the unpopularity of French and American troops was at 
least partly due to German resentment of the allegedly poor behaviour of Black 
American and French Moroccan troops. According to a report by local German 
officials on relations in the southern German Land of Baden Württemberg, it had 
been Moroccan troops which had committed ‘countless cases of rape’ in 1945.85 
The American troops not only demonstrated appalling, ‘rowdy-like’ behaviour but 
particularly Black American soldiers were blamed for continuous sexual assaults 
of German women. French Moroccan soldiers were frequently the subject of 
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complaints to German authorities.86 Statistics compiled by German authorities in 
areas occupied by French and American troops revealed a long list of crimes, 
including numerous cases of rape of children (both girls and boys) and pregnant 
women,  murder and assault among others.87 Compared to the severity of these 
cases the behaviour of British troops indeed appeared rather better and the 
issue of racial prejudice was largely non-existent in the British zone of 
Occupation. These statistics somewhat reflect the findings of this chapter as the 
unpopularity of British troops did not necessarily stem from their behaviour but 
rather from the economic disadvantages, political resentment and inconvenience 
caused by their presence.  
It is nonetheless somewhat surprising that the highly rated British 
behaviour did not continue throughout the period in question and in fact gave 
rise to increasing concern by German Federal and Land governments. 
Particularly after the admission of the FRG as a full member into NATO, German 
official concerns and attempts to improve relations and minimise crimes 
committed by soldiers grew. Apparently the behaviour of at least some British 
troops markedly deteriorated, particularly in the period of 1955 to 1957. At the 
very moment London and Bonn considered relations between the BAOR and 
Germans crucial to ensure West German integration into the Western orbit, local 
incidents in Germany indicated a turn for the worse in several areas. By 1955 
the frequent occurrence of incidents as a result of the actions of individual 
servicemen therefore caused serious concern to the Federal Government. In 
particular, serious crimes like theft, rape and even murder gave constant rise to 
complaints by the German press.  
The growth of British crime did not go unnoticed by the German public. 
According to an opinion poll on German views on the behaviour of Allied troops 
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in the FRG published in Die Welt in July 1956, only three per cent of those 
questioned held the behaviour of Allied troops to be very good. Thirty-one per 
cent considered it to be good, forty per cent fair and seventeen per cent bad. 
Nine per cent expressed no view. In answer to a further question, forty-five per 
cent considered the presence of Allied troops to be an unavoidable necessity, 
and thirty-eight per cent an undesirable burden. In fact the poll taken in 1952 
had shown more positive results, and, although the Chancery of the British 
Embassy in Bonn considered the reaction of the public as quite reasonable, 
there was little doubt that the results had been influenced by recent press 
publicity given to incidents in which troops were involved.88 Consequently in July 
1956 Bonn sent requests for statistics on the numbers of incidents and cases of 
prosecution to the Land governments. Furthermore the Federal Interior Ministry 
(Bundesinnenministerium) inquired about the quality and truthfulness of local 
German press articles. These steps were taken in order to consider whether or 
not to take diplomatic steps.89  
The increasing number of press reports on crime committed by Allied 
soldiers had already led the NRW interior ministry to list all crimes by Allied 
soldiers for the second half of 1955 and first half of 1956. The statistics revealed 
an increase in the number of crimes by British soldiers.90 Particularly incidents 
involving drunkenness in bars and restaurants showed a rise for the English 
(from eighteen to twenty-eight).  Burglaries rose from thirty-one to forty-eight. 
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According to the Interior Ministry of NRW, the level of crime had decreased 
slightly among the Canadians, whereas it had risen significantly among the 
British. There had been no change in troop numbers among any of the forces. 
The Interior Minister demanded that the Minister President should point out the 
rise in crime to the British authorities and suggest measures to deal with them, 
such as an increase in military police, the eviction of criminal elements and 
sharper punishment.91 The demand even included a template for a letter of 
complaint to the British Land Liaison officer.  
Moreover, concerned German officials even noticed the damage to 
Anglo-German relations caused by the BAOR in Britain. In September 1956 one 
observer highlighted the negative publicity the rise in crime had caused abroad, 
particularly in the Beaverbrook press, which apparently had blamed the rise in 
crime on a resurgence of German nationalism. According to the Beaverbrook 
press, the best solution to this problem was the complete withdrawal of Allied 
troops from Germany. As a consequence it appeared wiser to deal with the 
issue informally with the British Land Liaison Officer rather than file an official 
complaint.92 Nonetheless, the interior ministry did send an official letter to the 
Land Liaison Officer and pointed out that in some garrison towns, mainly 
Minden, Detmold and Münster, the number of crimes had risen alarmingly, 
whereas in other places this had not been the case. The letter asked to prevent 
crimes specifically over the Christmas period, as of January 1957 a large 
number of civilian properties in these areas was due to be requisitioned by 
British troops.93 Despite this effort at least one German newspaper reported that 
over Christmas numerous incidents had occurred in eastern Westphalia.94 
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Not all Land governments chose to complain formally to the British as in 
the case of NRW. The Interior Minister of Lower Saxony in fact decided against 
reporting individual cases to the Federal Government as requested, as he did 
not want to draw further attention to the issue. The reason for his decision was 
that ‘relations were rather better than those in the American zone’.95 The 
minister also pointed out that many cases reported in the German press turned 
out to be false and he was in fact against any diplomatic steps as a result of 
recent cases.96 Nonetheless, between July 1955 and July 1956 302 British 
soldiers committed crimes in Lower Saxony, including two cases of 
manslaughter, seventeen cases of rape and 130 cases of theft.97 
Despite the attitude of the Lower Saxony Interior Ministry, the Federal 
Government was so concerned about the behaviour of Allied troops, that a 
meeting with members of the military police of all three Allies was organised at 
the British headquarters in Lower Saxony in November 1957 to find solutions to 
the most pressing concerns. A Federal Interior Ministry consultant outlined some 
of the main German apprehensions.98 The problem of relations involving 
soldiers had long been a concern of the Federal Government and German 
statistics showed that in some areas since the spring of 1955 relations had 
deteriorated significantly. The timing of this deterioration of relations was 
important as it occurred at exactly the time the Federal Republic was to be 
treated as an equal ally against communism. The Federal Government had 
begun collecting data in 1955 when reports of incidents increased. The 
nationality of troops was an important factor and figures for American troops in 
Bavaria and Baden Württemberg were ‘alarmingly high’. Conditions in the 
northern states with British troops were significantly better despite a number of 
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serious incidents. According to the Germans the general reasons for 
misbehaviour were in some cases still the idea of being in occupied enemy 
territory, the fact that most soldiers were young and unmarried, they had too 
much money and some wished to import ‘cowboy manners’ from their 
homeland.99 The Interior Ministry stressed the view that no army stationed 
abroad could afford to accept attacks on the civilian population, as this 
undermined morale and discipline and as a result endangered fighting power 
and capability of the troops. The Federal Government therefore clearly regarded 
the issue as a real threat to the defence of Western Europe. 
In order to improve relations, the German Interior Ministry suggested 
soldiers should engage socially with Germans for example in sports clubs. This 
was considered more productive than having sports events with teams from 
each country as this interaction potentially proved counterproductive. These 
measures however were only considered to be feasible when involving ‘the 
older, more reasonable, intellectually interested soldiers’. In many cases all 
efforts with ‘the young, inexperienced, intellectually close-minded, primitive 
soldiers’ would be doomed to failure. 100 In the view of the Germans this type of 
soldier often left home for the first time and was confronted with problems he 
then failed to deal with. Apparently such people naturally tended to spend their 
free time consuming alcohol and consorting with the local ‘Frauleins’. It was felt 
they did not use their time in Germany for their own more ostensibly rational 
personal development. The ministry advised that if all efforts failed to bring this 
type of soldier into the fold of civilian life, the only thing left was strict disciplinary 
supervision. Finally, the Germans urged the Allies to be more careful in their 
selection of troops sent to Germany in the first place:  
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One might consider if it was possible in the interest of good relations to 
only send soldiers to Germany who can be expected to behave and send 
those home who do not.101 
 
Despite the Federal Government’s concern over the situation in some 
parts of the country, German crime statistics of 1957 revealed just how 
favourably the behaviour of British troops compared to that of the Americans. 
Between July 1956 and September 1957 US troops in Bavaria committed eight 
murders, 319 cases of grievous bodily harm and 136 cases of robbery as well as 
207 cases of rape. The corresponding figures for the British area of Lower 
Saxony were zero murders, twenty-seven cases of grievous bodily harm, nine 
cases of robbery and twenty-three cases of rape. Corresponding figures for 
North Rhine-Westphalia, which was also predominantly under British control, 
were zero murders, sixty-four cases of grievous bodily harm, twenty-six cases of 
robbery and thirty-six cases of rape. The overall number of offenders in Bavaria 
during this period was 714, whereas in Lower Saxony this figure was remarkably 
low with only twenty-six British offenders. In North Rhine-Westphalia there had 
been 195 delinquents during the period in question.102 The collection of data by 
the Federal Government continued and in March 1957, the German Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs revealed a list, compiled by the Länder, of incidents between the 
Allied Forces and the local population for the eighteen months ending December 
1956. For Baden-Württemberg, Bavaria, Hesse and Rhineland–Palatinate (the 
areas in which French and American troops were stationed) the total was 1,051; 
in contrast to this North-Rhine Westphalia, Lower Saxony, Hamburg and 
Schleswig-Holstein (the British and Belgian area) totalled a mere 137 incidents. 
The British Foreign Office had added that ‘even after making allowances for the 
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greater number of the American forces, we had every reason to feel satisfied 
with the general behaviour of our troops’.103  
Although the statistics provided by the German authorities do not indicate 
an overall rise or fall of crimes committed by the BAOR, they certainly 
demonstrate the restraint exercised by British troops compared to the other 
Allies. Overall the British Forces were therefore relatively well-behaved. 
According to the British Embassy most disturbances were of very recent 
occurrence and should be seen against the background of the generally 
acceptable behaviour of the British Services in Germany.104 German official 
attempts at reconciliation, analysed in the next section, were therefore not 
terminally undermined by the articulated disquiet about the excesses of some 
members of the BAOR. 
 
 
German Efforts at Conciliation 
 
The attitudes of the German civilian population towards British troops varied 
considerably depending on the geographical location, proximity to the Soviet 
zone of Occupation as well as whether garrisons were in urban or rural 
locations. The official history of the 15th/19th The King’s Royal Hussars, who 
arrived in the northern German city of Lübeck in October 1949, described the 
attitude of the 250,000 inhabitants as ambivalent. In the eyes of the author (who 
wrote his account in 1981) this depended mainly on just how much the Germans 
needed to get on with the military authorities in order to make a living. The black 
marketer with his suitcase, who came around the married quarters exchanging 
Deutschmarks for Navy, Army and Air Force Institutes (NAAFI) cigarettes, ‘was 
charm himself’. The civilians employed in the camp were polite enough during 
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the hours of work and the shopkeeper would almost literally roll out the red 
carpet when a soldier or his wife entered the shop. The remainder apparently 
steered clear of any social contact and, in case there was interaction, this was 
kept brief. ‘However, these were still the days when a pretty German girl would 
somehow manage to swallow her pride when a bar of chocolate or a packet of 
cigarettes were on offer’.105 The citizens of the Westphalian town of Münster 
apparently developed a somewhat stolid, almost off-hand attitude to the very 
considerable British Army garrisons that surrounded the city. The British troops 
considered Westphalians in general and Münster in particular to be traditionally 
anti-military:  
 
However, if one is to indulge in generalizations it is probably best to 
record that the further away from the East German border the less 
spontaneous Anglo-German relations tend to become and the faults do 
not all lie on one side.106 
 
German attitudes in smaller towns recorded by British observers were 
often more favourable. One of the regular visitors to the Sergeants’ Mess of the 
15th/19th Hussars in the small town of Wesendorf was the local German 
policeman, who arrived on his bicycle each Saturday just before lunch and left 
around mid-afternoon. However, as a figure of authority, he came into his own 
when the British military band gave an open-air concert in the village square, 
which ended with the playing of the two national anthems. The large German 
crowd stood firm during the playing of the German anthem but began to wander 
off during ‘God Save the Queen’, presumably from ignorance rather than bad 
manners. ‘One loud grunt of disapproval from the policeman and the crowd 
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stopped in its tracks where it remained until dismissed.’107 At times during 
exercises in the German countryside, troops found they even had to fend off 
curious local Germans from neighbouring villages hoping to pick up ‘the odd 
treat’, such as a bar of chocolate or ‘finding’ some useful spare bits and pieces 
with which to mend their cars’. Fencing off the entire area was no option as 
‘we’re supposed to keep good relationships with the locals’.108 
Despite the hostility in parts of the German press and public, there were 
large-scale, concerted efforts by German authorities and also by non-
governmental organisations to improve relations between Allied soldiers and 
civilians. The Anglo-German Association (Deutsch-Britische Gesellschaft), 
founded in May 1949 in Düsseldorf, quickly became the most prominent 
organisation fostering understanding between the British and German people. 
Its privately organised bilateral Königswinter Conferences aimed at getting 
Britons and Germans together once a year to ‘discuss matters of particular 
substance and moment (sic)’.109 Although non-governmental organisations 
largely focused on Anglo-German relations in general rather than BAOR in 
particular, the annual appeal ‘Christmas in peace and freedom – union of hearts’ 
by the Anglo-German Association, which was widely advertised in the German 
national press, stood out as a prominent example to include service 
personnel.110 This appeal called for Germans to invite Allied soldiers into their 
homes for Christmas. In particular troops who spent their first year in Germany 
were to be shown a traditional German Christmas. Noteworthy was the non-
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military character of the appeal, as the invitations were designed as a thank you 
to those Allied soldiers who had themselves provided many German children 
and elderly people with gifts in the past. The invitations by German families were 
to be sent to local unit commanders and contain special requests in regards to 
age, profession, religious affiliation and language skills of the soldiers.111 To 
further emphasize the non-military character, the appeal was continuously 
widened so that by 1954 this also included foreign students and refugees from 
the eastern bloc. In order to tempt more people to join the appeal, the organizers 
constantly pointed out the value of the invitations to the Germans, who could 
improve their language skills and learn about other cultures. 
German official efforts also continuously increased on all levels 
throughout the period in question. German politicians made regular appeals to 
both the German population as well as British troops to improve relations. For 
instance, as early as May 1951 the Minister President of NRW, Karl Arnold, 
called for an improvement of relations between the British and the German 
civilian population when visiting BAOR HQ at Bad Oeynhausen. He suggested 
transforming the BAOR from an occupation force to a protection force, as this 
would surely improve relations. He also asked for the British officials to work 
towards this aim.112 
 In order to improve Anglo-German relations further, the state-run northern 
German radio station (Norddeutscher Rundfunk-NDR) broadcast a programme 
in December 1956 on the relations between the civilian population and Allied 
troops. This included a two minute address by the German Chancellor Konrad 
Adenauer, thanking those who worked to create friendly and cordial relations. 
Adenauer stressed the willingness on both sides from the grassroots of local 
people up to federal authorities and Allied headquarters to foster better relations. 
He also reminded his German audience of the many benefits they had gained 
from the presence of Allied troops, ranging from sports grounds built by soldiers 
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and support of children in need to employment opportunities. Furthermore, he 
stressed the considerable economic benefits presented to the Germans by the 
presence of the troops.113 
Efforts by the various German ministries affected by relations with the 
British Services varied in scope and success. The German Foreign Office 
compiled a directory for Allied soldiers to improve relations between themselves 
and German civilians. This effort came at the height of the debate about 
misbehaviour of Allied troops in November 1956. The means to improve 
relations was to be the personal and professional interests of the soldiers 
stationed in Germany. The directory aimed to provide an overview of cultural 
and professional bodies in Germany which could be of interest, in order to foster 
contacts with the local population. Copies were initially sent to the American and 
French headquarters but British and Belgian troops were also supplied with 
them. The compendium was divided into trades, industries, agriculture and 
forestry, sports, music and arts, technology (engineering), universities and 
tourism. Essentially this provided a detailed list of a wide range of trades and 
leisure activities, ranging from subjects as diverse as agriculture and boxing to 
dog training.114 An accompanying letter from the German Foreign Office to all 
Minister Presidents asked for any additional suggestions to be made by any of 
the ministries involved. The trade and transport minister of NRW highlighted that 
companies and factories had already offered guided tours for Allied soldiers and 
their wives which had been a success.115 The Ministry for Food, Agriculture and 
Forestry added that a useful addition would be to include youth organisations in 
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Germany, as most young soldiers had expressed the desire to establish 
contacts to organisations related to those in the home country of the soldier.116  
Despite good intentions the compilation of the directory above all 
provided an example of a lack of co-operation between the German and British 
authorities as well as demonstrating the complexity of such a task in the FRG. 
The publication of this expensive brochure was significantly delayed due to a 
legal battle with the German printing company, as large numbers had been 
printed before important amendments had been made which essentially 
rendered them worthless.117 When it was finally available, it proved rather less 
popular with the British than had been anticipated. The reason for this was 
simple. Although the directory demonstrated the willingness of German 
authorities to improve relations, the British response to the directory, which was 
essentially a very long list of addresses and phone numbers, was reserved at 
best because it was written in German. The German Press and Information 
Bureau offered 3,000 free copies of the directory to the British Embassy but the 
reply to the ‘generous offer’ stated that, ‘due to the very particular nature of this 
guide book’, it was of very limited use to the simple soldier:  
 
If in the future you should again consider producing brochures in English 
for Allied Service personnel I would be most grateful for an opportunity to 
see a draft as we or the military authorities surely would be able to make 
some useful suggestions before the brochure is actually printed.118   
 
 Other promising German initiatives completely failed to materialise. A 
member of the German Lower House (Bundestag) suggested the German-wide 
                                                             
116 NRW, NW 179/685, p. 36, Letter dated 08 February 1957. 
117 BK, B145/60, 250-4. 
118 BK, B145/60, 250-4, Letter from JM Fisher, British Embassy, Bonn, to Hanns 
Küffner, Presse-und Informationsamt der Bundesregierung, Bonn, 16 May 1958 
(Italics added by the author). 
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establishment of meeting places for Allied soldiers and German youths, based 
on one successful example in the American zone of Occupation. The idea was 
to organise coach tours, dances, movie screenings and talks, aimed at both 
Allied soldiers and Germans. The plan envisaged three such meeting places in 
the British zone (as well as eight American and three French) and was in 
principle approved by all German ministries involved. However, when it came to 
funding the project, after a lengthy debate the idea was axed. The defence 
ministry refused to contribute the 300,000 DM necessary for the year 1957. As 
the project only involved German civilians, the Defence Ministry did not consider 
itself responsible. The Interior Ministry refused to pay on similar grounds, as the 
impact of the project was mainly related to foreign policy. As the Foreign Ministry 
disagreed with this assessment, the Member of Parliament was duly informed 
that there were no federal funds available for the project.119  The apparent lack 
of interest on the part of the federal ministries involved raises the question how 
seriously at least some German ministers were taking the issue of relations 
between Allied soldiers and German civilians. 
Despite the varying attitude of German ministries, it was the concern over 
crimes committed by Allied troops that led the German Foreign Ministry to 
establish an inter-allied commission, involving the embassies of the FRG and 
those of the Allies. Its overall aim was to examine incidents between troops and 
Germans. The German Interior Minister, Defence Minister and Federal Press 
Office were also involved. Depending on the subject of the meetings, 
commanders of Allied headquarters and local German officials were also in 
attendance.120 The findings of this group again stressed that in general the 
British efforts to bring troops and civilians together compared rather favourably 
to those of the United States.  The statistics of negative incidents also put the 
                                                             
119 BK, B136/5528, 4-24109-2175/57, Begegnungsstätten der Soldaten der 
alliierten Einsatzkräfte mit der deutschen Bevölkerung und deutschen Soldaten, 
2 September 1957. 
120 BK, B145/610, 250-2. 
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British into a rather favourable light. According to the German Foreign Office, the 
comparatively low number of incidents involving British soldiers was partly due 
to successful British measures, such as the establishment of local Anglo-
German committees; jointly organised events; the distribution of English books 
on Germany; and the showing of films about Germany. Further measures 
included discounted travel in Germany for BAOR soldiers and the 
encouragement to join activities of the Anglo-German Society.121  
Despite the aforementioned concerns about crime levels among Allied 
troops among Land governments, by November 1957 the German Foreign 
Ministry decided that the situation had sufficiently improved and postponed a 
planned meeting of the Allied working party, due to ‘the lack of specific 
concerns’.122 It is therefore apparent that despite a temporary rise in crimes 
committed by British troops between 1955 and 1957, in the view of the German 
Foreign Ministry the situation had improved by the end of that year. It was not 
until the 1960s that the behaviour of British troops became the focus of federal 
concern and the German Foreign Office suggested a renewal of the talks 





                                                             
121 BK, B145/610, 211-81-24-03/3620/56, Aufzeichnung über die Besprechung 
am 28. September 1956 im Auswärtigen Amt über Übergriffe von 
amerikanischen Soldaten gegenüber der deutschen Zivilbevölkerung. 
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1957. 
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This chapter has demonstrated that, from a German perspective, the presence 
of the BAOR in Germany increasingly threatened Anglo-German relations 
precisely because of the improvement of diplomatic relations between the 
Federal Republic and its new western partners in the defence against 
communism. The requisitioning of housing and land, imposed on German 
communities in 1945, continued into the late 1950s and attracted increasing 
hostility by the significant number of civilians affected. Added to this was the 
regular negative attention troops attracted due to manoeuvre damage, which 
was frequently used by the German press to stir up anti-British sentiment and 
even invited communist propaganda. During election campaigns, the presence 
of British troops was a potential problem to be exploited. It was used in attempts 
to damage the reputation of the Christian Democrats under Konrad Adenauer. 
Even when acting within the boundaries of policies agreed between London and 
Bonn, the BAOR often attracted widespread criticism due to the lack of 
communication with the German press as well as local German officials. This in 
particular was harmful to relations and frequently caused lengthy arguments and 
complex attempts at minimising damage at the highest levels.  
When considering German efforts at improving relations, it has become 
evident that, compared with French and American troops, the British were 
regarded as very civilised and willing to facilitate more harmonious relations 
between Servicemen and civilians. Many of the official German efforts - such as 
the directory for Allied soldiers - were well-intended, yet, through a lack of 
consultation with the British, severely flawed and often not very effective.  
Whereas many non-governmental organisations successfully brought British 
troops and German civilians together, there was a notable reluctance in the 
German Interior and Defence ministries to fund initiatives, even when these 
clearly had been proven to be successful. It is however also apparent that, 
according to the German administration, the rise of incidents caused by British 
soldiers noted after 1955 had been sufficiently brought under control by 1957. 
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This chapter has therefore shown that efforts to utilise the BAOR as a tool to 
improve Anglo-German relations were regarded as rather less urgent in Bonn as 
might be expected considering the view of the British Foreign Office. However, 
before analysing the British administration’s concerns over the impact of the 
changing relationship between Britain and Germany caused by Federal 
sovereignty in 1955 and its attempts to change the behaviour of the Services, it 
is necessary to consider the position of the Services themselves. In order to fully 
understand the relations between the BAOR and the Germans, the next chapter 
will analyse the situation in Germany as seen by British troops. It will also 
evaluate the efforts made on all levels by the armed forces themselves to work 







Chapter Five: The Soldiers, the Airmen and the Germans: Military 





The Westdeutsches Tageblatt, a local German newspaper, reported in 1952 that 
attempts to improve Anglo-German relations by both British troops and Germans 
showed some signs of success. However, a number of difficulties had to be 
overcome, including: 
  
the typical Anglo-Saxon lethargy which prevents the English from actively 
looking for new friends and learning new languages as well as the 
German tendency to come across as too friendly and therefore give the 
impression of ingratiation.1 
 
As the preceding chapters have demonstrated, any lack of contact between 
Services and Germans was not necessarily due to an overly friendly attitude on 
the side of the Germans. However, many observers commented on the 
perceived lack of effort by British troops to overcome their ‘Anglo-Saxon 
lethargy’. This thesis has analysed the view of the British and German media as 
well as those of the administration in Bonn of the Services’ efforts to improve 
relations. This chapter will consider the BAOR and its own efforts, both on the 
official as well as the more individual levels. On the one hand the focus here will 
be on changes made by the Services prior to 1955, when the Federal Republic’s 
sovereignty fundamentally changed relations between Bonn and London. On the 
other hand, this chapter will explore some measures taken by the Services in 
1956 and 1957 in order to demonstrate to what extent the Services could be 
                                                             
1 NRW, NW 115/175, Westdeutsches Tageblatt, 14 February 1952. 
153 
 
utilised to bring about an improvement in relations. As shown in chapter three, a 
number of incidents caused by British soldiers threatened to seriously 
undermine Anglo-German relations. It is important to highlight some of the 
underlying reasons for these incidents from a Service perspective. The chapter 
will begin by exploring the operational difficulties encountered by many 
regiments in Germany, which often made organised efforts to improve relations 
with Germans somewhat difficult. Furthermore, this chapter will examine the life 
of BAOR officers and ranks in Germany as well as the more personal contacts 
with the local population. The changing attitude towards Germany of regimental 
magazines, among other factors, was a contribution to an improved 
understanding. It is the aim of this chapter to investigate the attitudes and 
behaviour of the Services in the run-up to Federal German sovereignty in 1955 
as well as to highlight some of the problems and attempted solutions by the 
Services once Germany was a fully established member of the Western 
community. There is ample evidence of very thorough and successful attempts 
by British forces – incidentally RAF units - which require investigation. The 
measures introduced by the RAF will also be compared to those of the Army. 
The analysis of Service attitudes and efforts will then allow for conclusions to be 
drawn in regards to the value of the BAOR in the context of the improvement of 





Throughout the period in question, the British Armed Forces in Germany faced 
considerable pressures in fulfilling their military role in the Cold War. As a 
consequence, the improvement of relations with the local population was not 
necessarily a priority for the military leadership. As established in chapter two, 
General Brian Robertson himself considered the role of the BAOR to be largely 
political. He was gravely concerned about the present position of the forces in 
Germany: ‘It was not, properly speaking, a trained army and to put it in the field 
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if a crisis arose would present very great difficulties indeed’.2 It is important to 
consider the consequences of this weakness for the troops involved. The Chiefs 
of Staff of the British Forces in Germany had serious concerns in regards to the 
ability of the BAOR to successfully repulse or even slow down a Soviet attack. 
According to a report on the perceived lack of reinforcement on the operational 
plans of the British Forces in Germany, the efficiency of the troops varied 
considerably between the various arms of the Services. British military planning 
for a potential Soviet attack assumed that there would be ‘no warning period 
which will enable any preparatory mobilisation measures to be taken.’3 However, 
there were considerable shortages in regards to manpower and the BAOR in 
fact relied on the arrival of reinforcements from Britain in case of an emergency 
in order to become fully operational. These vital reinforcements were 
unavailable at unit locations until at least six days after an initial attack.4 
According to a 1953 report by the Chiefs of Staff, the Royal Armoured 
Corps had only enough men to crew fifty per cent of their tanks, Field Regiments 
of Royal Artillery could only man seventy-five per cent of their weapons, 
whereas light anti-aircraft regiments could only man half of their guns.5 Royal 
Artillery headquarters was only able to operate by withdrawing officers from 
regiments. Royal Engineer units were only able to produce fifty per cent of their 
‘working numbers’.6 This situation was regarded as particularly grave in view of 
                                                             
2 NA, FO 800/467, File 176 Ger/48/43, Secretary of State’s conversation with 
General Robertson, 27 July 1948. 
3 NA, FO 371/104044, COS Committee Report COS (53)376, Copy of Minute 
from R.N. Gale, Chairman,  Commanders-In-Chief Committee, British Forces, 
Germany to Secretary, Chiefs of Staff Committee, 4 August 1953. 
4 NA, FO 371/104044, COS Committee Report COS (53)376, The effect of the 
present reinforcement policy on the operational plans of the British Forces in 
Germany , 4 August 1953, Annex, p. 10. 
5 NA, FO 371/104044, COS Committee Report COS (53)376, Annex, p. 3. 
6 NA, FO 371/104044, COS Committee Report COS (53)376, Annex, p. 4. 
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extensive demolition programmes to be carried out to slow the Soviet advance 
and ‘the fact that seventy per cent of the engineer effort is German Service 
Organisation (GSO), regarding whose loyalty we have grave doubts’.7  
As early as 1948 the potentially dangerous position of BAOR in regards 
to its dependence on German labour for administrative support had become 
evident. If those 150,000 Germans employed by the BAOR should prove 
unreliable due to communist action, ‘our forces there would ultimately be greatly 
handicapped and movement on any substantial scale would be difficult’.8 The 
Royal Signals fared little better as ‘the present strengths […] would make the 
provision of adequate communications forward of Headquarters Northern Army 
Group very difficult’. Rear of Headquarters Northern Army Group the situation 
was ‘deplorable. Even if existing units are made up to Higher Establishment, the 
barest essential communications cannot be provided’.9 The position of the 
Infantry varied considerably in battalions but all battalions were short of men and 
support companies had been ‘pared to the bone’.  
The Royal Air Force in Germany apparently was in no better condition. In 
case of an emergency it would not be possible for the Army to take over stocks 
of aviation fuel stored in Antwerp and arrange for distribution of fuel to RAF 
airfields unless more trained personnel was made available. The Royal Air 
Force was ‘at the moment in danger of a breakdown in the command 
organisation due to deficiencies of Signals personnel’ as well as having its 
operations seriously curtailed due to shortages of personnel and resources.10 
The Chiefs of Staff demanded as essential that reinforcements were ‘trained 
men, in every way qualified and fit to undertake the operational tasks required of 
them’. The report concluded that:  
 
                                                             
7 NA, FO 371/104044, COS Committee Report, Annex, p. 4.  
8 NA, FO 800/467, Memorandum Alexander to Attlee, 14 February 1948. 
9 NA, FO 371/104044, COS Committee Report, Annex, p. 4. 
10 NA, FO 371/104044, COS Committee Report COS (53)376, Annex, p.5. 
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in order to be operationally effective, the British Forces in Germany need 
considerable reinforcement of men who are ready immediately to carry 
out their operational tasks between Simple Alert and D-Day and 
sufficiently in advance of D-Day, to enable them to be absorbed into their 
units. It will be impossible under present arrangements to ensure that 
these reinforcements will start arriving at unit locations before D-Day plus 
six.11  
 
The outlook in case of a Soviet attack was indeed bleak. Despite the 
desire to assure the Germans that the Allies would hold the river Elbe in case of 
a Russian attack, there was no mention of any plan other than to fall back to the 
Rhine in British COS reports on the subject. The effect on the Army of 
manpower shortages during the withdrawal phase following a Soviet attack was 
considered to be grave:  
 
The delay imposed on the Russians will be reduced as the covering 
forces as at present constituted will be too weak. […] The danger of 
successful airborne ‘coup de main’ action against both the Rhine and 
Maas bridges will be greatly increased. During the initial phase of the 
Rhine battle, the inability of all arms and services to deploy a reasonable 
fighting potential will cause unacceptable delay in the preparation of the 
Rhine position.  
 
The success or failure of the British Forces in Germany was therefore ‘gravely 
prejudiced by the lack of a comparatively small number of trained men’.12 This 
lack of resources might partly explain why many personal recollections by unit 
commanders of their time in Germany focus very little on relations with the 
Germans. For example, one regimental commander in his account of a three 
                                                             
11 NA, FO 371/104044, COS Committee Report COS (53)376, Annex, p. 10. 
12 NA, FO 371/104044, COS Committee Report COS (53)376, Annex, p. 7. 
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year period in Germany only mentioned Anglo-German relations once, when he 
met an officer of the new German army in 1957, whom he found a ‘sound, level-
headed and practical officer’, despite having spent eleven years in Soviet 
captivity.’13 The absence of any major initiatives by the British Army can 
therefore at least be partially explained by the military situation and the lack of 
personnel. 
The military preparedness and performance during manoeuvres did not 
boost either British or German confidence in the BAOR’s ability to stop a Soviet 
attack. According to the Westdeutsche Allgemeine newspaper, the 7th Tank 
Division had performed abysmally in a manoeuvre in 1950. Apparently the 
Commander of BAOR, General Keightley, had accused the division of being 
‘slow, lacking any element of surprise and generally not being what it was in 
1945’. According to the article, much of the equipment was outdated and nine 
out of ten vehicles were ‘scrap’.14 The serious situation in Germany did not only 
affect the higher echelons of the British Forces and their ability to spend much 
thought on Anglo-German relations. For many British soldiers stationed with 
BAOR during this period the international situation, combined with the perceived 
unpreparedness of the BAOR, proved rather unnerving: 
 
Korea was on and communist domination was feared in the West. The 
Armoured Corps was on forty-eight hour standby, looking at the Russian 
tanks looking at them and knowing that war was the squeezing of a 
trigger away. We didn’t have Centurion [tanks] then, we had obsolete 
Valentine Archers designed in 1939, and we got numerous calls to arms 
in the middle of the night, with rumours of Russian attacks. Truthfully 
                                                             
13 R[oyal] S[ignals] M[useum], File No. 936.1, David Horsefield, Personal 
account of time as Commander Royal Signals 2 Infantry Div. BAOR 1956-1959, 
1985.  
14 NRW, NW 115/173, Westdeutsche Allgemeine, 03 October 1950.  
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there were occasions when we thought we would never see another 
dawn.15 
 
Glyn Jones, a wireless operator at Royal Artillery Battery HQ in Düsseldorf, felt 
bemused when told by his sergeant that he was an essential cog in the wheel 
that would roll back the Russian hordes. He himself was rather less confident as 
‘in two years I [had] fired ten rounds from a rifle, ten from a Sten, five from a 
revolver and I’d never been on the field guns’.16 Considering this situation, it 
may not come as a surprise that many units as well as individual soldiers 
stationed in Germany considered Anglo-German relations to be a comparatively 
minor issue. Nonetheless, there is some evidence that particularly during this 
period, several unit commanders noted that relations with the Germans returned 
‘back to normal’ and that an increasing number of Anglo-German social events 
were organised by British regiments.17 Apart from the impact of the Cold War, 
issues such as the nature of the accommodation of troops in Germany also had 
an impact on relations between the Services and the Germans. 
 
 
BAOR Accommodation in Germany and its Impact on Community 
Relations 
 
Although some wives of Service personnel stationed in Germany felt guilty about 
living in comfortable houses in the UK, whilst their husbands were ‘probably in 
some horrid slum’, the barracks in Germany that housed British troops were in 
                                                             
15 Alan Tizzard, Tank Commander in the 10th King’s Hussars at Iserlohn, 1950, 
cited in: Tom Hickman, The Call-Up, p.133. 
16 Glyn Jones, cited in: Tom Hickman, The Call-Up, p. 134. 
17 RSM, File No. 938.1/7, p. 1, Brigadier C. T. Honeybourne, OBE, Account of 
7th Armoured Division, Royal Signals, October 1954-November 1956. 
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most cases a pleasant surprise for British soldiers.18 Most had been built in the 
1930s by the German armed forces and were centrally heated, double-glazed, 
had constant hot water and men slept two to six to a room. One National 
Serviceman commented: 
 
We had a camp cinema the size of the Odeon, Leicester Square, an 
indoor sports complex that included a full-size hockey pitch, and an 
officer’s mess like the Taj Mahal. There was a gymnasium that could 
have been a venue for the Olympic Games, swimming pools and acres of 
playing fields.19  
 
All British garrisons in Germany were self-contained units. As a result 
contact with the local population was to a certain extent limited. Facilities for off-
duty recreation were often provided within the barracks. The Army Kinema 
Corporation provided recent releases of popular films and the British Forces 
Broadcasting Services provided a mixture of record request programmes and 
military gossip.20  
For the single soldier the social life was straightforward. He could have a 
drink or a meal in the NAAFI canteen or, with a pass and in uniform, he could go 
into the town and spend the evening until midnight in a ‘Gaststube’.21 However, 
in more remote garrisons this proved difficult. For example, the 15th/19th Hussars 
at Wesendorf found themselves in a small village with little to offer by way of 
entertainment. The nearest town of any size was Celle, which was too far away 
                                                             
18 D[urham] R[ecord] O[ffice], D/Wn 20/468/1(2), Letter from Anne Watson to 
W.I. Watson, 1st Battalion Durham Light Infantry, 6 June 1950.  
19 Second Lieutenant Tony Thorne, stationed in Brunswick, cited in: Tom 
Hickman, The Call-Up, p. 137. 
20 Trevor Royle, The Best Years of Their Lives, The National Service Experience 
1945-1963, London, 2002, p. 145. 
21  Jeremy Bastin, The King’s Royal Hussars, p.52. 
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for a casual visit. Particularly in the early post-war period the lack of available 
transport discouraged soldiers from traveling, as ‘one moves about by the rule of 
thumb method’. Not all soldiers had ‘sufficient courage to face a refusal’ and 
walk quite long distances at times.22 The increasingly unfavourable exchange 
rate between the Pound and the Deutschmark also made it ‘almost impossible 
for a British soldier to go to a German restaurant or attend German 
entertainment’.23 Social life for these soldiers therefore centred on the camp 
NAAFI and the squadron clubs which held the occasional dance.24  
These conditions did not necessarily make Germany a popular posting for 
young Britons. An article in one regimental magazine lamented the lack of the 
friendly and homely atmosphere of the local public house back in Britain. The 
pub was not the only institution absent in Germany:  
 
Possibly most of all the soldier out here misses the fish and chips after a 
cinema show or what have you. Open fish and chips shops in Germany 
and many more, I’m sure, would soldier on.25 
 
Nevertheless, in many cases young British men did visit the local German towns 
during off-duty hours. Many found that, from the early 1950s onwards, 
conditions in Germany seemed better than back at home:  
 
The streets and buildings in Germany […] were clean and in good repair, 
the people were well-dressed and confident and the food seemed 
                                                             
22 The Wire, Vol. 3, No. 2, February 1949, p. 117. 
23 NA, DEFE 11/64 163A 412/42, Letter E. Shinwell to John Strachey M.P.,  
2 May 1951. 
24  Jeremy Bastin, The King’s Royal Hussars, p.59. 
25 Sgt. S. H. Harcourt, The Wire, Vol. 3, No. 2, February 1949, p. 117. 
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plentiful and of high quality. The first thing that struck me after only three 
weeks away was the drabness of austerity Britain.26 
 
The nature of British Service accommodation remained a regular obstacle 
in the way of utilising the BAOR as a tool for improving Anglo-German relations. 
This was due to the physical separation of many bases from their local 
surroundings as well as the self-contained nature of at least the larger barracks. 
It was therefore often easier for Service personnel to spend their time 
completely separated from their host country. It was in many cases only the 
routine and boredom associated with army life, which led to young Britons 
exploring the surrounding areas. There were nonetheless opportunities for 
young Britons to discover Germany, and many found that life outside the camp 
was rather more interesting. Groups of young British soldiers explored the 
country by train, tram and Rhine river cruises on weekend leaves.27 Some, like 
the National Serviceman Malcolm Barker, even travelled by themselves, as 
‘strangely enough, I cannot find anyone else with the same lust for travel’.28 
Despite the limitations described above, contacts between German 
civilians and British soldiers were, depending on the location, size and amenities 
on offer within the garrisons, a frequent occurrence. When it comes to 
overcoming language barriers, a considerable number of young Britons did 
make an effort to at least get by. The keen National Serviceman Malcolm Barker 
asked his mother to send a German language book as he was picking up the 
language in bits and pieces and wanted to know how to put those pieces 
                                                             
26 David McNeill, RAF Coastal Command, cited in: Trevor Royle, The Best 
Years, p. 146. 
27 As described for example by Private J.E. Booth, 4th Infantry Workshop REME, 
stationed in Duisburg between 1950 and 1951, cited in: Roy Bainton, The Long 
Patrol, p. 48. 
28 NAM 2006-12-77-82, National Serviceman Corporal Malcolm Barker, Queen’s 
Royal Regiment in a letter to his mother, 26 May 1953. 
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together. ‘With the book and the help from the Germans on the staff here I 
should be able to pick up the language before we go home’.29 
Those soldiers who did overcome the language barrier frequently 
encountered and reported on the many cultural differences between the British 
and Germans on those occasions when contacts did take place. British attitudes 
and behaviour frequently upset the feelings of local Germans. One young Briton 
commented on the apparent German lack of humour at a Christmas party, which 
the German staff had been invited to. At one point the party nearly broke up:  
 
when someone suggested they sang the old German hate song (the song 
the Nazis sang during the war and going something like this: Today we 
rule the world, tomorrow we rule England). They all rose in disgust that an 
English soldier should even suggest it and became rather offended.30 
 
The German guests vowed to never fight against England again and the young 
soldier thought ‘they were very sincere. At least I hope so’. The party was not 
helped by a drunken corporal shouting ‘Vive Stalin’, which apparently led to 
more German guests walking out. ‘It proved one thing – that the Germans have 
a very little (sic), if any, sense of humour.’ Furthermore the incident proved to 
the young Briton that the Germans were rather despondent and helpless, fully 





                                                             
29 NAM 2006-12-77-82, Malcolm Barker, in a letter to his mother, 15 September 
1952.  
30 NAM 2006-12-77-82, Malcolm Barker in a letter to his mother, 26 December 
1952. 
31 NAM 2006-12-77-82, Malcolm Barker, 26 December 1952. 
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Differences in Attitudes of British Officers and other Ranks  
 
From a British perspective, personal relations between soldiers and Germans 
varied significantly, depending on a number of factors: pre-conceived ideas of 
Germans; the impact of Nazism on the view of individual troops as well as 
garrison commanders; and personal attitudes of Service personnel. During the 
immediate post-war period, attitudes of at least some British troops towards 
Germans were quite clearly negative. As one Serviceman recalled in 1948:  
 
We did our “Army of Occupation” duties. It was called “showing the 
German population who won the war”’. Former SS soldiers were 
scrubbing the billet floor and the German workers in the camp were 
usually badly treated.32  
 
It is useful to distinguish between officers and other ranks when 
considering personal relations between British soldiers and German civilians, as 
a difference in behaviour was often apparent. The more distant and reserved 
behaviour of officers is made evident for example by the recollections of a young 
serviceman, who noted after six months in Germany when one officer left his 
regiment:  
 
He came round and said goodbye to us all […] He even said goodbye 
and shook hands with the German staff – a thing I have never seen any 
officer doing before.33  
 
                                                             
32 K.O. Airey, Royal Artillery, stationed at Bielefeld in 1947-8, cited in: Roy 
Bainton, The Long Patrol, p. 67. 
33 NAM 2006-12-77-82, Malcolm Barker, 22 November 1952. 
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The diary of another British officer in Germany revealed a curious mix of 
sympathy, humour and disdain, which shaped the attitudes of some Britons 
during this period: 
 
Dinner in Tyrol: Not too bad. Two star. Sat with two Krauts and their child. 
Made child aeroplanes out of table napkins. Child pleased. Obviously a 
future Messerschmidt.34 
 
The same officer’s impression of Hamburg in 1951 was dominated by the ‘drab’ 
Hotel Four Seasons, the ‘vaguely dreary’ Country Club and the ‘frightful’ people 
which rendered the place ‘like any other European city’.35  He nevertheless cut 
short a holiday into Luxemburg and France to spend time in the ‘clean, well-run 
Germany’.36 Frequent visits to a German friend in Cologne demonstrated the 
Wirtschaftswunder to him, when he saw ‘the huge place he has built since we 
knocked it down in the last war – and the country house and so on’37. 
Asked how he got on with the Germans during his time there, one former 
staff officer replied that, although he had had the most interesting time there, it 
was ‘quite close, six years after the war’. He thought it unfortunate that there 
‘was still a barrier between fraternising with the Germans (sic.). You were not 
supposed to do too much of this and it was a pity because I could have 
improved my German a bit.’38 Another officer was most impressed with the way 
the German people worked and their efficiency. ‘I’d come through Germany from 
                                                             
34 NAM 2002-02-901-18, LtCol. Anthony Gervase Ryshworth-Hill, MC, Diary 
entry, 20 July 1954. 
35 NAM 2002-02-901-15, Ryshworth-Hill, Diary entry, 11 July 1951.  
36 NAM 2002-02-901-18, Ryshworth-Hill, Diary entry, July 1954.  
37 NAM 2002-02-901-18, Ryshworth-Hill, Diary entry, 5 December 1955. 
38 I[mperial] W[ar] M[useum, Southwark], IWM Interview, file no. 26546, 
01/2003, Martyn Highfield, GSO2 Staff Officer to CRA, HQ, BAOR, 1950-1, 
served with 77 HAA Regt. 1952-55.  
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Italy when it was all blitzed – every city was flat and when I went back and saw 
the way they’d built these towns – you had to take your hat off to them.’39 A 
British unit commander commented on the good relations with his German civil 
labour teams and his admiration of ‘the way they stuck into clearing the bomb 
damage and rebuilding everywhere.’40 
David Findlay Clark, a RAF officer on his way to Germany in 1953, 
encountered other British soldiers on their way back to Germany after leave. ‘It 
was encouraging that most of them seemed to have enjoyed their postings in 
Germany.’41 The soldiers he met had little to remark on the present social or 
political conditions in the land of the former enemy. Some had learned a little 
German but few mixed to any significant extent with local German people.42 The 
same young NCO ‘still felt strangely exposed in this land of our former enemies’, 
when, in full uniform, less than a decade after the war, he crossed the border 
into Germany.43 This initial response was however gradually replaced by the 
‘attitudes of a member of an Occupying Force’, after witnessing the bomb 
damage to German cities and wondering ‘how the indigenous population might 
react to RAF personnel, especially in uniform.’44 When spending some free time 
in beer gardens in Münster, Clark felt keenly aware that ‘our Luftwaffe 
predecessors’ must have lounged at the same tables some years before. He 
was told by the pub landlord that ‘we were disarmingly like our former Teuton 
equivalents both in style and habits’.45 The majority of the inhabitants of 
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Münster, heavily bombed during the war, apparently were polite and helpful 
towards British airmen, although ‘there were several people of both sexes who 
would turn away very deliberately and spit as I passed’.46 This kind of 
experience of being sworn or spat at was shared by other British officers, but as 
one aptly summarised: ‘In general, we were accepted, and after all, we weren’t 
the Russians.’47  
The experiences of other ranks in Germany often differed from those of 
officers. Asked how British soldiers regarded serving in Germany, one regular 
soldier hesitated before replying:  
 
I was a little against Germans in general and I think that the whole, -at 
least the majority of squaddies were with me, - had this sort of thing about 
Germans because of what they did during the war (sic). I don’t think it 
would be a long, long time before they were really forgiven for this. 
Nevertheless, we had a job to do and we done it (sic) to the best of our 
abilities I think.48 
 
Despite this he claimed he ‘got on alright’ with the Germans. Nonetheless: 
  
I still think that, looking back on my time in Germany there that, although 
the British had this thing about the Germans, I still think there was a lot of 
conflict there you know. 
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It apparently did not take long then for an argument to develop, ‘if you were that 
way inclined’. But having learned his lessons on ‘what happens when you’re in 
the wrong I decided very much to turn the other cheek you might say’.49 
Once the Korean War was over and the death of Stalin temporarily 
relaxed the tense East-West relations, being posted to Germany constituted a 
considerable change from other postings for many soldiers:  
 
In Northern Ireland we had been on semi-active service dealing with 
urban guerrillas. In Germany we were part of an Army of Occupation in 
peacetime conditions: the heat was off.50 
 
Although this was a welcome change, it brought problems as ‘sex (the absence 
of) and boredom’ soon began to preoccupy the minds of all ranks and alcohol 
consumption rose enormously. Soldiers were: 
 
herded together in barbaric conditions, surrounded by wire fences and 
guards in a foreign country whose language they know nothing of, and 
with the bromide of fear removed, then the only reasonable thing to 
expect is drunkenness, inefficiency, and absence without leave.51 
 
This ‘pronounced sense of apathy and boredom’ was also remembered by some 
of the National Servicemen in units ‘directly on the front line’, i.e. on the border 
to the Soviet zone of Occupation.52 Although the forces attempted to keep 
morale high with military and sporting competitions as well as a full timetable of 
training exercises, there were lengthy periods of inactivity and boredom.53 Such 
                                                             
49 IWM interview, file no. 18477, 28 July 1998, Francis Leon Collett.  
50 National Serviceman Ian Carr, cited in: B.S. Johnson (ed.), All Bull, p. 112. 
51 B.S. Johnson (ed.), All Bull, p. 112. 
52 Tony Thorne,  Brasso, Blanco and Bull, London, 1998, p. 149. 
53 Trevor Royle, The Best Years, p. 146. 
168 
 
boredom often led to incidents. According to one National Serviceman who 
served in Brunswick in 1957, there was a favourite recreation for the soldiers, ‘at 
which they could pass many hours’. They would simply go down to the railway 
station and start ‘a tremendous brawl with the locals’. These street battles were 
referred to as ‘Goodwill Missions’ and would frequently involve hundreds at a 
time and sometimes last all night.54 Recollections of this kind of event occur 
repeatedly among British soldiers, often with the justification that ‘these same 
Germans had caused us all a great deal of inconvenience’ in the last war. These 
stories of ‘anonymous’ mass attacks and German ‘counter-attacks’ are however 
often accompanied by positive memories of encounters with individual 
Germans.55 
 The experience of first entering Germany left a lasting impression with 
many Servicemen. One noticed the change once he crossed the German border 
on a train to his unit, as ‘all along the railway line there were the remains of 
warehouses and other buildings bombed by the RAF during the war. And what a 
pitiful sight it was, too!’56 Troops were nonetheless often received warmly by 
Germans, who often waved and cheered at passing army trucks and, in some 
cases, even provided British soldiers on exercise with bottles of ice cold beer.57 
One National Serviceman recalled how, after having fallen off his motorcycle, 
local Germans took him into their home, washed his cuts and made him a cup of 
tea. ‘I recall trying to get a date with their daughter.’58 
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British Wives in Germany 
 
For many of the BAOR officers and regular soldiers, life in Germany was made 
more enjoyable by having their wives and children living with them. Despite 
initial German resentment, the presence of British wives and children arguably 
had a positive effect on Anglo-German relations due to the growing contacts 
between women and children. ‘Operation Union’, the accommodation of British 
married families in married quarters in Germany, had received Cabinet approval 
in 1946 and the first families arrived in Germany in August of that year.59 As 
established in chapter three, the necessary requisitioning of houses to house 
British families was not popular with the German population and also caused 
controversy in Britain. Immediately after the war the attitudes of some BAOR 
wives, who considered that ‘requisitioning a few houses from the German 
people’ was necessary to make up for the injustice of having been separated by 
war, did not help to alleviate tensions.60 There were however also wives who 
were ‘examples of all that an ambassador should be’.61 According to a report by 
British women’s organisations the strain on the German housing situation 
caused by British requirements for married families was so great that the living 
space for each German after British requirements had been met would be four 
square meters – the floor space of two ordinary beds.62 Operation Union was 
subsequently adjusted to take into account the housing situation in Germany.  
 The arrival of British mothers and children quickly brought down barriers 
between occupiers and occupied. Children on both sides only saw new 
playmates and as a result mothers began to develop contacts. Many British 
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families established friendly relations with their German maids, nannies and 
even the owners of the houses they occupied. Those British families who found 
themselves ‘in the lap of luxury after a tour in the UK’ or abroad were provided 
with plenty of information on how to spend their time and at the same time 
explore German customs and meet the local population.63 Regimental 
magazines painted increasingly inviting pictures of German fairgrounds, 
festivities and travel opportunities for British families. Some wives of Servicemen 
in Germany wrote letters to regimental magazines, highlighting the positive 
aspects of British family life in Germany:  
 
If all the holiday centres in this country are the same – so well run, with 
civility and no worry for the wife with a baby, however young – then I am 
staying until my husband has to leave this country through no fault of his 
own.64 
 
In a similar vein, as early as 1949, the Royal Signals Magazine described the 
pleasant life in the town of Bueckeburg, where ‘in the morning the German 
nursemaids can be seen wheeling their English charges about, and in the 
evening the park becomes the playground of all the local children.’65  
However, British and German children did not always get on well. One 
local German government report highlighted one case of a German child of 
primary school age being set upon by a group of English children aged ten to 
fourteen. ‘The children stole his purse, tied his hands and feet together and 
threw him into a pond where he was saved from drowning by a passer-by’.66 It 
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was now the task of local Resident Officers to cope with spontaneous and 
sometimes potentially dangerous incidents like this. Nonetheless, although 
initially controversial, the arrival of British families to Germany undoubtedly had 
a positive effect on relations at least between married Servicemen and the 
German population encountered by their families. 
 
 
British Soldiers and German Women 
 
For those young Britons without families in Germany life was somewhat 
different. Fraternisation with German girls occurred very early after the end of 
hostilities and by January 1946 was considered so normal that it was frequently 
mentioned in regimental magazines:  
 
‘Ladies’ night is held once a week, one man may accompany one ‘lady’ to 
an evening in the club. Up to the present it has proved successful. The 
‘Non-Fratters’ generally occupy their time in one corner playing darts, 
whilst the others are quite content dancing with the frauleins.67 
 
The same magazine later commented that ‘we do not take too seriously the 
Sapper, who in a recent essay on ‘Life in BAOR’ alleged ‘there is plenty of sport 
here besides frauleins’.68 One soldier commented on how much was written in 
Britain about the low moral standards in Germany and that ‘little more than a low 
standard can be expected amongst the poverty and the ruin of Germany at the 
moment’. Official attitudes towards relations with ‘the better type of German girls’ 
had clearly relaxed at least in some regiments, as an article in the Royal Signals 
magazine in 1949 revealed. The author wished those soldiers married to 
German girls ‘the best of luck’ and urged to accept this as ‘a normal outcome of 
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close contact by occupation’.69 Figures collated by the War Office in 1950 
showed 717 marriages by BAOR soldiers to German women, twelve of those by 
British officers. In 1951 seven officers married Germans and so did 390 other 
ranks.70 Some RAF officers were nonetheless warned as late as 1953 to be 
cautious with fraternising with German women, due to anxiety of classified 
information being passed on to Soviet spies. This attitude did however not exist 
in all units, as the Royal Signals magazine published a photo of one of its 
officers and his new German bride as early as 1949.71 Whereas some 
Servicemen stationed in Germany for a longer term formed firm relationships 
with German girls, others seemed to enjoy a colourful sex life instead. However, 
as many of the National Servicemen had girlfriends at home, often nothing more 
than ‘pleasant little episodes’ developed, which were ‘simply part and parcel of 
the adventure of being abroad in the comfortable warmth of a Westphalian 
summer’.72 
Those British soldiers willing to pay for sex were served by numerous 
brothels in Germany. In Hannover the whorehouses were in a street running 
parallel to the five platforms of the station and were known as ‘Platform Six’. 
Hamburg, with its red-light district turnstiled at either end, was described as the 
biggest brothel in the world. At the time of the Korean War, sex in Germany only 
cost a tin of Nescafe, a bar of chocolate or perfumed soap and sometimes as 
little as two cigarettes. By the mid-fifties this had risen to twenty cigarettes and 
by the mid-sixties it was strictly cash only.73 Throughout the period in question, 
the changing status of the BAOR, combined with the growing purchasing power 
of the German population, caused significant inflation for the squaddie who paid 
for sex.  
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It appears that contacts with German girls among British officers were 
less common than among other ranks. British women in Germany appeared to 
be rather more popular. Some officers of the Royal Northumberland Fusiliers 
stationed in Münster managed to achieve ‘pleasant relationships’ with teachers 
at a local British school, whose parties were ‘famed for the kind of satisfaction’ 
they afforded. ‘But on the whole, Germany, for an unmarried officer, was fairly 
barren sexually.’74  The other ranks in Münster appeared rather more willing to 
engage with German girls. As one signalman recalled, ‘troops always seem to 
respond to a nation’s ladies as opposed to its men’ and some of the more 
enterprising simply cut holes into the perimeter fence of the base and smuggled 
in the women they had met in the town.75 The patrolling officer often ‘had to 
make short detours to avoid the writhing bodies’.76 
 
 
Efforts by Army Units to improve Relations 
 
This chapter has outlined some of the conditions encountered by British troops 
in Germany. Having explained some of the factors preventing closer Anglo-
German relations on the more individual level as well as pointing towards a slow 
improvement, it is now necessary to analyse the efforts made on the level of 
Army units and garrisons. Records show that the efforts of British Army 
generally lacked both the scope as well as the long-term commitment to produce 
significant results. In fact as late as 1955 the British civilian administration in 
Germany commented on the still widespread suspicions in Service circles, ‘that 
something like Hitler will emerge more or less inevitably in the Federal Republic 
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in the course of time’.77 But a general change of attitude was nonetheless 
increasingly apparent. The satisfaction expressed by the British ambassador in 
1956 at the Services’ efforts, demonstrated the willingness of at least all senior 
BAOR officers to improve relations. A brief for the ambassador concluded that 
negative German press reports had fallen from 112 in July and August 1956 to 
only fifteen in October of the same year and that the number of positive reports 
had risen from nineteen to twenty-three. This was largely due to the work of 
Army Public Relations Officers and much of the remaining criticism of troops had 
come from remote areas, which did not have either Army Public Relations 
Officers or a British Consular Officer.78 The Commander-In-Chief of BAOR, 
General Richard Gale, commented that ‘the Germans were noticeably more 
friendly to the Forces since the end of the Occupation’.79 
Some Army units did actively work on relations with the German 
population from an early stage of the British Occupation. Attempts to engage 
with the local German population were made by inviting German children to 
Christmas parties at British camps.80 A particular effort was made by the 
Services to improve Anglo-German relations by hosting or participating in sports 
events. As Tony Mason points out, sport was of high importance to the British 
military and many unit commanders in the BAOR displayed a ‘ferocious 
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commitment to sport of every kind’.81 Soon after 1945, British troops began to 
play sport, particularly football, against German sides and, after initial reluctance 
by the Foreign Office, the CCG soon decided that ‘the playing of matches 
between British and German teams can contribute to the democratic re-
education of the Germans’.82 Particularly National Servicemen proved keen 
participants in BAOR sport events such as the BAOR football cup. Sports had 
proven a valuable factor in encouraging the mixing of regiments and civilians in 
Britain itself, as well as increasing ‘the pleasure and prestige to be had when 
service sportsmen reached the highest levels of a particular sport’.83 This tactic 
was also to be applied in Germany. Despite being involved in a large number of 
Service sports events, several units increasingly tried to improve local relations 
with Germans by organising Anglo-German fixtures. Attempts to promote good 
relations through sports were often met with an immediate positive response, for 
example the entry of an RAF team into the Geilenkirchen Kreis football league 
or the participation of troops in local town anniversary celebrations.84 Football 
matches were organised in large capacity stadiums in Münster85 and despite the 
danger of emotions running high, a most successful international boxing match 
took place in Münster between 23rd Armoured Brigade and the local boxing 
club.86  
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However, occasionally the BAOR strategy to use sports to build bridges 
failed without the Forces themselves being to blame. According to the local 
Resident officer a football match held in the town of Wuppertal between the 
Wuppertal and Manchester City teams did a very great deal to destroy the 
reputation for sportsmanship and fair play which had been established and 
consistently maintained by Service units. The incident in question involved an 
English forward, who:  
 
was sent off the field for foul play, refused to go for a little while, and 
finally left giving the crowd a short, sharp series of gestures which may 
conceivably have been mistaken by the shorter sighted for the ‘V’ sign.87 
 
It is evident that occasionally the efforts made by the Forces were undermined 
by British civilians, who were under no instructions to improve relations with the 
Germans. Nonetheless, the strategy to participate in sports, lend the Services’ 
band to towns and to generally maintain a high standard of discipline generally 
paid off, as pointed out by the Recklinghausen Resident, who claimed the 
withdrawal of British troops from Wuppertal was genuinely regretted by the 
German population.88 
Drag hunt meets provide another particularly well-documented example 
when it comes to using sports as a means to foster Anglo-German 
understanding. Arguably the motivation for the British units in question was not 
necessarily to improve Anglo-German relations when approaching German land 
owners for permission to use their land for hunting. It was simply the need for 
facilities which brought this about. Nonetheless, the results were noteworthy and 
a contrast to the frictions over fox hunting highlighted in chapter four. In typical 
                                                             
87 NA, FO 1013/2451, British Resident Recklinghausen, Quarterly Report, June 
1954. 




military fashion some units drew up detailed lists of various hunting lines, 
including comments on the German owners, their willingness to cooperate with 
the Services as well as their willingness to allow further hunts. Comments 
ranged from ‘Herr Heidmann is useless and there is little support’ to others 
demonstrating genuinely friendly relations between British and German hunting 
enthusiasts.89 In the case of the Royal Engineers this led to several Anglo-
German drag hunts being favourably reported on by the local German press.90 It 
is worth mentioning at this point that the case of Army reports on drag hunting is 
a typical example of BAOR documentation of records. Regimental records 
dealing with German issues are rare and those which do often focus on 
somewhat obscure details. For example the minutes of the 2nd Battalion Durham 
Light Infantry’s Officers’ Mess discuss in great detail the planned purchase of 
German coffee cups for the Officers’ Mess. This plan included the establishment 
of a mess committee to examine various German cups and make 
recommendations at a subsequent meeting. However, very little material on 
dealings with the German population that supplied the cups has been 
preserved.91 
Nonetheless, records that demonstrate changes in attitudes exist also 
outside the field of sports. Regimental publications for Service personnel 
revealed slowly changing attitudes in Army regiments towards the Germans. 
Increasingly throughout the period in question, regimental magazines developed 
from being entirely focused on the regiments themselves to sources providing 
information about German culture and customs. Whereas the Royal Engineers 
Sapper Magazine only ever mentioned German Frauleins or children very briefly 
in the 1940s, the magazine began to take more interest in the host country from 
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around August 1949 onwards.92 By 1952 the magazine reported signs that 
‘barriers are collapsing’, as quite a number of Sappers were enjoying attractive 
invitations by the local Germans. ‘One Sapper was seen being driven away in a 
motor car which was strangely reminiscent of a Rolls Royce.’93 By 1956 the 
magazine printed full-length feature articles on ‘Life in the BAOR – you may be 
posted here’, to inform soldiers stationed abroad and overseas. One feature, 
split over two separate issues, stressed the excellent travel and sports facilities 
as well as luxurious accommodation for troops in Germany. Although somewhat 
factual rather than entertaining, a detailed overview was provided of German 
festivities and traditions.94 Even German language classes were highlighted for 
soldiers as well as for their wives. A later edition featured an organised visit to 
the Volkswagen factory, essentially completing the transformation from an 
inward-looking regimental magazine to a tourist-style guide to Germany.95 The 
change in focus and content in this particular magazine constituted a significant 
change towards a normalisation of relations between the British and Germans 
and was evident in a number of other Army publications.  
 
 
Efforts by RAF Units to improve Relations 
 
Despite manpower shortages, parts of the British Forces went to surprising 
lengths to improve relations with the German population. However, it appears 
these organised, long-term efforts were largely confined to the Royal Air Force 
(RAF) and not the British Army. Due to the need to practice low-level flying for 
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training purposes, the RAF had to contend with the additional problem of aircraft 
noise in terms of relations with local populations compared to the Army. As RAF 
records at the National Archives reveal, the results of initiatives to address 
German grievances were impressive. For example, a ‘Review of Press Liaison 
Officer Organisation’ produced by the Command Information Office 
Headquarters 2nd Tactical Air Force (TAF) for the period July to December 1956, 
outlined the great lengths to which the RAF in Germany went to improve 
‘community relations’ as well as the considerable success achieved.96  
Station Commanders in 2nd TAF had appointed Press Liaison Officers 
(PLO’s) at twenty-nine units within Western Germany, at two units in Holland 
and one in Belgium by December 1956. Under authority of the Air Ministry, the 
Commander-in-Chief laid down for all units in 2nd TAF a programme of public 
relations work, the main tasks of which were community relations, news supply, 
press visits and inquiries. The aim was to stimulate ‘community relations’ activity 
between the RAF and the local population under the guidance of the Station 
Commander and to see that such activity received the maximum possible 
publicity by obtaining coverage on a national level and by keeping the local 
press informed by providing them with facilities to report the activity. 
The review of these initiatives showed ‘most encouraging’ results. It 
showed that many station commanders devoted serious study to the problem of 
maintaining good relations with the local population and introduced positive 
policies that had helped improve existing relations. According to the paper the 
RAF in Europe had several tasks apart from its operational role and therefore 
had to ensure collaboration and support of the local population in order to 
safeguard its ability to carry out its operational role. This task was:  
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particularly onerous in Germany where the military foreigner is bound to 
be a major target in the Election battle. We would, of course, have no 
justification whatever for interfering in internal affairs. But we have a 
perfect right to watch that we are not drawn into German politics to our 
own, or NATO’s, disadvantage.97   
 
The review indicated that most progress was made in the field of community 
relations and least advancement in press activity. This was problematic as 
‘doing the good deed is only half-completing the job. It must be seen to be done, 
in other words publicised.’98 
 The RAF scheme to improve relations continued for a year and was 
reviewed twice. The first half-year review of the Press Liaison Officer 
organisation, circulated in July 1956, had indicated that for a scheme which had 
never before been operated in Germany, the results had been encouraging. 
Where units had taken positive action there had been a worthwhile gain. 
However, only thirteen out of twenty-two units had attempted any community 
relations activity and only six of those had seriously tried to achieve publicity for 
their efforts. Only seven out of twenty-two units had made any effort to inform 
Command Information Office regularly of their activities. Seventeen units had 
established a drill for handling press visits and local inquiries and nine of them 
had earned the praise of the press for these arrangements. Overall the 
efficiency of the scheme could not be assessed at higher than forty per cent. 
The first review drew attention to the fact that a unit’s efficiency in public 
relations depended on the personal interest taken by the station commander as 
well as the quality of his PLO. It had become clear that energy and enthusiasm 
were the most important qualities of a PLO and that some were not properly 
representing their stations:  
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The review concluded that if the aim was to be improvement the units 
would clearly have to appraise their own performances, where necessary 
re-orientate their views and change their PLO’s.99  
 
 The twenty-nine units in Western Germany were then assessed again for 
the second period of six months on the same basis. Now twenty-eight units 
conducted some form of community relations activity and sixteen of them 
informed Command Information Office of special events so that publicity on a 
national scale could be achieved. In the first period of review there had been no 
‘outstanding’ performances. During the second period there were nine 
‘outstanding’ performances. Twenty units had now established a drill for 
handling press visits. The scheme was now working at sixty per cent efficiency. 
One of the lessons drawn from the initiative was that although the first need for 
units was to get on well with the German population in their immediate 
neighbourhood, there was a much wider market for news of local activity than 
units realised. Furthermore the Command Information Office and the British 
Embassy’s Information Service could utilise local news of unit activity on the 
national level to help bolster up the general picture of Anglo-German relations.  
 The report contained revealing comments from unit commanders giving 
reasons for lack of contacts with the Germans. Sometimes this was simply due 
to the distance of the camp from the nearest large town, where in fact the 
distance accounted for the absence of friction over the noise problem. Others 
noted signs of improvement due to ‘a modest beginning in press work’. Some 
responses in fact pointed out the German population’s unwillingness to improve 
relations. The station commander at Bückeburg commented that:  
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individually, at officer and airman level, there are good local relationships. 
But the unit effort as a whole to get response from the population has had 
an apathetic reception.100  
 
At times the RAF unit commanders’ main problem was indeed the British Army 
due to the ‘tendency of population to include RAF personnel among those 
responsible for isolated incidents of misbehaviour by Soldiers or Americans’. 
There were also reports of failed efforts regarding press activity ‘after experience 
of distortion of material’ in regards to a bombing range used as a political issue 
in local elections. The majority of comments did however report an improvement 
of relations due to personal social contacts as well as sporting fixtures. 
Comments ranged from there being ‘no real problems other than the difference 
of language’ to ‘hitherto official contacts have been on a formal if not frigid basis. 
There are now encouraging signs that certain institutions […] are showing an 
increased interest in the station’. One unit commented, that: 
 
relations, which are now very good, have improved materially during the 
last twelve months, principally because RAF authorities have made every 
endeavour to understand local difficulties over land requisitioning and to 
ease them.101 
 
Comments by the station commandant of the coastal town of Jever, 
consistently the best-performing throughout the initiative, were also very 
encouraging. Apparently relations with the local press were very good as they 
had been invited to cover some of the main happenings on the station and were 
also supplied with material. This resulted in considerable publicity. There also 
had been a marked improvement between unit and local population over the 
twelve month period in question:  
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One has the comfortable feeling that for peacetime routine one can rely 
on the co-operation of local inhabitants to the same degree as one can in 
the UK. There is no doubt that station activity in regards to publicity and 
good community relations has paid a handsome dividend. The station has 
aroused some feeling of local pride in their local NATO base.102  
 
According to the station commander it was the NATO angle which should be 
pressed as very many locals appeared to get immense satisfaction from learning 
that the base was a NATO rather than a British one. The example of Jever 
demonstrated that a concerted and persistent effort on the part of the British 
could lead to a significant improvement of relations with the local population, 
even if the Germans had to contend with aircraft noise. 
 The initiative also pointed out areas for further improvement. The task of 
developing good relations ‘should have more official recognition’. The task of 
preparing translations from local papers, dealing with reports, handling press 
visitors and answering numerous queries could not be accomplished as a part-
time job. The PLO commitment was rising and it should not be viewed in 
isolation from the many secondary duties existing for officers. The job of the 
PLO was indeed a secondary one on top of a normal routine job. Sometimes it 
was not the only secondary job and in some cases the PLO was also the unit 
commander. One PLO was acting at the time as CO, Adjutant and Accountant 
Officer. Another was Education Officer, Official Interpreter, Station Translator 
and had several other secondary duties to perform.103 According to the 
Laarbruch RAF unit commander, more encouragement was also needed for 
personnel to learn German. Of course the language barrier played an important 
part. The report outlined that, out of twenty-eight PLO’s, thirteen had ‘a 
smattering of German’, three others spoke the language well, another two were 
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of interpreter standard, one deputy PLO was a qualified interpreter and nine had 
no knowledge of the language at all. Considering all officers and airmen in 
Western Germany at the time, roughly twelve per cent of officers and five per 
cent of airmen spoke some German. Improving on these figures proved difficult 
as Officers and airmen were reluctant to learn the language without an incentive. 
Small units were in a better position here, as the men were ‘forced on to the 
German market for their entertainment’. The percentage of German speakers in 
small RAF units was significantly higher than on large stations. 104  
In order to further improve relations, ease the workload of PLOs as well 
as overcome the language barrier, unit PLO’s were encouraged to make as 
much use as possible of their nearest Joint Services Liaison Officer (JSLO). The 
JSLO were to be used for establishing contacts for community activities and for 
press activity. Headquarters, JSLO in Bonn had agreed that its twenty five 
officers in the field should assist RAF public relations in every way possible. The 
JSLO had much experience of the local scene and excellent contacts. They 
furthermore spoke German and had a direct liaison with British Information 
Services representatives in the field. The report however pointed out the 
enormous variations between units when it came to the frequency of contacts 
with JSLO’s. One unit said their contact was ‘daily’, two said it was ‘weekly’, five 
replied ‘fortnightly’, ten said ‘monthly’, four ‘quarterly’, one ‘annually’ and two 
units said they had never met their JSLO.105 The main reason for the lack of 
contact was the great distance of the JSLO from the unit.106 
 The comments of unit commanders provide an insight into the very large 
variety of attempts and activities undertaken by at least some local RAF units. 
These ranged from football matches between English and German teams, the 
joining of local sports clubs by service personnel, to the activities of ‘the Wives 
Club’ in Schleswigland. The club organised the adoption of orphans and 
collections for local elderly and needy people. All units concentrated on the 
                                                             
104 NA, FO 953/1791, p. 9. 
105 NA, FO 953/1791, p. 9. 
106 NA, FO 953/1791, p. 7 
185 
 
smaller community relations activities, such as sports, religious services, Anglo-
German club meetings, school visits and organised tours. Experience had 
shown that these events could take place regularly and thus keep the 
relationship going. Units were encouraged to invite the local press to cover 
functions which might be of interest. It was quickly found out that routine activity 
such as inter-section sport held no interest and units concentrated on sending 
out invitations to main events. 
 In the field of RAF relations with the press the initiative also resulted in 
improvements. In the six months period observed by the report German local 
newspapers printed a total of 157 articles and news stories, many of them 
illustrated, as a result of the facilities and information material offered by the 
PLO’s. In addition, Command Information Office used all of the material 
collected by PLO’s in their publicity services and was able to obtain sixty 
mentions in the larger German papers as a result. A questionnaire asked PLO’s 
and station commanders to report frankly on the success or otherwise of their 
activity since the PLO scheme had been launched a year earlier. Ten PLO’s 
said they had noticed an improvement in relations with the local press. Out of 
twelve who reported that relations were ‘good’, six said that regular contact was 
being maintained in both directions. Six assured relations as ‘fair’, eleven 
confessed they were ‘indifferent’. Thirteen station commanders had noticed an 
improvement in relations with the local population in the last year. Of fourteen 
who assessed relations as ‘good’, ten reported that contact with the locals was 
regular. Six station commanders rated relations as ‘fair’ and six as 
‘indifferent’.107 
 In regards to future challenges for the relations between Services and 
Germans, the report highlighted the fact that ‘certain political groups’ would 
endeavour, in the months leading up to the 1957 General Election in Germany, 
to make the Forces as unpopular as possible. The NATO programme in general, 
and the task which 2nd TAF was seeking to carry out, could not be effective 
                                                             




unless it had the support and acceptance of the local population. Therefore it 
was essential to continue to strive for the best relationship with the population 
and counter every attempt to undermine it.  According to the report the 
community relations aspect of the PLO scheme was gathering momentum. What 
was needed now was a concerted effort to counter adverse press reports. The 
British Embassy had already concerned itself about adverse press reports, and 
a drill had been agreed under which British Information Services and the JSLO 
would co-operate in countering such reports. This was, however, not something 
they could often do on their own as they required access to the facts. Inevitably 
this entailed more effective and swifter liaison with units, as it was often 
ineffective trying to correct something which had been printed days or weeks 
before. The report provided a positive example of press liaison: on the night of 
11 January 1957, the German press agency (Deutsche Presse Agentur) 
broadcast a report which said that a British single-engined, swept-wing jet 
aircraft from the airfield at Weeze-Laarbruch had flown into high tension cables 
near a farm at Wesel at 1541 hours with the result that the towns of Emmerich, 
Kleve, Bocholt and Rees-Geldern had been completely blacked out. This report 
was picked up at 2nd TAF within an hour of its broadcast and two hours later, 
after a check round the command, it was possible to issue a denial that the 
aircraft was British or from Laarbruch or in fact any other unit in Germany. The 
Deutsche Presse Agentur then amended their report and referred to an 
unidentified aircraft from outside Germany. The newspapers on 12 January 
carried the correct story. As a result the politicians of four towns were not able to 
say their night of discomfort was the penalty of harbouring 2nd TAF. 108 
 In a case of this type requiring immediate action, the burden fell entirely 
on the Services, which had the great advantage of being able to guarantee 
action at all times of the day and night. According to the report the clue to the 
whole situation was to spot the adverse criticism at birth or even to anticipate it. 
British Information Services and the JSLO took between them a certain number 
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of German newspapers and had been charged with the duty of hunting out 
adverse comment and notifying those concerned. However, there were many 
small papers which they did not read, hence the advisability of units themselves 
seeing that this gap in press coverage was closed. In addition, there was also 
the advantage of maintaining regular contact with the staff of local papers. The 
review had shown that in places good press relations had been developed to the 
point where the unit was consulted in advance to ensure accuracy of facts. 
 Cooperation of all British Services was essential for an improvement of 
relations. In order to extend the effectiveness of community relations, it was 
essential that PLO’s were informed about activities by all branches of a unit. All 
of this information could then be used in the publicity services of Command 
Information Office, which transferred material over the German national 
networks and through British Information Services, and via agencies to Holland 
and Belgium and if the story was good enough via Air Ministry to the press all 
over the UK. All of this information could be telephoned to Command 
Information Office day or night as the office functioned twenty four hours 
including weekends and holidays. The only material a PLO had to write up was 
what was acceptable locally. Visits of local schools and any routine activity 
which would probably not bring a pressman up to the unit were to be written up 
briefly, translated into German, and delivered speedily to the local press. It was 
almost certain of inclusion and told the whole population what otherwise only 
those in the visiting party experienced.109 This RAF initiative proved that a 
systematic and long-term effort provided tangible results. It furthermore 
underlined the importance of the issue of Anglo-German relations despite or 
rather because of Cold War tensions. 
 At times British officers expressed the view to German authorities that 
their efforts at improving Anglo-German relations were rather one-sided. The 
British Information Services in Bonn pointed out to the Federal Press Agency in 
Bonn that unit commanders had given a great deal of thought to the question of 
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Anglo-German relations as well as the formation of Anglo-German committees 
between military authorities and prominent personalities. At least in the Iserlohn 
area it appeared that it was now up to the local German authorities to ‘help a bit 





This chapter has outlined some of the conditions encountered by the British 
Services in Germany that influenced Anglo-German relations in the towns and 
cities with British garrisons. The total management of the everyday social 
activities and social relations of the British serviceman with the locals was 
impossible, and every so often, tensions came to the fore. For many Servicemen 
Anglo-German relations were not a high priority. Isolated and self-contained 
garrisons, the language barrier and reluctance to interact with the former enemy 
were some of the reasons for this. The tension of the Cold War, boredom and 
alcohol also often prevented more cordial relations. However, this reluctance to 
explore Germany and meet its inhabitants was not universal and throughout the 
period in question at least a small change in attitude among some troops was 
apparent. This was however not enough in the eyes of the British Foreign Office 
as the next chapter will show. 
Whereas chapter four has established that, by the end of the period 
under observation here, the German authorities were not unduly concerned 
about the impact of troop behaviour on Anglo-German relations, this chapter 
demonstrated that, at least from the perspective of the British administration, 
there was ample reason for concern. It is evident that the British Services made 
some efforts to improve relations with the Germans. Particularly the RAF 
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demonstrated that organised, long-term initiatives could have a significant 
impact on community relations, once the Federal Republic had regained its 
sovereignty. A combination of frequent contacts with the local communities and 
press relations led to the desired outcome in a number of cases. Several of the 
RAF units examined managed to strengthen Anglo-German relations and foster 
the sentiment in local communities that Germany was a part of the NATO 
defence against communism. However, there were also rather more negative 
examples and, as this chapter has shown, a number of constraints meant that 
Army units generally did not make the necessary efforts to improve relations 
prior to 1955. Naturally this lack of initiative did not escape the Foreign Office in 
London, where the strengthening of Anglo-German ties was considered vital. 
The BAOR was to play a part in this, particularly after 1955. The following 
chapter will therefore turn to the British administration’s view of the problems 
involved, beginning with the view of the British Foreign Office of the BAOR and 





Chapter Six: The British Administration in Germany and the BAOR 
 
 






This statement by a British official employed in the Information Services 
Department of the British Foreign Office in Bonn, made as late as March 1956, 
is in many respects exemplary for the views on the British Army by members of 
the civilian British administrative staff in Germany as well as London. The 
assumption made here does however also raise further questions in regards to 
the relationship between the British Foreign Office and the BAOR.  
Whereas the previous chapter focused on the obstacles in the way of 
better relations from the perspective of the BAOR, this chapter will evaluate the 
efforts of the BAOR as seen from Whitehall. This issue lies at the heart of this 
thesis, as the Foreign Office was the driving force behind the attempts to change 
BAOR attitudes. As established in chapter two, the potential opportunities for re-
education of the Germans, as well as better Anglo-German relations offered by 
the stationing of British troops in Germany, had been realised in London very 
early on after the war and certainly in the run-up to the establishment of the 
Federal Republic. The potential threat that the BAOR posed to a better 
understanding with an increasingly independent Federal Republic became 
evident by the time the Paris Agreements regarding German sovereignty were 
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signed in 1952. Hence, it is important to analyse how the Foreign Office 
attempted to influence both the BAOR as well as the Germans during this 
period.  
The near-complete restoration of German sovereignty, and the 
acceptance of Germany as a full NATO member in 1955, again had a 
substantial impact on Anglo-German affairs on all levels. It was arguably this 
transformation which the Foreign Office was most concerned about when 
considering the Services. Relations between the civilian and military sides of the 
British presence also require scrutiny, as these were not always without frictions. 
This chapter will consequently examine the view of the BAOR as seen from the 
various levels of the British administration in the run-up to and immediately after 
the restoration of German sovereignty. This involves the Foreign Office in 
London, the Military Government and High Commission in Germany, the staff at 
Land Commissioners offices as well as the judgment of the BAOR by British 
Resident Officers in local German communities. Due to its liaising role between 
the BAOR and the German authorities, a close inspection of the relationship 
between the civilian British administration and its German counterpart is also 
essential. Similar to its German equivalent, the Foreign Office initiated a wide 
range of measures designed to aid the transformation of the BAOR from an 
occupation to an allied force and made large-scale efforts on all levels to 
improve the standing of the Services with the German population. This chapter 
will assess these measures and address the essential question of whether by 
the end of the period in question, the Foreign Office deemed the BAOR able to 
effectively adapt its rationale to serve its new policy purposes.  
       
 
The Information Services Division and the BAOR 
 
The various Foreign Office departments involved in liaising between the BAOR 
and the Germans rigorously monitored developments in Germany due to fear of 
negative incidents and publicity causing a widespread anti-British mood in 
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Germany. The Services in Germany were even provided with what could be 
described as their own ‘public relations department’ – the Information Services 
Division of the Foreign Office (ISD). The Information Services Division of the 
British High Commission for Germany had developed from the former Public 
Relations and Information Services Branch of the British Control Commission. 
Among other tasks this department was increasingly responsible for monitoring 
and improving the standing of the Services in Germany and influencing the 
German media in order to avoid negative publicity. As one Information Services 
memorandum of 1952 stated, Her Majesty’s Government:  
 
maintained in Western Germany the cream of the British Army as well as 
a large contingent of Royal Air Force and some naval forces. The security 
of these forces, as well as their effectiveness in the discharge of their 
duties, depended upon a friendly and co-operative German population.2  
 
Information Services were very much aware that, whatever the label placed on 
these forces, their very presence in strength and the problems caused thereby 
inevitably provided plenty of opportunities for friction with the local population. 
One of the main tasks of the Information Services Division was to monitor and 
influence the attitude of the German press due to its impact on the opinion of 
German citizens:  
 
Hardly a day passed but some local newspaper printed a story of damage 
to crops, motor accidents, requisitioning and the like, mostly unimportant 
affairs which nevertheless contribute to a growing feeling of asperity on 
the part of the local Germans.3  
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The importance of the ISD increased throughout the period in question as 
the reputation of the BAOR in Germany became ever more important after the 
conclusion of contractual relations and the end of the Occupation in 1955. The 
Federal Republic regained most of the rights of sovereign states and direct 
British influence was therefore significantly reduced at the very moment when 
communist propaganda in Germany intensified and concentrated on the 
presence of foreign troops on German soil. The ISD effectively anticipated a 
deterioration of Anglo-German relations after 1955 due to the presence of the 
BAOR in a Federal Republic with renewed confidence.  
As established in chapter three, there were a number of German 
grievances against the BAOR potentially souring Anglo-German relations. 
However, the ISD predicted further trouble as British troops themselves posed a 
potential threat to relations if economic measures were to: 
  
affect seriously the amenities of the British troops, as the attitude of the 
latter to the Germans may well deteriorate and the situation become even 
more serious.4  
 
In the eyes of the Information Services, the economic recovery of the Federal 
Republic, while aiding the incorporation of West Germany into the Western 
alliance system, posed a significant risk to relations on the ground. While the 
public relations officers dealt with local matters affecting the fighting services, 
the Information Services were thus left with the important task of explaining the 
general policy requiring the presence of troops, maintaining German morale and 
preventing local friction from turning into widespread hostility.5 The Foreign 
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Office in London, as well as the staff on the ground in Germany, had clearly 
identified a significant number of potential threats to contain in order to avoid 
conflict between Germans and British Servicemen and the potentially disastrous 
consequences for Anglo-German relations and European defence. The 
Information Services Division was to play a significant role here. 
Although the tasks of the Information Services Division in Germany were 
largely the same as those of other British Information Offices in other overseas 
missions, in many respects the situation in Germany differed from that in other 
countries with a British diplomatic presence. Once again, pessimistic British 
predictions of future attitudes of a sovereign German state permeated views on 
all levels of the Foreign Office. This led to increasing demands to change the 
attitude of the BAOR. This interpretation was held to be of relevance at the 
highest levels as demonstrated by a despatch from the British High 
Commissioner Sir Ivone Kirkpatrick to the Foreign Secretary Anthony Eden, 
dated 9 June 1952. This paper pointed out the special conditions the Information 
Services had to deal with in regards to the BAOR and the Germans. Relations 
between the UK and Western Germany in the political and commercial spheres, 
and in the sphere of defence-co-operation, had obviously been ‘of a special 
character’, and were likely to remain so for some time to come. In the view of the 
High Commissioner there were furthermore a number of distinct factors, of 
which the most important was ‘the presence in Western Germany of very large 
British Forces’.6 Moreover, the increased sovereignty of Germany resulting from 
the Paris Agreements brought with it a decrease in British administrative staff in 
the British zone. The large staffs previously headed by Land Commissioners 
had been considerably reduced, and would be further reduced when the latter 
no longer existed as such. Whereas the number of Resident Officers was also 
being reduced, the numbers and duties of the British officials remaining in 
Germany were likely to remain respectively greater and more specialised 
(especially in the sense that they entailed more involvement in internal German 
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matters) than those of the Consular staffs subordinate to the normal diplomatic 
mission. The Information Services were therefore a crucial element in the British 
strategy to improve Anglo-German relations. The value of Information Services 
was furthermore highlighted as the German Education and Information 
Department was a more flexible and specialised source of material than was 
available to the equivalent staff at other missions.7  
A significant problem for the Information Services Division’s attempt for 
better relationships with Germans was the necessity to adopt a tripartite position 
on most important questions affecting German public opinion which brought 
obvious disadvantages. It remained necessary to follow a common line with the 
Americans, whose efforts in the information and cultural fields were ‘greater in 
Germany than in any other country’.8 Furthermore the lack of anything 
resembling a centralised national press in Germany with some 1,000 
newspapers of varying size and importance as well as the presence of a large 
number of foreign, especially of British journalists, permanently assigned to 
Western Germany had to be taken into account. These special conditions had 
led to the adoption of organisations and methods different in scope and in scale 
from those found in other countries to carry out the common objective of 
extending the range of diplomatic action ‘by direct stimulation of the responsible 
public opinion of the country concerned’.9 
The Foreign Office considered the ISD valuable due to its effective 
contribution to the diminution of criticism of British policy, and the creation of 
greater understanding and acceptance of the aims of British policy. The 
potentialities of personal contacts were not limited to Information, Cultural or 
Educational Officers, but extended to all British personnel in Germany, including 
especially many Resident Officers and Army Officers, who had dealings with 
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Germans. Information Services division was to make as much use as possible of 
this indirect means of approach.10  
The ISD itself considered its goals in Germany to be both short-term as 
well as long-term. In the short run, the department concentrated on discovering 
the points of tension in the relationships between Great Britain and Germany 
and, ‘by judicious projection and influence on important people, aimed to 
decrease that tension’.11 In the long run, the ISD task was to build up the 
prestige of British policy so as to create for Britain a position of respect which 
would be useful when negotiating on any particular issue. The means to achieve 
this were increasingly limited. As early as 1952 the ISD lamented that in dealing 
with the newly established democratic Germany: 
 
the use of armaments was precluded by the general line of British policy 
as well as international obligations. Economic or financial pressure was 
also no longer possible due to the weakened economic position of 
Britain.12 
  
The success of British diplomacy in dealing with Germany therefore now 
increasingly depended to a very large extent upon the sympathy and 
understanding for British policy which could be built up in Germany and the 
general prestige in which Britain and British institutions were held. This would be 
particularly important after the entry into force of the Contractual Agreements, 
when the Occupying Powers would have abandoned their privileged positions 
                                                             
10 NA, FO 953/1285, Despatch Kirkpatrick to Eden, 9 June 1952.  
11 NA, FO 953/1285, Report on ISD role in Germany, R. Chaput de Saintonge, 
16 May 1952. 
12 NA, FO 953/1285, Report on ISD role in Germany, R. Chaput de Saintonge, 
16 May 1952. 
197 
 
and power.13 Once German rearmament was under way, the BAOR was to be 
used to maintain the essential controls on German militarism: 
 
The more we can influence the German Army the more likely we shall be 
to succeed. In Rhine Army we have the perfect instrument to hand. […] 
Perhaps the most important peace-time task of Rhine Army is the 
cultivation of close relations with the new German forces.14 
 
 There was an acute awareness in the Foreign Office that British powers 
to influence German opinion were waning at the same time as the largest British 
presence in Germany was that of the BAOR, whose attitudes were considered 
ambivalent at best. British administrative staff and the ISD were useful in 
furthering unofficial contacts and influencing the German press but, particularly 
after 1955, it undoubtedly appeared easier to at least certain sections of the 
Foreign Office to influence the BAOR rather than the Germans.  
 
 
Foreign Office Initiatives to improve Relations 
 
Just as its German counterpart, the Foreign Office regularly aimed print 
publications at British Service personnel in order to further the understanding of 
British soldiers of German culture and customs. In common with so many other 
efforts, this practice began when it became increasingly clear that the western 
zones of Germany would soon merge into a semi-sovereign state. The CCG 
Background Letter, initially only aimed at CCG officials was the first of this kind. 
To keep members of the widely dispersed Control Commission in Germany 
abreast of current developments in the country and in order to enable them to 
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speak with one voice in their contacts with Germans, the Background Letter was 
produced by the Information Services Division. Appearing approximately three 
times a week, it aimed at providing a comprehensive picture of British and Allied 
policy in Germany against the background of the changing political scene. 
Although originally published for members of the Control Commission only, the 
Background Letter found its way to an increasing extent into the Army Education 
Service, and by 1952 half of the total circulation of 2,500 copies was taken by 
the BAOR. This aspect of the Background Letter was regarded as of continuing, 
even increasing, importance. In addition, it proved very popular with British and 
Allied correspondents and therefore provided a means to influence press 
comment on British policy.15 
Rather than merely changing Army attitudes, the Foreign Office 
increasingly also aimed at eradicating the main German grievances, if 
necessary, against the will of the BAOR. As highlighted in chapter four, the issue 
of requisitioning of housing was hugely unpopular among the German 
population. The changing nature of the status of the FRG had a considerable 
impact on this issue and due to the extensive use of German housing and land 
the Services were increasingly required to go to astonishing lengths in order to 
minimise German ill-will. For example, a project in the town of Herford in 1951 
forced a British garrison to share its requisitioned houses with German families – 
a measure unthinkable in 1945, and certainly one not popular with all Officers in 
1951.  
In terms of housing shortages, Herford was a typical example of a 
German town. From November 1944 onwards Herford had suffered heavy air 
raid damage. Herford had a shunting yard and a bridge and garrisoned two 
thousand German soldiers to defend the nearby Autobahn, making it a 
‘defended city’ according to Nazi propaganda.16 The marshalling yards at 
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Herford were targeted by the US Eighth Air Force in November 1944 during a 
raid involving over 1,800 bombers.17 Despite the heavy bomb damage there was 
a considerable number of refugees. This did however not stop the CCG from 
requisitioning a substantial number of properties in order to establish its own 
administration. Due to the disbandment of the local CCG administration in 1951, 
the Army took over 257 requisitioned houses in Herford to accommodate an 
armoured car division. However, due to German pressure, as well as the 
consent of the British Land Commissioner in Düsseldorf, ‘the great moment had 
arrived for the carrying out of the Herford Plan’.18 
Sixty properties in Herford were being used as shared accommodation 
between German civilians and British officers with their families. The German 
conservative daily newspaper Die Welt reported on the mixed results of the 
Anglo-German project designed to alleviate some of the housing shortages. 
Each party had one storey, only the front door and garden were shared. 
According to the report, ‘they get on wonderfully together. They say ‘good 
morning’ and ‘good evening’ to each other’.19 However, there were another thirty 
houses which had been lived in by their former German inhabitants for several 
months, while the storey reserved for the officer’s family stood empty. This, 
according to one German originator of the Herford Plan, was due to the 
unwillingness of the officers to live under the same roof with Germans: ‘The act 
of goodwill is in danger.’20 The scheme itself was proof of the intense efforts 
undertaken by the High Commission to improve housing conditions for the 
Germans and therefore improve Anglo-German relations, whereas the refusal of 
officers on the ground pointed towards the difficulties of implementing these 
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measures. The fact that about thirty officers simply refused to move in arguably 
also suggests a class issue rather than only a nationalistic one.21  
 The Army unit involved refused to take the blame for the partial failure of 
the scheme and negative press comments. The cooperation between the British 
and local German officials on the Herford Plan was, according to a British 
Colonel in charge, rather difficult and frustrating for the British side:  
 
The trouble with these Germans is that they never give any credit for 
concessions we have made. The word ‘compromise’ does not exist in the 
German language. They expect that we should give way to every request 
they make on compassionate grounds quite regardless of our own needs, 
and, whenever we do settle any compassionate cases, a couple more 
come out of the bag as a matter of routine.22 
 
According to the report, the Services, as a result of the Herford Plan, were also 
now in control of only three quarters of the living quarters required for other 
ranks. The Herford Plan, envisaged as an opportunity for the BAOR to 
demonstrate its willingness to improve Anglo-German relations, instead 
highlighted the anti-German attitudes of at least a significant minority of British 
officers. Despite a partial success in eradicating some of the worst housing 
problems in the town the anti-British elements of the German press evidently 
made use of this issue. 
 Requisitioned property remained a difficult issue for the British authorities: 
many Army officers were accused not only by the Germans but also by the 
British civilian administration of not caring about property rights, or ever 
remembering that the accommodation they occupied belonged to someone. The 
apparent remedy for all these problems as proclaimed by the British High 
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Commissioner appeared simple – behave in Germany as you would behave 
anywhere else: 
 
If this could be drummed into the Service mind, and they would develop a 
common standard of behaving here exactly as they would behave in their 
own country, ninety-nine per cent of the frictions that are constantly 
breaking out would be done away with.23  
 
It is evident that as negotiators between the Services and the German 
population at least some of the Residents and Commissioners were 
exasperated about British rather than German attitudes. In the eyes of the 
Deputy Commissioner the satisfaction of the Services’ demands was going to 
become increasingly difficult, and the atmosphere in which those demands 
would be negotiated was ‘capable of being greatly improved’, if the Services, 
once they had lost the support of the Control Commission, had adjusted 
themselves to the new conditions.24 
Due to the unsatisfactory Army attitude towards the Germans, the Office 
of the Services Relations Adviser in Bonn produced a ‘basic brief’ on the object 
and role of the British Armed Forces in Germany in February 1954.25 Once more 
the main reason provided for this was the concern of the British High 
Commissioner and the British Commander-in-Chief in Germany to make known 
to Commanders of Service Units:  
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the gradual change that is taking place in the political situation in 
Germany and in the relationship of the Occupying Forces with the 
Germans.26 
 
This again referred to the almost complete emancipation of the FRG from Allied 
control due to the Bonn Treaty. In March 1954 a pamphlet was printed and 
copies were distributed to all British Unit Commanders and British Residents as 
well as Canadian troops as it was to be of use for the ‘process of indoctrination’ 
of newly arrived Unit Commanders.27 The pamphlet, simply named Anglo-
German Relations, briefly explained the political developments in Germany 
since 1945. It went on to highlight the fundamental change of role and status of 
the Forces in Germany. The Services’ role had gradually moved away from that 
of an occupation army and instrument of Military Government towards that of an 
army stationed by agreement with the government of an ally. According to the 
pamphlet the:  
 
Germans are well aware of the benefits which the new situation […] will 
bring them [and] they are eager to enjoy these benefits, and there is at 
the present time, therefore, a special need for both sides to exercise 
patience and forbearance in order to avoid prejudicing future 
relationships.28  
 
The document also pointed out the increasing importance of relations 
between the Services and the German population at the time of the rapidly 
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growing independence of the FRG. Being welcomed by the German people was 
an important factor for the morale of the troops as well as allowing effective 
fulfilment of the Services’ role in an emergency. According to Anglo-German 
Relations the preservation of good relations depended largely on the avoidance 
of incidents which could lead to misunderstanding or resentment on either side. 
Although no specific cases were mentioned, most of these incidents apparently 
occurred due to a lack of appreciation of the true conditions in Germany. The 
pamphlet described British and Germans as: 
  
two different people who have different viewpoints, especially with regard 
to the war and the Occupation, and who not think or act on precisely the 
same lines.29 
 
This allowed for the creation of conditions in which comparatively small 
happenings could be magnified beyond reason and cause repercussions out of 
all proportion to their real importance. Much therefore depended on the proper 
instruction of the individual officer, soldier and airman in regards to the occurring 
changes as well as underlying politics and principles involved in order to avoid 
incidents30.  Furthermore soldiers should be instructed not only on how to avoid 
incidents but also about the repercussion they potentially cause, as the fact 
remained that the Services stationed in Germany ‘have to live and work side by 
side with the German people’.31  
The Services, armed with advice from the High Commission, were 
therefore increasingly bearing the sole responsibility for ensuring good relations 
with the Germans throughout the British zone. According to the pamphlet all 
Commanders, regardless of the size of their unit, had a duty in this matter and 
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were required to seek advice either from Residents or Land Commissioners 
before making any decision affecting either German authorities or people. 
Moreover all Unit Commanders had to obtain real knowledge of factors involved 
rather than simply carrying out military duties in a prescribed manner. The 
responsibility of ensuring the smooth transformation of the Occupation regime to 
a non-occupation status was firmly being placed with the Unit Commanders of 
the Services. The question remained how willing and well-suited they were to 
carry out this duty. The pamphlet made it very clear that as late as 1954 the 
Foreign Office considered relations between BAOR and the Germans to be 
unsatisfactory and in need of improvement. With less than a year until German 
sovereignty further measures were needed to prevent BAOR from turning into a 
major liability. 
The Foreign Office was acutely aware of the German dissatisfaction over 
manoeuvre damage as highlighted in chapter four. Once again, the BAOR had 
to readjust to the change in diplomatic relations between London and Bonn. 
Once the FRG was established, the issue of damage to German roads and 
property caused by BAOR manoeuvres led to far more concern in London than 
one might expect. The resulting changes required of British troops when training 
in Germany were drastic and undoubtedly unpopular with Service personnel. 
Servicemen now had to behave in a courteous manner and avoid any 
unnecessary damage when driving their armoured vehicles through German 
towns. The damage compensation procedure for victims of manoeuvre damage 
was continuously improved to prevent anger. Kreis Residents and Land 
Commissioners in Germany constantly dealt with claims made by German 
civilians, ranging from illegal hunting by British troops in private forests to entire 
houses being burnt down by British verey flares.32  
As was noted in chapter four, there was a distinct fear among 
‘responsible and reasonable’ Germans, as well as British Residents, that 
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extremism in political feeling was engendered by manoeuvre damage. Evidence 
of wilful damage being caused by the Services threatened to exacerbate the 
situation.33 It is important to note, however, that this fear was certainly shared in 
much higher political circles in London. This was demonstrated by a lengthy 
correspondence between the Office of the British High Commissioner, the War 
Office and the Foreign Office in regards to manoeuvre damage caused in Lower 
Saxony in August 1953. As this had occurred during harvest time, the result had 
been an outcry by farmers and the German press. Mr W.M.F. Vane, a 
Conservative Member of Parliament and member of the Anglo-German 
Association, had become aware of the Lower Saxony Land Government’s 
concern over unnecessary damage by Allied troops and the fear that 
representations about this through normal channels would take too long. He 
therefore decided to take up the matter with the Foreign Office directly. This 
caused a considerable stir and led to a flurry of activity. Not only had manoeuvre 
damage increased compared to previous years due to additional numbers of 
troops to be trained as well as a larger scope of training: 
  
To this natural factor for increased agitation must also be added the 
political factor of the forthcoming Federal Elections.34  
 
There was an underlying fear that the BAOR could severely damage the 
prospects of the pro-western Adenauer government to stay in power and 
strengthen both the KPD as well as right-wing splinter parties in the FRG. The 
British Cabinet grew increasingly concerned over the instability of the German 
government due to CDU losses in local elections and by the emergence of the 
Refugee Party, ‘a focus for unhealthy nationalist and irredentist tendencies’. 
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There was furthermore the brief but unsettling rise of the ‘semi-Nazi Socialist 
Reich Party’.35 These found very fertile ground for anti-British agitation, as the 
compensation for damage was not paid by the British government, but came out 
of Occupation costs, in other words was paid for by the German taxpayer. The 
total amount of compensation paid for training damages on only one major 
training area for the financial year ending in March 1953 amounted to around 3.7 
million Deutschmark.36  
Unsurprisingly therefore, the fear of causing any unnecessary 
antagonism prior to the elections led to a concerned letter from the War Office to 
British troops in Germany, photographic evidence being examined by the 
Ministry of Defence37 as well as an explanatory letter from the High 
Commissioner’s Office to the Foreign Office in order to provide adequate 
material ‘with which to reply to […] any other Members of Parliament who may 
make similar enquiries’.38 Furthermore, other strategies to minimise or at least 
localise discontent were taken:  
 
By using one general (training) area, the agitation, though intensive in 
that area, is localised, whereas otherwise it would be widespread and 
therefore more embarrassing.39 
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A number of strategies were now employed in order to minimise German 
resentment of the Services. Tensions over manoeuvre damage between the 
Services and the local German inhabitants in some areas ran so high that press 
conferences were now held before the beginning of manoeuvres in order to 
assure the population. A memorandum of 1952 in regards to a press conference 
concerning the Reinsehlen area of Niedersachsen stated that if the ‘assurances 
are carried out by all formations’: 
 
it is possible that there may be considerable easing of the tension which 
has prevailed in the past in this area as a result of training damage; if not, 
there will be adverse comments and accusations of bad faith.40 
 
Emotions ran high and the issue was frequently dealt with by the highest political 
circles in Bonn and London.  By 1953 the Foreign Office considered that:  
 
the damage caused in Lower Saxony has been, as in previous years, 
exaggerated and made the subject of political propaganda by the 
irresponsible local press and by agitators of the extreme left and right. It 
has also been the occasion for electioneering statements by Federal 
Ministers and a personal approach by the Chancellor to the High 
Commissioner.41 
 
Nonetheless, in the view of the High Commission every possible measure to 
minimise damage by the Army had to be undertaken. A quick system of 
repayment had been introduced and even positive measures like the 
employment of special mobile repair teams equipped with road mending 
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machinery had been taken. The point had been reached at which any further 
restrictions imposed on the troops would largely destroy the training value of the 
exercises they were required to carry out.42 The High Commission kept a close 
watch on this question and with the approach of the 1953 elections the German 
outcry was be expected to become louder, ‘but we do not think that too much 
importance should be attached to it’.43 
Despite this dismissive view of German protests, measures to prevent 
German anger were increased even further in some areas of Lower Saxony. 
Apart from the complete avoidance of fire and the protection of trees and fences, 
the forces were now also barred from driving across fields and from dropping 
litter which might endanger livestock. They were required to refill any trenches 
and only allowed to use private residences with the owner’s permission. Areas 
of natural beauty were declared out of bounds, pipelines were marked with 
warning signs and six hundred signs were placed on monuments and historical 
places to protect them from damage. In addition, German Resident Officers 
were now appointed to assist the British Resident Officers when assessing 
damage claims and damage prevention. The German Resident Officer was to 
play an important psychological role, as troops had to constantly expect the 
German Resident to pursue avoidable or wilful cases of damage. Germans who 
suffered damage were also to be calmed by the presence of a German 
representative when dealing with foreign troops.  The British authorities also 
considered the German Resident vital in preventing anger from spreading as 
was demonstrated in the case of the Oldenburg Resident, who persuaded the 
local German press not to report on a British tank damaging a war memorial. 
These drastic measures increasingly bore fruit. Apart from Lower Saxony, 
where the subject of damage caused by troops on manoeuvres or training was 
brought into prominence by the protest lodged by the Deputy Minister-President, 
publicity given to British troops in the non-communist press was mainly 
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favourable. One local paper commented prominently on the ‘democratic 
behaviour’ of the British Officer Class, who, on one occasion, entertained the 
German children and served them food.44 The monthly Information Services 
report for August 1953 also highlighted the positive impact on Army initiatives on 
the German press and public opinion. The Lüneburger Landeszeitung issued a 
tribute to British Army Officers for their interest in reducing manoeuvre damage 
despite previously having led the attack on British troops for damage on training 
and manoeuvres. In an article covering a column and a half, the writer 
commended British Officers for the interest which they were now taking in the 
farmlands contained within the manoeuvre areas. Several communities had 
reported the presence of British officers who had made detailed inspections and 
had asked owners of land to explain to them how they intended to use their 
fields this autumn. Coming just before the manoeuvres, these discussions, 
‘which were held in a polite and understanding atmosphere’, were much 
appreciated. They gave cause for hope that the troops involved in the 
manoeuvres would show similar understanding.45 
Foreign Office attempts to minimise German protests over manoeuvre 
damage turned into a regular feature. As September 1954 saw the first full-scale 
NATO manoeuvres to include atomic weapons - exercise ‘Battle Royal’ -, 
manoeuvre damage once more became an issue. Again, some of the British 
reports highlighted that neither adverse reports nor complaints were received 
either from the German officials or from the farmers and ‘the services relations 
with the German population were excellent’.46 Often dealing with local German 
officials took place in a ‘friendly spirit of cooperation and give and take’ 
regardless of the rapidly changing status and independence of the FRG:  
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Whilst they drive as hard a bargain as they know how, they continue to 
show every understanding for our needs, and I have so far observed no 
change in their attitude to us or to any sign of ‘marching time’ pending the 
anticipated change in our mutual status.47  
 
It appears therefore that cooperation between the Services, aided by the 
Residents, and the local German officials was increasingly successful in 
minimising manoeuvre damage throughout this particular period. The overall 
impression which the British Resident reports of 1954 convey, is that in no small 
part due to the various efforts of both units as well as German local officials and 
civilians, relations between the Services and the local population were better 
than ‘they have [been] for a very considerable while’.48 It was evident that, while 
for example the British were taking considerable efforts to minimise manoeuvre 
damage, the German press, partly due to the appreciation of the British 
presence after the failure of the EDC, went to great lengths to explain to the 
population the reason and necessity for certain manoeuvres. According to the 
British Kreis Residents the situation at the end of 1954 was looking rather 
positive. 
Foreign Office initiatives and changes to BAOR behaviour and practices 
initiated in London and Bonn clearly produced at least some local successes. 
The main problem was the fact that the issues at hand required constant and 
continued attention, and improvements did not necessarily prove long-lasting. 
This again highlighted the necessity to continue efforts to change BAOR 
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The ISD View of the Germans 
 
Information Services Officers frequently voiced concern that they had to 
continually go over the same ground in order to keep the friendly Germans from 
being led into defection. Whereas British Information Services in America were 
dealing with individualistic people who liked to form their opinion independently:  
 
in Germany you have a people who are not concerned with the right or 
wrong of a situation but are seeking alibis which will enable them always 
to remain on the right side of the fence.49 
 
It was for this reason that Germans always aimed at being popular with the 
British: 
 
They will agree with you when you talk with them and will curse your guts 
behind your back when they are talking in suitable company.50 
 
The problem according to the ISD was that there was seldom a German 
who was openly Anglophile in German company. It was this characteristic which 
justified the continuing presence of British Information Officers. Although tasks 
performed were largely similar to those performed in other British overseas 
missions, complications arose in Germany from the absence of anything 
resembling a centralised national press.51 Furthermore the special 
characteristics of Germany itself had to be considered, notably that:  
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despite some success in creating personal relationships from which we 
derive advantage, the general attitude has been one of distrust of the 
Allies.52  
 
This attitude was however often mutual as was shown by a remark by the British 
High Commissioner Sir Ivone Kirkpatrick. His view was that it was neither 
possible nor desirable for British policy to satisfy German demands on every 
point ‘and we must accept disappointments and vexation when dealing with a 
people so immature and unstable’.53 
The view of one ISD officer was shared by many among the British 
civilian staff in Germany tasked with the improvement of Anglo-German 
relations:  
 
God knows none of us like the Germans much, but it is necessary at this 
juncture to try and avoid some of the mistakes we made in the time of the 
Weimar Republic.54 
  
There was considerable doubt over the future of Anglo-German relations as well 
as the BAOR’s role in these. It was the perceived dangers of the German 
character, combined with Federal Germany’s independence, which made the 
1955 change in relations so important in the eyes of the Foreign Office and High 
Commission. However, this view needs to be considered in conjunction with the 
experiences made by the British administrative staff on the local levels. 
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The Relations of the British and German Administrations in the Länder  
 
As established in chapter two, the higher echelons of the British administration 
not only viewed the BAOR as problematic, but also had considerable doubts 
about the Germans with whom they were tasked to co-operate in an Anglo-
German as well as Western alliance context. British policy towards Germany 
was positive because it was ‘fatal to be negative about Germany. We are all 
aware of the risks entailed in the present policy, but those in any other would be 
much greater’.55 It has become evident throughout, that British expectations of 
the future of Germany and Anglo-German relations were not necessarily positive 
in 1955. It is however also important to consider the views of those members of 
the British administration working on the Land level with the Germans and the 
BAOR.  
In North Rhine-Westphalia the Services Liaison Section and Information 
Services Division were tasked with bringing British troops and Germans 
together. The suspicion that co-operation between the British and German 
administrations in the British zone was going to be increasingly difficult after 
1955, was confirmed in a Services Liaison Section report of March 1954. This 
paper claimed that, although generally the cooperation between the Land 
government of North Rhine-Westphalia and the Services was good, the 
Germans were deliberately ‘dragging their feet’ in regards to important Service 
requirements such as accommodation and training grounds despite prolonged 
negotiations. Although this could partly be attributed to the upcoming Landtag 
elections in June 1954, a far more important reason was to be found in the fact 
that: 
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they do not want to make decisions now which they might be able to 
avoid making after the Occupation Statute has been repealed.56  
 
The head of Services Liaison Section in North Rhine-Westphalia concluded that 
it was time for a ‘showdown’ to achieve at least some of the most urgent Service 
requirements. This was best done at a time when the Services possessed some 
residual authority rather than later, when British power would be drastically 
reduced.  
By 1955 one of the main problems for the British administration, when 
liaising between the Services and German authorities, was that the Services had 
used the terms ‘priority’ and ‘urgent’ so often that they ceased to mean very 
much to the German authorities. The Germans also could no longer be ‘blinded 
with science’ and frequently called up technical experts to challenge decisions 
made on the advice of Service technicians.57 On a more positive note, from a 
Services Liaison perspective demands for training facilities and manoeuvres had 
been met without any unreasonable protests from the responsible German 
authorities and in day-to-day negotiations between the Services Liaison Section 
staff and the German officials there was the fullest cooperation and good will. ‘It 
is however possible that the Services would not consider that they can endorse 
this opinion.’58 The Services were faced with a large number of urgent problems 
and could not be expected to appreciate all the multitudinous causes of delay in 
the satisfaction of their bids. If the improvement of relations was to be led by 
British officers and the same officers were continuously frustrated in their efforts 
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to fulfil Army requirements by German bureaucracy and reluctance this was 
counter-productive.  
Finally, the decentralisation of power in Germany, for which the Allies had 
been responsible, had effectively hamstrung the Federal Government in its 
attempts to impose its will (and therefore indirectly that of the British) on the 
Länder. German self-government above local levels in the British zone had 
begun with the Land governments in 1946.59 The principle of federalism had 
been enshrined in the Basic Law of the FRG in 1949 as a safeguard against 
excessive central power.60 As a result extensive powers, for example in the 
fields of police and local government, were vested in the states rather than the 
Federal level.61 This factor also applied to the relationship between the Länder 
and the local authorities. The moral therefore was that the British had to 
continue to maintain the best possible relationships with the Federal, the Land 
and the local authorities and get the best they could from all of them.62 The head 
of Services Liaison Section in North Rhine-Westphalia nonetheless concluded 
that, in spite of many difficulties and differences in viewpoint, the Services and 
the Germans had:   
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worked well together. I do not believe that in this land we shall notice an 
immediate change of heart or policy when sovereignty becomes a fact.63  
 
It is noteworthy that, when considering attitudes of British administrative staff 
towards the German people and authorities, rather more positive views were 
prevalent on local levels compared to those on Land and national levels. 
 
 
The Assessment of BAOR Attitudes by British Resident Officers 
 
Despite the often critical view of the behaviour of the Services, there was also 
some praise, particularly on the ‘ground level’. The British Kreis Residents 
regularly provided detailed quarterly reports to the Land Commissioners 
outlining political, economic and social events in their Kreise as well as Anglo-
German relations in general and relations between the Services and Germans in 
particular. These reports provide a useful insight into local views on British 
actions and politics as well as Anglo-German relations. The year of 1954 is 
particularly well-documented and provides a different view of the crucial period 
preceding German sovereignty. The main concerns to Anglo-German relations 
on the local level in Germany during this period were in particular the failure of 
the EDC and widespread German admiration for the British foreign secretary Sir 
Anthony Eden and his successful efforts to reconstruct Western European 
defence thereafter.64 This effort was mentioned in a large number of reports as a 
particular boost to Anglo-German relations on a local level, which consequently 
led to a number of British units to go out of their way to cultivate the improved 
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relations. The Mönchen Gladbach Resident even worried that the trend of 
growing friendship continued:  
 
with quickening tempo, bringing with it the possible danger that over-
enthusiasts, on both sides, may force too quickly a plant which will 
ultimately have to face the cold winds which blow prosaically from the 
Bonn Agreement on Tax treatment of the Forces and their members.65 
 
The overall picture provided by Resident reports certainly did not suggest a lack 
of initiative on both sides - the Services and the civilian population - on local 
levels. The reports also highlighted - at least in some cases - the ‘very 
satisfactory’ nature of contacts between British and German officials due to ‘the 
maintenance of good personal relations’.66 The impression which the Resident 
reports of 1954 conveyed was that, partly due to the British Foreign Secretary 
Anthony Eden’s determination, but also due to unit efforts, relations between the 
Services and the local population were better than they had been for a 
considerable while.67 This assessment, in many respects similar to that of the 
German authorities highlighted in chapter three, was clearly more positive than 
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Foreign Office Assessment of BAOR Attitudes towards Germans after 
1955 
 
Relations were nonetheless still fragile and the gains made could quickly be lost 
again. Particularly in the context of increasing German sovereignty the 
behaviour of the British Services was under continuous scrutiny. A 1956 account 
by the British Embassy highlighted renewed incidents of manoeuvre damage 
and their negative consequences. Troops of the Sixth Armoured division, taking 
part in a night exercise, had passed through a stretch of thirty year old forest 
and destroyed some two thousand trees in the Soltau area. As the trail of 
destruction was only a few yards from completely open ground, the local 
population found it hard to believe that the tank crews were unaware of what 
they were doing and that the damage was not malicious or, to say the least of it, 
carefree. This incident sparked the resentment of the local farmers, which was 
further inflamed by another exercise during the next forty-eight hours. An irate 
deputation of farmers visited the Services Liaison Officer in Soltau on 14 July 
and threatened to lie down in front of the tanks unless the damage was 
restricted.  
Although individual complaints had been common, this was the first 
organised protest from farmers in the area. The press, ‘which has of late been 
on the look-out for incidents involving Allied forces’, naturally took the farmers’ 
part and demanded that the exercise should be stopped. Taken as a whole, the 
damage was not regarded by the Embassy as remarkably heavy, ‘though in 
some places it is said to be rather spectacular’. The Land Government found 
itself releasing statements and ‘objective articles’ to the press in order to aid 
British efforts to prevent the escalation of the problem.68 
In March 1957 a group of fifty Scottish soldiers rampaged through the 
town of Lüneburg, overturning vehicles, smashing windows and beating 
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civilians. The Military Police were unable to prevent this, as they simply were 
‘powerless’.69 ‘The trouble at Lüneburg’ caused an outcry by the German press. 
The developments in Lüneburg were also reported in The Times on 8 August 
1957. According to the article, there had been fifty-three recorded incidents of 
misbehaviour since the beginning of April, as well as an increase in more 
serious offences. The incidents involved a German apprentice hit over the head 
with a brandy bottle, an attack on two German policemen as well as a young girl 
and a woman being molested in a park. ‘A catalogue of these incidents can be 
made to look unpleasant’.70 The inhabitants of the beautiful and quiet town did 
not want visitors frightened away by ‘lurid mental pictures of marauding bands of 
wild British soldiers’. Locals apparently were able to see things in perspective: 
  
but when an aged woman visitor here for the cure is molested by a 
drunken British soldier as happened recently she leaves and tells all her 
friends and the Press and the place begins to get a bad name.71  
 
Despite this local opinion was judged ‘remarkably objective’ and ‘soldiers 
will be soldiers’ was the normal reaction to ‘normal’ misbehaviour – a few 
windows broken, singing in the streets at night and the occasional fight over a 
girl. Of the 3,500 troops in Lüneburg most were from the Welch Regiment, the 
Highland Light Infantry, the 8th Hussars and some Royal Artillery. About ninety 
per cent of all incidents were attributed to alcohol. It was also viewed that ‘the 
existence of a few more or less criminal types who lead others on’ as well as the 
rivalry between Scottish and Welsh regiments were to blame. 
The British Embassy’s report of the Lüneburg disturbances was rather 
gloomy:  
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On March 1 the Welch Regiment celebrated St. David’s Day by breaking 
a lot of windows in the town, and on the following day the Highlands Light 
Infantry were involved in widespread disturbances and clashes with the 
Military Police. 
 
There had been nearly eighty incidents (which was more than the 
German press had claimed) and ‘there were far too many trouble-makers in the 
Lüneburg area’. The German press on this occasion was regarded as ‘very 
reasonable’, praising the discipline of British troops in general and their role in 
the defence of Germany. According to the report, there was no doubt that the 
Lüneburg troubles caused damage throughout the entire area occupied by 
British troops. A recent tour through North Rhine-Westphalia had revealed that 
‘reasonable people, who are more than satisfied with the conduct of British 
troops in their area, are perpetually talking about the Lüneburg affair’. Strong 
disciplinary measures as well as good public relations work would now be 
required to restore confidence in the relations between troops and civilians in 
Lüneburg.72 
In stark contrast to the aforementioned RAF initiative, as well as previous 
Army efforts, the behaviour of some BAOR Army units appeared to deteriorate 
rather than improve, as by 1957 the British administration increasingly found 
itself having to minimise political damage over incidents involving the Services. 
A telegram from the Charge d’Affaires to the Commander-in-Chief from August 
1957 expressed concern at the increasing criticism, directed against the British 
Forces in Germany as well as in the whole German press on account of the 
incidents in Lüneburg. These incidents formed one of the main topics of 
discussion in North Germany at the time. There was a widespread feeling that 
the forces had taken inadequate steps to maintain discipline in the Lüneburg 
area since the New Year, that punishment of the guilty had been too light and 
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that adequate apologies had been lacking. Although much of this criticism was 
‘no doubt unfair and based on inadequate information’, it was liable to affect 
relations between the forces and the local population, ‘and even Anglo-German 
relations in a wider field’.73 The incident did indeed cause severe problems. The 
Niedersachsen Land Government press office reported on two cases of English 
soldiers robbing and assaulting German youths in the town of Lüneburg in 1957. 
As the number of incidents in the area had increased significantly, the local 
Liberal Democratic Party even demanded a complete break of relations between 
the town and the British troops. Particularly the perceived lack of an apology by 
the British officers caused anger.74 
Fear of more widespread misbehaviour was created by further serious 
incidents in a base one hundred miles away from Lüneburg and the Chief of 
Staff at Northern Army Group was concerned ‘that the indiscipline might prove 
catching and had decided to take decisive action to discourage unruly 
elements’.75 The incidents were regarded so seriously that they caused 
discussions between the British Embassy and the Federal Foreign Office as well 
as the involvement of the War Office. The root of the trouble ‘was the rather 
injudicious decision of the War Office to put the H.L.I. alongside the Welch 
regiment’, neither of which were ‘notable for punctilious behaviour’.76 According 
to a FO minute, the Chief of Staff Rhine Army was to send a report on the 
troubles to the Secretary of State for War, the offending Regiment was to be 
withdrawn in a month’s time and the whole future of the Lüneburg Garrison itself 
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was under consideration. Ironically, Rhine Army was most anxious that ‘no hints 
should reach the Germans that we are considering clearing out of Lüneburg’.77 
The measures taken to suppress any further trouble clearly indicated the 






As established throughout this chapter, the Foreign Office assessment of 
the behaviour of the Services was, in contrast to that of the British Residents, at 
times quite negative and a significant effort was considered necessary to 
prevent the Army from destroying those improvements in relations already 
achieved once Germany had regained its status as a sovereign state. Despite 
an overall improvement in Anglo-German relations, when it came to attitudes 
towards Germans in North Rhine-Westphalia in particular, there was apparently 
ample evidence that some members of the Services ‘have got their ideas all 
wrong about being in Germany’.78 Even British Residents frequently mentioned 
instances of this character, in which a British soldier or a British family behaved 
differently from the manner in which they would behave anywhere else. This 
apparently gave Germans ample opportunity to accuse the British of preaching 
democracy and equality without adhering to their own principles. The root of this 
problem, according to the Deputy Land Commissioner of North Rhine 
Westphalia, was that from top to bottom in the Services’ structure one 
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continually came up against the feeling that in dealing with Germany and the 
Germans ordinary considerations did not apply.79 
A Foreign Office minute dated 16 December 1954 still judged the ‘attitude 
of the forces in general and the Army in particular towards the Germans’ as 
unsatisfactory. Apparently there had been remarkably little social contact 
between the forces and the German civilians; and little interest shown in the 
importance of the relationship. Although several attempts had been made to 
improve this situation there had only been local successes. The trouble seemed 
to lie mainly with the Unit Commanders and the senior officers in the smaller 
formations:  
 
and more particularly with their wives who either will not or cannot give 
the necessary lead. Where a lead has been given, however, good results 
have been obtained.80 
 
The minute continued to argue that this situation had been bad enough during 
Military Occupation and had continued to cause difficulties during the last four 
years. Good and constructive relations between the forces and the Germans 
now was of very great importance as very soon the forces would be stationed in 
Germany by agreement with a Sovereign Government, and not by virtue of their 
victories in war.  
Furthermore the Germans themselves were shortly to build up an army of 
their own and should be given the best possible demonstration of how the army 
of a democratic nation should behave. It was therefore desirable to make one 
more effort to try to get the Army to co-operate fully in establishing better and 
more constructive relations with the German population. The ‘fresh situation’ 
created by the imminent end of Occupation was to be a benefit when 
approaching the Army. For example Officers of the information and cultural 
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relations divisions in Germany who were stationed near military installations and 
barracks were to be used to help Unit Commanders. The British ambassador Sir 
Frederick Hoyer-Millar had discussed this issue recently with the BAOR’s 
Commander-in-Chief General Gale, who apparently was very keen on doing 
what he could to encourage contacts. However, Hoyer-Millar himself apparently 
was ‘not too unhappy about the present situation; there are quite a lot of 
contacts, he says’.81 
Since 1945 relations between the Services and the (Foreign Office-led) 
Control Commission in Germany had generally been poor and it may be that the 
widespread criticism of Army officers in Germany by Foreign Office staff partly 
has to be seen in this light. It is evident that the Foreign Office considered that 
all major efforts undertaken by the civilian administration to bring British soldiers 
and German civilians closer together stood and fell with the attitude of local Unit 
Commanders. There were frequent complaints by local liaison officers that 
Service personnel behaved in an utterly unacceptable manner towards 
Germans. According to the Information Services Department this situation did 
not improve after 1955 and it appears that the Foreign Office increasingly grew 
tired of attempting to improve the situation. An Information Services Division 
memorandum from 1956 drew the rather frustrated conclusion that ‘our men 
simply do not like Germans’.82 The paper furthermore considered it best if the 
host country itself, for instance through mayors, took more initiative. Frustration 
with the German attitudes was equally still as strong as it had been prior to 
1955. Also if the Germans were to make more efforts it would be better to do so: 
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in a manner less ponderously formal than Germans usually employ, so 
much the better from the point of view of ready response.83  
 
A resigned and frustrated ISD therefore put the blame on a continued 
lack of improvement on both sides. The memorandum claimed that a good many 
Germans did not like the British either and that it was doubtful whether a 
completely satisfactory solution could ever be achieved within the foreseeable 
future. Despite this resignation Foreign Office fears of a deterioration of Anglo-
German relations due to German independence and rearmament did not 
materialise. Regardless of some ‘disquieting signs of a resurgence of Nazism’84 
in 1953, the Neo-Nazis fared disastrously at the 1953 elections, ‘a reverse from 
which they have never since recovered’.85 
In the meantime the Foreign Office often found itself attempting to 
prevent a spread of potentially negative publicity not only in Germany but also 
abroad. One example of this was the case of four young Commonwealth 
journalists who had toured the British Service installations and troops in 
Germany. Apparently in a conversation with the British Ambassador the 
journalists had become very critical of the apparent relationship between the 
Services and the local German population. There were of course many 
arguments which the Services would be quick to bring out, like the intensity of 
their training, the fact they had little spare time, they were often far away from 
centres of population, had little incentive to learn German, little or no money for 
activities of this kind, to name only a few.86 But the Services in Germany were in 
a very special position: 
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They are the only British troops stationed in any numbers in an Allied 
country and I wonder whether any special thought has ever been given to 
the problem this presents.87 
 
The Information Service Division’s reply to this statement remarked that the 
problem of fostering contacts between the British Forces in Germany and the 
German population was an old one and that various measures had been tried in 
the past, including edicts sent out to the BAOR from the War Office. These 
apparently had very little effect since the whole question depended upon the 
frame of mind and degree of energy on the part of the British local commanders 
concerned. In the circumstances it was difficult to make any really constructive 
suggestions and perhaps the main hope lay in the formation of German military 
units, who may then find it easier to get on with their British counterparts: 
  
In short, we have no particularly bright ideas. But I do agree with you that 
it is a problem which should continually be borne in mind, and I should be 
grateful if you would report from time to time how things are 
progressing.88 
 
By 1956 it was therefore evident that the ISD had run out of ideas and 
motivation to deal with a problem that was essentially considered unsolvable. 
After eight years of efforts to change BAOR attitudes and some local successes, 
the main problem still appeared to be the attitudes of unit commanders and 
high-ranking officers in small units. The British civilian administration had 
introduced drastic changes to the ways in which the Army behaved in Germany 
when considering accommodation and training, but the behaviour and attitude of 
individual officers and soldiers was more difficult to influence and, although there 
was no widespread anti-British unrest caused by the BAOR in Germany, from a 
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Foreign Office perspective the idea of using the BAOR as an asset for Anglo-




Chapter Seven: Conclusion 
 
 
Relations between the Services in Germany and the German population 
have always been a problem. I believe that from time to time the Service 
Ministries issue special instructions encouraging the forces to take more 
notice of the Germans in their areas, and senior officers stationed in 
Germany do their best. But it is at the ordinary level that relations still 
remain almost non-existent.1 
 
This comment by a British Information Services official from 1956 aptly 
summarised some of the existing problems in relations between the Services 
and the Germans as well as pointing towards some of the continuous efforts 
made in London and Bonn to foster contacts between Britons and Germans. 
However, this thesis has uncovered evidence showing that ‘non-existent’ was 
not always the correct term for relations between the Services and Germans. As 
the previous chapters have demonstrated, some very real problems caused by 
the presence of British troops in Germany at times posed a threat to Anglo-
German relations, which were dominated both by the German defeat in World 
War Two and the heightened Cold War tensions. As highlighted in chapter two 
of this thesis the growing Cold War threat led to a continuous increase in the 
size of the British troop commitment during the period in question. This provided 
further opportunities for contacts with the German population but also created 
the potential for greater friction at a time when London regarded the German 
integration into the Western system of defence as crucial.  
Many of the British decision makers in London and Bonn had first-hand 
experience of two conflicts caused by German aggression. It was the 
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combination of the Soviet threat and the fear of a revival of German nationalism 
which fuelled the London administration’s desire to transform the BAOR. Despite 
both the Labour and Conservative administration’s reluctance to take part in the 
process of European integration, the BAOR and its relations with the German 




The Impact of British Public Opinion on BAOR Relations with the Germans 
 
Whereas official British policy aimed at integrating Germany into the Western 
defence system and rearming the Federal Republic in the context of NATO, 
British public opinion was somewhat reluctant to adapt to this situation. As has 
been established in chapter three, much of British opinion as expressed in the 
popular press and, to an extent, non-fictional literature still very much associated 
Germany with the threat of a revival of nationalism throughout the period in 
question. In particular, the conservative popular press ceaselessly produced 
vitriolic anti-German views and, rather than addressing the changing relationship 
between Britain and Germany in the Cold War context, popular entertainment 
mainly focused on British victories in the Second World War. The swift economic 
revival of Germany also added to the resentment of the former enemy.  
Despite these fears and resentments there was nonetheless a slow but 
important change in attitudes. This thesis has shown that non-fictional literature 
on the subject of Germany was far from unanimously anti-German, even if partly 
due to interference from the Foreign Office. In addition, a closer inspection of 
press articles of even the most hostile papers such as the Daily Express reveals 
at least a degree of normalisation in relations through factual reporting. The 
image of Germany portrayed outside the popular press was often surprisingly 
positive. Although war films and novels generally celebrated British courage in 
the Second World War, they either did not portray Germans at all, or 
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characterised them not as goose-stepping Nazis, but increasingly as ordinary 
and even decent people who were fighting on the wrong side of the war.  
In post-war Britain, many individual views of Germany were also shaped 
by personal experiences unrelated to the recent conflict. Contacts on individual 
levels between Britons and Germans were fostered through non-governmental 
organisations and, for example, the twinning of towns. To argue that these 
changes affected large parts of the British population would of course be wrong. 
For the most part these efforts were initiated by the politicised sections of the 
population. But to simply assume that all British Servicemen despatched to 
Germany would have held anti-German views because of the recent conflict and 
a negative portrayal of Germany in Britain would also be too simplistic. Although 
some of the testimony of Servicemen pointed towards a general antipathy 
towards all things German, evidence has also shown that a number of young 
conscripts were in fact rather keen on meeting Germans and exploring the 
country in which they were stationed. As shown in chapter three, the impact of 
British public opinion of the Germans was therefore not an entirely negative 
factor when considering relations between the BAOR and the Germans. The 
slow changes in the public perception of Germany established in this thesis 
arguably strengthened Foreign Office plans to use the BAOR as a tool to 
improve relations between the Services and the German population. 
 
 
‘Out with the English’? German Perceptions of the BAOR 
 
As chapter four has demonstrated, the German people living under the 
Occupation had just as diverse views of the British as the British had of them. In 
the immediate post-war period economic reasons compelled many Germans to 
ingratiate themselves with their occupiers. However, during the period in 
question this slowly changed with the advent of the ‘economic miracle’. There is 
nonetheless much evidence to support the idea that significant parts of the 
German population were genuinely willing to establish good relations with the 
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Services, despite the recent conflict and a widespread antipathy towards the 
military in general. This was partly due to the Cold War threat but also due to an 
admiration of British values and way of life. The behaviour of the BAOR did not 
lead to widespread protest against the stationing of British troops in Germany in 
the context of the European defence system or against the financial support of 
the Services. As polls revealed, the British were generally considered to be the 
best-behaved of all the Occupation troops. Units on manoeuvre were often 
greeted with friendly curiosity. Despite the considerable economic strain caused 
by the presence of the BAOR on a country in the process of rebuilding itself, the 
majority of German protests aimed at changing the conditions of Occupation, not 
at abolishing it. 
This should not however distract from the fact that there was also 
hostility. German wartime experiences often gave rise to resentment of 
militarism in general, particularly among the younger generations. The human 
losses of the war frequently led to individual Servicemen experiencing negative 
German attitudes. Furthermore, throughout the period under observation in this 
thesis, German demands in regards to Allied rights and troop behaviour rose 
with the degree of independence of the Federal Republic. This was arguably 
reflected by a decrease in the popularity of the Services in opinion polls during 
the period in question.  
The Germans placed the BAOR in a very difficult position. On the one 
hand, the German population demanded adequate protection from a potential 
Soviet attack rather than an orderly retreat beyond the Rhine. Despite the 
hopelessness which the potential conflict with Russia caused in many ordinary 
Germans encountered by the Services, any suggestion of troop reductions or a 
partial withdrawal was met with outrage. On the other hand, there were 
increasing complaints about the consequences of the British troop presence, be 
it the requisitioning of housing, manoeuvre damage or incidents caused by 
individual soldiers. The German press was generally keen to report negative 
incidents involving British troops and these quickly spread from local to national 
levels. Particularly the communist press used every opportunity to discredit the 
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Allied military presence at a time when the KPD was a concern for both the 
Federal Government and the British Foreign Office. It was arguably only drastic 
changes in the behaviour and attitudes of troops, as well as co-operation of the 
BAOR with German authorities, which prevented widespread hostility among the 
German population. These fundamental changes in BAOR attitudes and 
behaviour were, however, not always initiated by the Army itself.  
The idea of strengthening cultural ties by intensifying relations with British 
troops was also taken up by the German government, if somewhat less 
enthusiastically and, as the case of the guidebook for Allied soldiers printed in 
German in 1956 demonstrated, also less successfully. As shown in chapter four 
the much lower levels of crime in the British zone partly explain the lack of 
interest apparent among the Federal administration to fund measures designed 
to improve relations with the British. Statistics produced by the German 
administrations on Federal and Land levels continuously highlighted the 
difference in behaviour between the BAOR and its French and American 
counterparts. The German Land administrations in the British zone also often 
found that British behaviour compared favourably to that of Canadian troops. As 
has been demonstrated, in several cases Federal requests for crime statistics 
were ignored by Land authorities as the situation was regarded as satisfactory. 
In the context of an increasing political focus on the EEC, the economic revival 
and political stability of the FRG as well as the combined experiences with all 
Allied occupying armies, the perception of the BAOR as a threat to Anglo-
German relations arguably ceased to be a major factor for the Bonn 
administration by the mid-1950s. Nonetheless, the British Foreign Office 
continued to make efforts on all administrative levels to further improve relations 








The Foreign Office and the BAOR  
 
Due to the British fears of a German flirtation with the Soviet Union in order to 
achieve German unification and the aim of integrating the Federal Republic into 
the Western family, the Foreign Office went to great lengths in order to utilise the 
BAOR as a tool for Anglo-German rapprochement.2 Germany had allied itself 
with the Soviet Union both in 1922 and 1939 and the German integration into the 
anti-communist defence of Europe was crucial for the preservation of British 
influence in Western Europe.3 British diplomats carefully watched out for any 
anti-Western tendencies and the view of the prospects of democracy in 
Germany held by Foreign Office staff was often dim. The British placed their 
faith increasingly in the person of Konrad Adenauer and it was partly this 
support and the question of German politics in a post-Adenauer era which 
necessitated the exploration of all avenues to improve Anglo-German relations: 
‘The struggle for Germany will not only be with the Russians; it will be with the 
Germans themselves.’4 Throughout the period examined, a wide range of efforts 
was initiated by the Foreign Office in order to strengthen what the British High 
Commissioner Hoyer-Millar in 1956 referred to as the ‘easy and cordial’ relations 
with the Federal Republic.5 The BAOR was to be used as a tool to develop a 
‘sense of community’ between the Western Allies and remind the Germans ‘that 
there are other problems in the world besides German reunification’.6  
The Foreign Office in London and the High Commission in Bonn went to 
great lengths to achieve an improvement by initiating numerous programmes 
aimed at eradicating German grievances. Shared housing schemes for troops 
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and civilians in times of great shortages were signs of good-will introduced by 
the British administration and, more or less reluctantly, carried out by the BAOR. 
The minimisation of manoeuvre damage, establishment of friendly press 
relations, organisation of cultural and sports events and the severe curtailment 
of customs such as hunting by British troops were enforced. 
 There is much evidence that at least some British units (albeit RAF 
rather than Army units) successfully planned and executed sophisticated 
initiatives to improve relations with local communities. However, despite the 
efforts of the Information Services Division, which essentially acted as a public 
relations agency for the BAOR, the Foreign Office had, by the end of 1957, 
essentially given up on the idea of the BAOR as a goodwill ambassador of Great 
Britain: 
 
I doubt whether we shall ever arrive at a completely satisfactory solution 
– at any rate, within the foreseeable future.7 
 
In fact, rather than hoping for better relations between soldiers and civilians, by 
1957 the best chance was that ‘things may improve when there are German 
forces alongside our own’.8 It was continued pessimism in regards to the future 
of Germany and resignation as to the value of the BAOR which characterised 
the Foreign Office attitude in 1957. Both German as well as British policy 
makers were therefore inclined to give up on the idea of utilising the BAOR, 
albeit for different reasons. 
 It would however be wrong to deem the efforts of the Foreign Office to 
improve relations between troops and Germans a failure. In fact they most likely 
prevented a significant deterioration of Anglo-German relations by forcing a 
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change of attitude and preventing the spread of some of the worst behaviour of 
British troops in the Federal Republic. Overall, the close study of German 
reactions to the continued British Occupation has demonstrated that, although 
by and large the majority of Germans were willing to accept foreign troops as a 
necessary evil, the behaviour of soldiers was heavily scrutinised by the German 
press and frequently used as tools for anti-Western propaganda. As noted, 
however, levels of crime committed by the British Services were far lower than 
those of the other occupying powers and only few incidents, such as the 
Lüneburg case of 1957, gained notoriety on a national level. Despite German 
press criticism of Army attitudes when handling the crisis, the British civilian 
administration successfully prevented further escalation. It is also important to 
note that, although the view from the Foreign Office in London of the future of 
German nationalism and the value of the BAOR as a tool for improving relations 
may have been pessimistic, the co-operation between the British and German 
administrations on the Land and Kreis levels was rather more promising. 
Chapter six has demonstrated that dealing with local German officials often took 
place in a spirit of give and take regardless of the rapidly changing status and 
independence of the FRG. 
 
 
The BAOR and the Germans – From Enemies to Partners?  
 
When considering the suitability of the BAOR as a tool for a rapprochement 
between Britons and Germans, there were several obstacles which were difficult 
to overcome. Arguably it was not necessarily British attitudes which stood in the 
way of relations but the nature of ‘visiting forces’ in itself. As demonstrated in 
chapter five, British garrisons were ‘by nature self-contained, geographically 
separated and an unnatural intrusion’.9 Units often had very busy training 
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schedules and also suffered from staff shortages. Consequently the focus on 
relations with locals was often not a high priority when running an army lacking 
both in equipment and manpower as a first-line defence against communism. 
Whereas those officers in charge of organizing community relations with 
Germans were often far too busy, ordinary ranks were often somewhat reluctant 
to establish contacts themselves. The language barrier was a major problem 
and records show that Britons were not particularly keen to learn German. As a 
consequence often the only contacts between Britons and Germans were 
between large groups of young British Servicemen and Germans in local bars. 
This repeatedly led to mass-brawls and hostility. 
 Army records on relations with Germans are scarce but Regimental 
Magazines clearly show a slow change in attitudes away from an occupation 
power towards an army of protection. Marriages to German women were less 
frowned upon and holiday visits to Germany were advertised frequently. Also 
German customs increasingly featured in magazines. Despite the apathy of 
many Britons, successful attempts were made by troops to improve relations. In 
the beginning these generally involved entertaining German children and sports 
events. Sports events in particular were a successful means of Anglo-German 
rapprochement as often the Services had to rely on German facilities and land to 
practice certain sports. This forced even the more reluctant units to develop 
contacts. Often these contacts were then picked up on by the local press 
featuring as positive examples for Anglo-German relations. The fact that in 
amateur and informal sports the recent history arguably did not matter very 
much and the effort of individuals on an equal playing field counted for more 
than national matters, made sports an ideal area for improving relations. 
Language barriers also counted for less here. Contacts were also often 
improved by the arrival of British wives and children, despite the increased 
pressure on the housing situation in Germany and despite FO concerns over the 
attitude of officers’ wives.  
Considering attitudes towards Germans by British officers, regular 
soldiers and National Servicemen, it appears that particularly junior officers were 
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often unwilling to approach Germans. As chapter five has demonstrated, regular 
soldiers also often proved reluctant, whereas National Servicemen often were 
more outgoing. Just as the view of the British public established in chapter three, 
the views of the British soldier, forged in the crucible of war and its aftermath, 
were nuanced. They were sometimes hostile, sometimes indifferent, generally 
reluctant, but by no means an immovable obstacle that stood between the FO 
and the German population. 
 
 
The Impact of the BAOR on Anglo-German Relations 
 
Throughout the period in question the British administration was concerned over 
the potential damage the presence of the BAOR could do to the West German 
integration into the Western alliance system. London was also hopeful the 
Services could be used to further Anglo-German relations. It is important to note 
that, despite all the problems caused by the Services, the presence of nearly 
80,000 British troops in Germany shortly after the Second World War did not 
lead to a deterioration of relations. Despite a generally reluctant Army, the 
transformation from an army of occupation to a protecting force was surprisingly 
successful so soon after the war. The necessary measures for this 
transformation were not initiated by the Army but, by and large, were enforced 
by the Services. What is most remarkable is the extent to which the BAOR was 
required to change in order to facilitate Anglo-German understanding. As 
demonstrated in chapter six, it was the wide range of efforts taken, ranging from 
housing initiatives to avoidance of manoeuvre damage, which highlighted the 
extent of change. This in itself was remarkable only ten years after the war. The 
BAOR of 1957 was very different than that of 1948. Troops went to great lengths 
to avoid manoeuvre damage and in some cases shared their accommodation 
with Germans. Property was derequisitioned and the often luxurious conditions 
for British officers slowly changed. The Army leadership was clearly willing to co-
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operate with the civilian administration in order to adapt to the changing Anglo-
German relations. 
 However, the value of the BAOR as a tool for improving Anglo-German 
relations was limited. In spite of some successful efforts at unit levels progress 
was slow. In the more individual contexts anti-German sentiment still often 
prevented closer relations. Despite a change in the portrayal of Germany in 
Britain and concerted efforts at all levels of the British administration, it appears 
the average British ‘squaddie’ simply refused to fulfil the diplomatic hopes 
placed in the BAOR. The success of the efforts to utilise the BAOR therefore lay 
not within a marked improvement of relations during the period in question, but 
rather in preventing deterioration at a crucial time in both Anglo-German 
relations as well as the re-emergence of the Federal Republic as a sovereign 
state. If the BAOR’s impact on Anglo-German relations was limited, the same is 
equally true for the European dimension of the subject of this thesis. The issues 
addressed here tended to take place in a localised and self-contained context 
rather than impact on the wider issues of Western defence against communism. 
 As is evident with hindsight, British fears of a resurgent German 
nationalism proved unfounded. Doubts were certainly understandable during the 
period in question here. However, despite the integration of the Federal 
Republic into NATO and the EEC, British demands for using the BAOR to 
influence Germany did not disappear. As late as 1968 British observers still 
drew attention to the need for the BAOR to improve relations with the German 
public in order to restrain German politics in case of a resurgence of nationalism. 
The defence correspondent of The Times remarked in April of that year that the 
BAOR’s role was that of an ‘intensely political army’ which had to: 
  
continue cultivating the best possible relations with German military, 
official and civilian circles alike in the hopes that its relationship deter or 
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at least defuse any rise in anti-British feeling which could readily occur 
under a more nationalist government.10 
 
Although the success of using the BAOR as a tool for Anglo-German 
rapprochement during the 1940s and 1950s varied, with some successes and 
some shortcomings, the idea of using the BAOR as a political tool clearly 




                                                             
10 Charles Douglas-Home, ‘Rhine Army’s relations with the German people’, The 
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